



Temporary Protected Status: Calendar Year 2022 Annual Report

Report to Congress



Homeland
Security

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services



**Homeland
Security**

April 4, 2023

Foreword

I am pleased to present the following “Temporary Protected Status: Calendar Year 2022 Annual Report,” which was prepared by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

Pursuant to statutory requirements, this report is provided to the following Members of Congress:

The Honorable Jim Jordan
Chairman, House Committee on the Judiciary

The Honorable Jerrold Nadler
Ranking Member, House Committee on the Judiciary

The Honorable Richard Durbin
Chairman, Senate Committee on the Judiciary

The Honorable Lindsey Graham
Ranking Member, Senate Committee on the Judiciary

Inquiries relating to this report may be directed to me at (202) 447-5890.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Zephra Buetow".

Zephra Buetow
Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs

Executive Summary

Under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), 8 U.S.C. § 1254a, the Secretary of Homeland Security (Secretary) may designate a foreign state (or part thereof) for Temporary Protected Status (TPS) after consulting with appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government. The Secretary may then grant TPS to eligible nationals of that foreign state or eligible noncitizens having no nationality who last habitually resided in that state. Section 244(b)(1) of the INA provides the circumstances and criteria under which the Secretary may exercise his or her discretion to designate a foreign state for TPS.¹ In accordance with section 244(i)(1) of the INA, the Secretary submits this annual report to Congress on the operation of section 244 (the TPS statute) during the previous calendar year.

At the close of Calendar Year (CY) 2022, there were approximately 654,418 TPS beneficiaries.

During CY 2022, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced the following TPS actions:

- On March 3, 2022, DHS announced via *Federal Register* notice (FRN) the extension of the TPS designation for South Sudan and the redesignation of South Sudan for 18 months, effective May 3, 2022, through November 3, 2023.²

¹ Section 244(b)(1) of the INA provides:

The [Secretary of Homeland Security], after consultation with appropriate agencies of the Government, may designate any foreign state (or any part of such foreign state) under this subsection only if--

(A) the [Secretary] finds that there is an ongoing armed conflict within the state and, due to such conflict, requiring the return of aliens who are nationals of that state to that state (or to the part of the state) would pose a serious threat to their personal safety;

(B) the [Secretary] finds that--

(i) there has been an earthquake, flood, drought, epidemic, or other environmental disaster in the state resulting in a substantial, but temporary, disruption of living conditions in the area affected,

(ii) the foreign state is unable, temporarily, to handle adequately the return to the state of aliens who are nationals of the state, and

(iii) the foreign state officially has requested designation under this subparagraph; or

(C) the [Secretary] finds that there exist extraordinary and temporary conditions in the foreign state that prevent aliens who are nationals of the state from returning to the state in safety, unless the [Secretary] finds that permitting the aliens to remain temporarily in the United States is contrary to the national interest of the United States.

A designation of a foreign state (or part of such foreign state) under this paragraph shall not become effective unless notice of the designation (including a statement of the findings under this paragraph and the effective date of the designation) is published in the *Federal Register*. In such notice, the [Secretary] shall also state an estimate of the number of nationals of the foreign state designated who are (or within the effective period of the designation are likely to become) eligible for temporary protected status under this section and their immigration status in the United States.

² See 87 FR 12190 (March 3, 2022) (18-month extension of South Sudan's TPS designation through November 3, 2023, and redesignation of South Sudan for TPS through November 3, 2023).

- On April 19, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the designation of Sudan for TPS, effective April 19, 2022, through October 19, 2023.³
- On April 19, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the designation of Ukraine for TPS, effective April 19, 2022, through October 19, 2022.⁴
- On May 20, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the designation of Afghanistan for TPS, effective May 20, 2022, through November 20, 2023.⁵
- On June 7, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the TPS designation for Cameroon for 18 months, effective June 7, 2022, through December 7, 2023.⁶
- On August 1, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the extension of the TPS designation for Syria and the redesignation of Syria for 18 months, effective October 1, 2022, through March 31, 2024.⁷
- On September 8, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the extension of the TPS designation for Venezuela for 18 months, effective September 10, 2022, through March 10, 2024.⁸
- On September 27, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the extension of the TPS designation for Burma and the redesignation of Burma for 18 months, effective November 26, 2022, through May 25, 2024.⁹
- On December 5, 2022, DHS publicly announced that Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas had decided to extend the TPS designation of Haiti and redesignate Haiti for TPS, to be effective February 4, 2023, through August 3, 2024. The FRN announcing this decision published on January 26, 2023.¹⁰
- On December 12, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the designation of Ethiopia for TPS, effective December 12, 2022, through June 12, 2024.¹¹
- On December 30, 2022, DHS publicly announced that Secretary Mayorkas had decided to extend the TPS designation of Yemen and redesignate Yemen for TPS, to be effective March 4, 2023, through September 3, 2024. The FRN announcing this decision published on January 3, 2023.¹²

In addition to the actions listed above, although the Secretary did not announce any new TPS actions regarding Somalia, in CY 2022, Somalia's 18-month designation continued through the year, and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) continued to process applications related to the TPS program for this country.

³ See 87 FR 23202 (April 19, 2022) (18-month designation of Sudan for TPS through October 19, 2023).

⁴ See 87 FR 23211 (April 19, 2022) (18-month designation of Ukraine for TPS through October 19, 2023).

⁵ See 87 FR 30976 (May 20, 2022) (18-month designation of Afghanistan for TPS through November 20, 2023).

⁶ See 87 FR 34706 (June 7, 2022) (18-month designation of Cameroon for TPS through December 7, 2023).

⁷ See 87 FR 46982 (August 1, 2022) (18-month extension of Syria's TPS designation and redesignation through March 31, 2023).

⁸ See 87 FR 55024 (September 8, 2022) (18-month extension of Venezuela's TPS designation through March 10, 2024).

⁹ See 87 FR 58515 (September 27, 2022) (18-month extension of Burma's TPS designation and redesignation through May 25, 2024).

¹⁰ See 88 FR 5022 (January 26, 2023) (18-month extension of Haiti's TPS designation and redesignation through August 3, 2024).

¹¹ See 87 FR 76074 (December 12, 2022, 2022) (18-month designation of Ethiopia for TPS through June 12, 2024).

¹² See 88 FR 94 (January 3, 2023) (18-month extension of Yemen's TPS designation and redesignation through September 3, 2024).

During CY 2022, DHS also announced actions to ensure its continued compliance with the preliminary injunction order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in *Ramos, et al. v. Nielsen, et al.*, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. October 3, 2018) (“*Ramos*”) and with the order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to stay proceedings in *Bhattarai v. Nielsen*, No. 19-cv-00731 (N.D. Cal. March 12, 2019) (“*Bhattarai*”).¹³ Specifically, on November 16, 2022, DHS published a *Federal Register* notice announcing the continuation of TPS and TPS-related documentation through June 30, 2024, for eligible, affected TPS beneficiaries from the six countries whose TPS designations are the subject of one or more of the three lawsuits noted above: El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan.¹⁴ DHS will continue to ensure its compliance with all relevant court orders if it remains necessary after that date.

¹³ Although a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the *Ramos* preliminary injunction on September 14, 2020, the plaintiffs have requested *en banc* review of the panel’s decision, and litigation is continuing. See *Ramos, et al., v. Wolf, et al.*, No. 18-16981(9th Cir., Sept. 14, 2020). The district court’s preliminary injunction remained in effect throughout CY 2022, as did the *Bhattarai* order.

¹⁴ See 87 FR 68717 (November 16, 2022) (continued compliance with the preliminary injunction order in *Ramos*, as well as orders in *Bhattarai*).



Temporary Protected Status: Calendar Year 2022
Annual Report

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I. Legislative Requirement

Section 244(i) of the *Immigration and Nationality Act* (INA) (8 U.S.C. § 1254a(i) provides:

(i) Annual Report and Review. -

(1) Annual report. - Not later than March 1 of each year (beginning with 1992), the [Secretary of Homeland Security], after consultation with the appropriate agencies of the Government, shall submit a report to the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives and of the Senate on the operation of this section during the previous year. Each report shall include—

(A) a listing of the foreign states or parts thereof designated under this section,

(B) the number of nationals of each such state who have been granted temporary protected status under this section and their immigration status before being granted such status, and

(C) an explanation of the reasons why foreign states or parts thereof were designated under subsection (b)(1) and, with respect to foreign states or parts thereof previously designated, why the designation was terminated or extended under subsection (b)(3).

(2) Committee report. - No later than 180 days after the date of receipt of such a report, the Committee on the Judiciary of each House of Congress shall report to its respective House such oversight findings and legislation as it deems appropriate.

II. Background

Section 244(b)(1) of the INA provides the Secretary with the authority to designate a foreign state, or any part of such state, for TPS upon finding, among other things, that such state is experiencing ongoing armed conflict, an environmental disaster, or other extraordinary and temporary conditions. (See Executive Summary, fn. 1, for specific statutory requirements for each type of designation.) The Secretary may grant TPS to an eligible national of the designated foreign state (or to an eligible noncitizen having no nationality who last habitually resided in such state) who, as described in section 244(c)(1)(A) of the INA and implementing regulations in 8 C.F.R. § 244.2:

- Has been continuously physically present in the United States since the effective date of the most recent designation of the state as published in the *Federal Register* notice for the country designation;
- Has continuously resided in the United States since a date determined by the Secretary and published in the *Federal Register* notice;
- Is admissible as an immigrant except as otherwise provided under section 244(c)(2)(A) of the INA;
- Is not ineligible for TPS under section 244(c)(2)(B) of the INA; and
- Registers during an initial registration period of not less than 180 days, as announced by public notice in the *Federal Register*, or the applicant meets late initial registration criteria during any subsequent extension of TPS designation pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 244.2(f)(2).

During the period for which the Secretary designated a foreign state for TPS, registered TPS beneficiaries are eligible to remain in the United States, cannot be removed, and are authorized to work, so long as their TPS was not withdrawn for individual ineligibility. They may also be granted authorization to travel abroad temporarily with prior consent of the Secretary. See INA §§ 244(a)(1), 244(a)(2), and 244(f)(3).

Granting TPS itself does not lead to lawful permanent resident status. When the Secretary terminates a foreign state's TPS designation, beneficiaries return to the same immigration status they possessed prior to gaining TPS (unless that status expired or was terminated) or to any other status they obtained while registered for TPS. Beneficiaries who had no lawful status before obtaining TPS and who have not obtained any other lawful status after TPS return to unlawful status when the TPS designation ends.

III. Data Report

Section 3.1 Foreign States with TPS Designations in Calendar Year (CY) 2022

The following table reflects all foreign states that held a TPS designation in CY 2022. The table shows the most recent effective dates of each designation and/or extension or termination, and the expiration date for each foreign state's TPS designation as of December 31, 2022. As of the end of CY 2022, litigation regarding termination of the TPS designations for El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras,

Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan is ongoing.¹⁵ The TPS designations for these countries continue as of the end of CY 2022 based on preliminary injunctions and related court orders in the cases.¹⁶

Country	Last Action (as of 12/31/22)	Expiration (as of 12/31/22)	Federal Register Notice
Afghanistan	18-month designation	November 20, 2023	87 FR 30976 (May 20, 2022)
Burma	18-month extension and redesignation	May 25, 2024	87 FRN 58515 (September 27, 2022)
Cameroon	18-month designation	December 7, 2023	87 FR 34706 (June 7, 2022)
El Salvador	compliance with the <i>Ramos</i> preliminary injunction order	pending further resolution of litigation	87 FR 68717 (November 16, 2022)
Ethiopia	18-month initial designation	June 12, 2024	87 FR 76074
Haiti	18-month extension and redesignation	August 3, 2024	88 FR 5022 (January 26, 2023)
	compliance with the preliminary injunction orders in <i>Ramos</i>	pending further resolution of litigation	87 FR 68717 (November 16, 2022)
Honduras	compliance with the order staying proceedings in <i>Bhattarai</i>	pending further resolution of litigation	87 FR 68717 (November 16, 2022)
Nepal	compliance with the order staying proceedings in <i>Bhattarai</i>	pending further resolution of litigation	87 FR 68717 (November 16, 2022)
Nicaragua	compliance with the <i>Ramos</i> preliminary injunction order	pending further resolution of litigation	87 FR 68717 (November 16, 2022)
Somalia	18-month extension and redesignation	March 17, 2023	86 FR 38744 (July 22, 2021)
South Sudan	18-month extension and redesignation	November 3, 2023	87 FR 12190 (March 3, 2022)
Sudan	18-month designation	October 19, 2023	87 FR 23202 (April 19, 2022)
	compliance with the <i>Ramos</i> preliminary injunction order	pending further resolution of litigation	87 FR 68717 (November 16, 2022)

¹⁵ See, e.g., *Ramos, et al. v. Nielsen, et al.*, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. March 12, 2018), *on appeal Ramos, et al., v. Wolf, et al.*, No. 18-16981(9th Cir., Sept. 14, 2020) (“*Ramos*”); *Saget, et al., v. Trump, et al.*, No. 18-cv-1599 (E.D.N.Y. May 31, 2018) (“*Saget*”); and *Bhattarai v. Nielsen*, No. 19-cv-00731 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 10, 2019) (“*Bhattarai*”).

¹⁶ Haiti and Sudan were newly designated for TPS, and designations also continue for these countries pursuant to the most recently published FRNs for each, respectively at 88 FR 5022 and 87 FR 68717.

Country	Last Action (as of 12/31/22)	Expiration (as of 12/31/22)	Federal Register Notice
Syria	18-month extension and redesignation	March 31, 2024	87 FR 46982 (August 1, 2022)
Ukraine	18-month designation	October 19, 2023	87 FR 23211 (April 19, 2022)
Venezuela	18-month extension	March 10, 2024	87 FR 55024 (September 8, 2022)
Yemen	18-month extension and redesignation	September 3, 2024	88 FR 94 (January 3, 2023)

Section 3.2 Number and Prior Immigration Status of TPS Beneficiaries During CY 2022

The following table reflects the number of TPS beneficiaries under each designated foreign state at the close of CY 2022.¹⁷

Country	Total
Afghanistan	578
Burma	1,291
Cameroon	1,129
El Salvador	239,139
Ethiopia	0 ¹⁸
Haiti	110,638
Honduras	75,803
Nepal	14,477
Nicaragua	4,163
Somalia	425
South Sudan	102
Sudan	1,082
Syria	6,424
Ukraine	14,647
Venezuela	182,579
Yemen	1,941
Total	654,418

¹⁷ Data may differ from prior reports due to annual fluctuations in the number of beneficiaries and to steps taken to improve data accuracy.

¹⁸ Registration for TPS under Ethiopia's designation opened on December 12, 2022. As of December 31, 2022, USCIS had not yet approved any applications under the designation.

The following tables reflect the self-reported prior immigration status of noncitizens with TPS at the close of CY 2022.¹⁹ Noncitizens who entered without inspection; who were stowaways; as well as others with no immigration status, may not recall their immigration status,²⁰ or who had applications/petitions for status denied prior to obtaining TPS, are also listed in the table. Appendix A provides the description of each status abbreviations in the first column of the table. Under INA § 244(a)(5), a noncitizen may continue to maintain his or her prior immigration status while holding TPS, provided he or she maintains eligibility for the prior immigration status.

Table No. 1: Afghanistan, Burma, Cameroon, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal.

Status	AFGH	BURM	CMRN	ELSL	ETH	HAT	HOND	NEP
1B1	0	2	1	6	0	18	2	0
1B2	0	4	0	1	0	78	1	0
1B3	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
A1	0	3	0	8	0	22	2	3
A12	0	0	0	20	0	33	11	0
A17	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
A2	0	0	7	8	0	17	3	7
A3	0	0	0	1	0	2	3	1
AA3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
AA6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
AA8	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
ABD	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
AS	5	131	205	99	0	12,929	18	1,192
AS1	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
AS2	0	0	1	0	0	2	0	0
AS3	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
AS6	0	0	1	0	0	48	0	1
AS7	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	1
AS8	0	0	0	0	0	16	0	0
ASD	0	0	17	2	0	110	0	3
ASR	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0
ASY	0	0	7	44	0	233	0	0
AY1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
B1	0	13	9	16	0	423	30	13
B11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B16	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0

¹⁹ Data Source: Computer Linked Application Information Management System (CLAIMS), USCIS Electronic Immigration System (USCIS ELIS), and USCIS Service Center Operations Directorate, as adjusted. Prior immigration status is self-reported by TPS beneficiaries on Form I-821, Application for Temporary Protected Status.

²⁰ This is based upon self-reported information, which is not always accurate. At the time of filing for TPS, the applicant is self-reporting that he or she cannot recall his or her immigration status. Immigration status, or lack of status, does not impact eligibility for TPS. See INA § 244(a)(5).

Status	AFGH	BURM	CMRN	ELSL	ETH	HAT	HOND	NEP
B1A	0	0	0	1	0	2	0	1
B1B	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
B2	1	78	42	136	0	7,861	217	84
B21	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
B22	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
B23	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
B24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B25	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
B26	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
B29	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
B31	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
B33	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B36	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
BCD	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
C1	0	0	0	0	0	23	11	2
C2	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
C21	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
C22	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
C26	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
C27	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
C3	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
C33	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1
C4	0	0	0	2	0	15	0	0
C57	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CF1	0	1	0	0	0	3	0	0
CF2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
CH	18	0	3	11	0	116	13	5
CH6	0	0	0	0	0	26	0	0
CP	0	0	0	1	0	8	3	1
CR1	0	0	0	0	0	24	0	0
CR2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CR6	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0
CR7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CS2	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
CU6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CU7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CW1	0	4	0	1	0	0	0	6
CW2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	4
CX1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
CX2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
CX3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

Status	AFGH	BURM	CMRN	ELSL	ETH	HAT	HOND	NEP
CX6	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
D1	0	0	0	2	0	5	1	0
DA	0	0	0	141	0	85	53	6
DE	0	0	0	2	0	4	0	0
DED	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
DHR	0	0	0	0	0	15	0	0
DT	2	0	3	2	0	91	0	0
DT2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DV1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DV2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DV6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DV7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DV8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E1	0	0	0	5	0	1	2	0
E10	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E11	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
E16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E18	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E19	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1
E21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E28	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E30	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E31	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
E34	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E36	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
E37	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E39	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EAO	0	0	0	61	0	1	6	0
EB1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
EB2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EB5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ENT	0	0	0	290	0	0	64	0
EW0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EW8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EW9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EWI	0	2	6	3,876	0	1,149	3,255	144
EXC	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0

Status	AFGH	BURM	CMRN	ELSL	ETH	HAT	HOND	NEP
F1	11	570	154	5	0	624	21	2,035
F11	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
F16	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
F2	1	42	5	1	0	36	3	423
F21	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
F22	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
F24	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
F26	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
F27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
F29	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
F31	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	0
F41	0	1	0	0	0	9	0	0
F46	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
FUG	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0
FX1	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
FX2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FX6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FX7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
G1	0	2	0	2	0	5	1	4
G2	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0
G4	0	2	3	0	0	1	0	5
G5	0	1	0	0	0	4	0	2
GB	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
GT	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
H1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	21
H1B	0	20	4	0	0	13	2	622
H2	0	0	0	18	0	4	7	0
H2A	0	0	0	15	0	14	2	2
H2B	0	0	0	22	0	28	17	6
H3	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
H3A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
H3B	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
H4	1	4	5	2	0	8	4	268
HA6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
HB6	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	0
I	0	0	0	1	0	3	1	0
I1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IB0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
IB1	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0
IB2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
IB5	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
IB6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Status	AFGH	BURM	CMRN	ELSL	ETH	HAT	HOND	NEP
IJ	0	1	9	0	0	29	0	1
IMM	0	0	0	66	0	663	29	1
IN	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	0
IR	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
IR0	0	0	1	1	0	10	0	0
IR1	0	0	5	1	0	53	0	0
IR2	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
IR5	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
IR6	0	0	1	0	0	18	0	0
IR7	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
IW1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
IW6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J1	6	36	11	3	0	48	4	25
J1S	0	2	3	0	0	5	0	0
J2	5	1	5	0	0	14	1	25
K1	0	2	0	0	0	46	0	0
K2	0	0	0	0	0	27	1	0
K3	0	0	0	3	0	25	2	0
K4	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0
L1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1
L1A	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	2
L1B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
L2	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2
M1	0	1	0	0	0	2	1	0
M2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
M83	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N1	0	0	0	28	0	12	8	3
NP1	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
O1	0	1	0	0	0	2	0	1
O1A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O1B	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
O1M	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
O3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
OAR	344	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OP	0	0	0	1	0	4	2	0
P1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	0
P1A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P1B	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P1S	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
P3	0	0	1	0	0	6	0	0

Status	AFGH	BURM	CMRN	ELSL	ETH	HAT	HOND	NEP
P3S	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
P4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P63	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
PAR	150	2	13	259	0	3,505	161	44
PWA	0	0	1	0	0	150	0	0
Q1	0	0	0	5	0	0	0	0
Q3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
R1	0	6	1	1	0	21	0	5
R2	0	3	2	0	0	8	0	4
R86	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RE	0	0	3	20	0	565	16	0
RE1	0	0	0	0	0	22	0	0
RE3	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
RE4	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
RE5	0	0	0	0	0	454	0	0
RE6	0	0	0	0	0	10	0	0
REF	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
REM	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
S1	0	0	0	2	0	8	2	0
S9	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
SL6	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
SR1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
SR2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SR6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ST	0	0	0	2	0	16	3	0
T1	0	0	0	7	0	2	1	0
T2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
T21	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
T3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
T4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T41	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
T5	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0
T51	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TC1	0	0	1	0	0	3	0	0
TC2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
TC6	0	0	1	0	0	4	0	0
TD	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	0
TPS	0	1	1	2,936	0	1,516	993	3
TR6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TR7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TRM	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
TW1	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0

Status	AFGH	BURM	CMRN	ELSL	ETH	HAT	HOND	NEP
TW2	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
TW3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
TWO	0	0	0	3	0	1	1	0
U1	0	0	1	11	0	2	3	1
U2	0	0	0	1	0	3	0	0
U4	0	0	0	5	0	0	3	0
UN	25	322	374	198,402	0	73,891	58,755	9,469
UNK	9	30	212	21,669	0	4,403	9,053	13
UU	0	0	5	10,529	0	182	2,557	3
V1	0	0	0	1	0	5	0	0
V2	0	0	0	0	0	6	0	0
V3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
W26	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
W2D	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
WB	0	0	0	1	0	4	1	1
WD	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
WI	0	0	0	336	0	529	429	0
WT	0	1	0	19	0	45	8	2
X	0	0	0	13	0	14	5	1
X11	0	0	0	0		0	0	0
Z66	0	0	0	0		1	0	0
ZN	0	0	0	0		0	0	0
TOTAL	578	1,291	1,129	239,139	0	110,638	75,803	14,477

Table No. 2: Nicaragua, Syria, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, Venezuela, Yemen.

Status	NIC	SOMA	S.SUDA	SUDA	SYR	UKR	VENZ	YEM
1B1	0	0	0	1	2	0	10	0
1B2	0	0	0	2	8	36	6	0
1B3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A1	0	0	8	7	3	7	106	14
A12	1	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
A17	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A2	0	0	1	3	0	22	9	5
A3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
AA3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
AA6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AA8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AS	3	16	2	115	890	932	88,660	232
AS1	0	0	0	0	0	0	85	0

Status	NIC	SOMA	S.SUDA	SUDA	SYR	UKR	VENZ	YEM
AS2	0	0	0	0	0	0	85	0
AS3	0	0	0	0	1	5	30	0
AS6	0	0	0	0	2	3	41	0
AS7	0	0	0	0	0	3	11	0
AS8	0	0	0	0	0	2	15	0
ASD	0	0	0	0	1	3	43	0
ASR	0	1	0	3	6	14	58	0
ASY	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
AY1	0	0	0	1	1	10	8	0
B1	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0
B11	26	0	1	10	32	164	348	3
B16	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
B1A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B1B	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	1
B2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B21	93	4	5	57	402	4,865	13,218	40
B22	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
B23	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B24	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B25	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
B26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B29	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B33	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
B36	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
BCD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C1	2	0	0	0	0	6	3	0
C2	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
C21	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
C22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C27	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C33	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
C4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C57	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
CF1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CF2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CH	3	0	0	0	1	467	24	0
CH6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CP	0	0	0	0	1	1	2	0

Status	NIC	SOMA	S.SUDA	SUDA	SYR	UKR	VENZ	YEM
CR1	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
CR2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CR6	0	0	0	0	0	2	49	0
CR7	0	0	0	0	0	0	10	0
CS2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CU6	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
CU7	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0
CW1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CW2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CX1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CX2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CX3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
CX6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
D1	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
DA	3	0	0	0	1	16	7	1
DE	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
DED	0	0	0	0	0	0	24	0
DHR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
DT	1	0	0	0	1	1,188	6	0
DT2	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
DV1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
DV2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
DV6	0	0	0	0	0	0	8	0
DV7	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0
DV8	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
E1	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	0
E10	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
E11	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E16	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
E18	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
E19	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
E2	0	0	0	0	1	29	799	0
E21	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
E23	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
E26	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	0
E27	0	0	0	0	0	1	4	0
E28	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
E3	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
E30	0	0	0	0	0	0	13	0
E31	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
E34	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
E36	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0

Status	NIC	SOMA	S.SUDA	SUDA	SYR	UKR	VENZ	YEM
E37	0	0	0	0	0	0	6	0
E39	0	0	0	0	0	0	9	0
EAO	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
EB1	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
EB2	0	0	0	0	1	6	38	0
EB5	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
ENT	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
EW0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
EW8	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
EW9	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
EWI	156	5	0	3	28	28	322	2
EXC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
F1	3	2	5	125	134	627	2,987	192
F11	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
F16	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
F2	1	0	1	15	21	77	646	29
F21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
F22	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
F24	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
F26	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
F27	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
F29	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
F31	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
F41	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
F46	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FUG	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FX1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
FX2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
FX6	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
FX7	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
G1	0	0	0	5	4	0	5	6
G2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	5
G4	0	0	0	0	0	0	21	2
G5	1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
GB	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
GT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
H1	0	0	0	0	7	0	2	0
H1B	0	0	0	26	144	25	129	6
H2	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
H2A	0	0	0	0	1	33	0	0
H2B	1	0	0	0	0	301	2	0
H3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Status	NIC	SOMA	S.SUDA	SUDA	SYR	UKR	VENZ	YEM
H3A	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
H3B	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
H4	0	0	0	13	60	49	122	5
HA6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
HB6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I	0	0	0	0	0	2	4	0
I1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
IB0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IB1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
IB2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IB5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IB6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
IJ	0	0	0	1	7	13	3,407	3
IMM	2	1	0	0	2	3	36	0
IN	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
IR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IR0	0	0	0	0	0	0	17	0
IR1	0	0	0	0	0	3	4	0
IR2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IR5	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	0
IR6	0	0	0	0	0	0	20	0
IR7	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
IW1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
IW6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
J1	4	0	0	28	53	206	130	12
J1S	0	0	0	0	1	3	1	1
J2	0	0	0	14	19	26	92	3
K1	0	0	0	1	12	10	3	0
K2	0	0	0	0	4	2	0	0
K3	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0
K4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	1
L1	0	0	0	0	0	2	37	0
L1A	0	0	0	0	1	4	45	1
L1B	0	0	0	1	0	9	10	0
L2	0	0	0	1	2	25	175	1
M1	0	0	0	4	2	1	10	4
M2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
M83	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
N1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
NP1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O1	0	0	0	0	1	10	110	0
O1A	0	0	0	0	0	3	6	0

Status	NIC	SOMA	S.SUDA	SUDA	SYR	UKR	VENZ	YEM
O1B	0	0	0	0	0	2	28	0
O1M	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
O2	0	0	0	0	0	8	29	0
O3	0	0	0	1	1	12	160	0
OAR	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
OP	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
P1	0	0	0	1	0	6	60	0
P1A	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
P1B	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0
P1S	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
P2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P3	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
P3S	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P4	0	0	0	0	0	1	45	0
P63	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
PAR	2	0	0	5	71	1,662	222	7
PWA	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0
Q1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Q3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R1	1	0	0	0	1	3	44	0
R2	2	0	0	0	3	5	46	1
R86	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
RE	4	0	0	0	2	3	13	0
RE1	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0
RE3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RE4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RE5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
RE6	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
REF	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
REM	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
S1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
S9	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SL6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SR1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
SR2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
SR6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
ST	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
T21	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Status	NIC	SOMA	S.SUDA	SUDA	SYR	UKR	VENZ	YEM
T41	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T51	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
TC1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TC2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TC6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TD	0	0	0	1	0	0	8	0
TPS	88	1	9	21	591	13	74	8
TR6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
TR7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
TRM	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
TW1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TW2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TW3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
TWO	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
U1	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0
U2	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
U4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
UN	2,841	275	70	439	3,759	2,268	49,206	1,315
UNK	710	105	0	147	47	1,323	19,798	26
UU	186	11	0	28	16	26	50	8
V1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
V2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
V3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W26	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W2D	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WB	0	0	0	0	3	0	31	0
WD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
WI	18	3	0	0	0	7	14	0
WT	0	0	0	0	3	15	530	2
X	0	1	0	1	26	1	86	0
X11	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0
Z66	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ZN	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
TOTAL	4,163	425	102	1,082	6,424	14,647	182,579	1,941

Grand Total	654,418
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IV. Analysis/Discussion

Section 4.1 Legal Authority for the Secretary to Designate a Foreign State for TPS Under INA § 244(b)(1)

Under INA § 244(b)(1), the Secretary, after consultation with appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government, may designate a foreign state (or any part of such foreign state) if conditions in the foreign state fall into one or more of three statutory categories, generally described as ongoing armed conflict, environmental disasters, or extraordinary and temporary conditions.²¹ An initial TPS designation is purely discretionary, and the Secretary can decline to make a designation even if he or she determines eligible conditions exist in a foreign state. The Secretary may designate the foreign state for a period of six, 12, or 18 months.²² When the Secretary designates a foreign state for TPS, he or she establishes the dates from which a TPS applicant must have continuously resided in and been continuously physically present in the United States in order to be eligible for TPS under the particular designation.²³ By establishing these “continuous residence” and “continuous physical presence” dates in accordance with TPS statutes, the Secretary can afford temporary protection to the most appropriate group of noncitizens from the designated country.

Section 4.2 Legal Authority for the Secretary to Extend or Terminate TPS Designations of Foreign States Under INA § 244(b)(3)

As required by the INA, the Secretary conducts a periodic review of country conditions affecting each TPS-designated foreign state in consultation with appropriate agencies of the U.S. Government, to determine whether the conditions support extension or termination of the TPS designation, and whether a new designation may be warranted.²⁴ At least 60 days prior to the current expiration of a country’s TPS designation, the Secretary must review the conditions in the designated foreign state and determine whether the conditions for such designation continue to be met. If the Secretary determines statutory conditions for designation are no longer met, the TPS statute requires that he or she terminate the designation. If the Secretary finds, however, that conditions for designation are met (or makes no determination at all), the statute requires the TPS designation be extended for a minimum of six months, or, at the Secretary’s discretion, for 12 or 18 months. USCIS publishes a notice in the *Federal Register* that announces the Secretary’s determination of whether to extend, extend and redesignate, or terminate a country’s TPS designation.

That notice includes an explanation of the reasons for the determination.

²¹ See *supra* note 1 (providing text of INA § 244(b)(1)).

²² See INA § 244(b)(2)(B).

²³ See INA § 244(c)(1)(A). The continuous residence date is such date as the Secretary may establish. *Id.* at §(244(c)(1)(A)(i). However, the continuous physical presence date is the effective date of the most recent designation, which itself is the *Federal Register* notice publication date of the designation or such later date as the Secretary may specify in the notice. See *Id.* at §244(b)(2)(A); §244(c)(1)(A)(ii).

²⁴ See INA § 244(b)(3) (A-C).

Section 4.3 Extensions of Designations Under INA § 244(b)(3)(C)

This section provides details about TPS actions announced by the Secretary in CY 2022 regarding foreign states for which the most recent action by the Secretary, as of December 31, 2022, was an extension of the state’s existing TPS designation.

Venezuela

On September 8, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the extension of the TPS designation for Venezuela for 18 months, effective September 10, 2022, through March 10, 2024.²⁵

The information below describing the reasons for these actions has been excerpted from the September 8, 2022 FRN that announced the extension.

The Secretary has determined that an 18-month TPS extension is warranted because the extraordinary and temporary conditions supporting TPS designation remain based on DHS' review of country conditions in Venezuela, including input received from the Department of State (DOS) and other U.S. Government agencies.

Overview

Extraordinary and temporary conditions that prevent Venezuelan nationals from returning in safety include severe economic and political crises ongoing within Venezuela, which have an impact across sectors, including limited access to food, basic services, and adequate healthcare, and the deterioration of the rule of law and protection of human rights.

Venezuela remains in a humanitarian emergency due to economic and political crises. The Congressional Research Service (CRS) reported in April 2021 that “Venezuela's economy has collapsed”²⁶ and noted that Venezuela was “in the throes of a multiyear economic crisis, one of the worst economic crises in the world since World War II,” with its economy contracting by “more than 75 percent since 2014 [...], estimated as the single largest economic collapse outside of war in at least 45 years and more than twice the magnitude of the Great Depression in the United States.”²⁷ More recently, the CRS reported, “Between 2014 and 2021, Venezuela's economy contracted by 80 percent.”²⁸ Though the CRS indicates that “hyperinflation has abated, and higher oil prices driven by Russia's invasion of Ukraine appear to be driving a nascent

²⁵ See 87 FR 55024 (September 8, 2022) (18-month extension of Venezuela’s TPS designation through March 10, 2024).

²⁶ Clare Ribando Seelke, Rebecca M. Nelson, Rhoda Margesson, Phillip Brown, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service (CRS), Summary, Apr. 28, 2021, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R44841.pdf> (last visited: Aug. 18, 2022).

²⁷ *Id.*

²⁸ *Id.*

economic recovery,” the economic situation, which negatively impacts access to food, purchasing power, and social services, has created a humanitarian crisis.²⁹

Moreover, Venezuela has experienced more than “two decades of political tumult.”³⁰ The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) also reported that this political polarization contributed to the emergence of institutional duality in Venezuela, in which neither side, those allied with Nicolas Maduro and those allied with Juan Guaidó, recognizes the validity of the other's institutions.³¹ Though the Venezuelan constitution provides citizens the ability to change their government through free and fair elections, the Maduro regime has restricted the exercise of this right and arbitrarily banned key opposition figures from participating, maintained hundreds of political prisoners, used judicial processes to steal the legal personages of political parties, and denied opposition political representatives equal access to media coverage and freedom of movement in the country.³²

The resulting impact of the economic and political crises spreads across various sectors in Venezuela. Reuters reported on a 2020-2021 National Survey of Living Conditions (ENCOVI) that found that of the country's 28 million residents, 76.6 percent live in extreme poverty, which was an almost 10 percent increase from the previous year.³³

Moreover, Human Rights Watch reports that one out of three Venezuelans is food insecure and in need of assistance.³⁴ Based on data collected prior to the pandemic, 8 percent of children under age 5 were acutely malnourished and 30 percent chronically malnourished or stunted.³⁵ UNICEF estimates that 116,596 Venezuelan children could suffer from global acute malnutrition in 2022.³⁶ Estimates suggest that Venezuelans would require 136 times the minimum wage of \$1.71 per month to access a basic food basket.³⁷

²⁹ Clare Ribando Seelke, Venezuela: Political Crisis and U.S. Policy, CRS, p. 1, Aug. 1, 2022, chrome-extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/ <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10230.pdf> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

³⁰ Overcoming the Global Rift on Venezuela, International Crisis Group, p. i, Feb. 17, 2022, <https://d2071andvip0wj.cloudfront.net/093-overcoming-the-global-rift-on-venezuela.pdf> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

³¹ Venezuela: Country Focus, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), p.21, Aug. 2020, https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2020_08_EASO_COI_Report_Venezuela.pdf (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

³² 2021 Country Reports of Human Rights Practices: Venezuela, U.S. Department of State, Apr. 12, 2022, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/venezuela/> (last visited: Aug. 18, 2022).

³³ Reuters, Extreme Poverty in Venezuela Rises to 76.6%—study, Sept. 29, 2021, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/extreme-poverty-venezuela-rises-766-study-2021-09-29/> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

³⁴ Human Rights Watch, World Report 2021, Venezuela, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/venezuela> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

³⁵ *Id.*

³⁶ UNICEF, Humanitarian Action for Children 2022—Venezuela, (Dec. 7, 2021), <https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/humanitarian-action-children-2022-venezuela> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

³⁷ *Id.* The UN's Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) issues a monthly food price index, a measure of change in international prices of a basket of food commodities. See United Nations, “Global Issues: Food” (last visited 7/25/2022), <https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/food>. A national food basket is a group of essential food commodities.

Additionally, sources have described Venezuela's health system as “run-down,”³⁸ “overloaded and crumbling,”³⁹ and “collapsed.”⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch noted that millions of Venezuelans are unable to access basic healthcare.⁴¹ Moreover, Venezuela's “collapsed health system has led to the resurgence of vaccine-preventable and infectious diseases. Shortages of medications and supplies, interruptions of utilities at healthcare centers, and the emigration of healthcare workers have led to a decline in operational capacity.”⁴² Venezuela is currently experiencing an outbreak of yellow fever, and other vaccine-preventable diseases such as measles and polio are at risk of re-emerging.⁴³ Three quarters of households experience irregular water service provision, while 8.4 percent do not have access, factors which exacerbate health and nutrition problems.⁴⁴

Human Rights Watch reports that “As of October 28 [2021], Venezuela has confirmed 403,318 cases of COVID-19 and 4,848 deaths. Given limited availability of reliable testing, lack of government transparency, and persecution of medical professionals and journalists who report on the pandemic, the actual numbers are probably much higher.”⁴⁵ Reports further indicate that “Venezuela's COVID-19 vaccination has been marred by corruption allegations and opacity regarding the acquisition and distribution of vaccines and other medical supplies.”⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch reports that “...” only 21.6 percent of Venezuelans were fully vaccinated as of that date [October 27, 2021], according to the Pan American Health Organization, and 25 to 28 percent of health professionals were still waiting for their second vaccine shot in August.”⁴⁷

The political and economic crises also impact respect for human rights in Venezuela. In a February 2022 report, Amnesty International noted that “[c]rimes under international law and human rights violations, including politically motivated arbitrary detentions, torture, extrajudicial executions and excessive use of force have been systematic and widespread, and could constitute

³⁸ Vivian Sequera, Venezuela COVID patients, exhausted doctors get mental health help from medical charity, Reuters, Feb. 2, 2022, <https://web.archive.org/web/20220217023626/https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/venezuela-covid-patients-exhausted-doctors-get-mental-health-help-medical-2022-02-02/> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

³⁹ Venezuelans rely on the kindness of strangers to pay for COVID-19 treatment, Reuters, Oct. 4, 2021, <https://web.archive.org/web/20211004193653/https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuelans-rely-kindness-strangers-pay-covid-19-treatment-2021-10-04/> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

⁴⁰ Ribando Seelke, Clare, Nelson, Rebecca M., Brown, Phillip, Margesson, Rhoda, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, CRS, p.11, Apr. 28, 2021, <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R44841.pdf>; World Report 2022—Venezuela, Human Rights Watch, Jan. 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/venezuela> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

⁴¹ Human Rights Watch, World Report 2021, Venezuela, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2021/country-chapters/venezuela> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

⁴² World Report 2022—Venezuela, Human Rights Watch, Jan. 2022, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/venezuela> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

⁴³ UNICEF, Humanitarian Action for Children 2022—Venezuela (Dec. 7, 2021), <https://reliefweb.int/report/venezuela-bolivarian-republic/humanitarian-action-children-2022-venezuela> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁴⁵ Human Rights Watch, World Report 2022, Venezuela, <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/venezuela> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁴⁷ *Id.*

crimes against humanity.”⁴⁸ Amnesty International further reported that “trends of repression in Venezuela have been directed against a specific group of people: those perceived as dissidents or opponents” of Nicolás Maduro.⁴⁹ While the “people belonging to this group are all different,” Amnesty International noted that it is nevertheless “possible to identify particular groups that have been especially targeted by the policy of repression, namely students, political activists, and human rights defenders.”⁵⁰

It is estimated that “more than 6 million refugees and migrants have left Venezuela as a result of the political turmoil, socio-economic instability, and the ongoing humanitarian crisis.”⁵¹ The New Humanitarian reports that “The vast majority of the 6 million Venezuelans who have escaped poverty, insecurity, and economic collapse ... have tried to start new lives in South America. But two years after COVID-19 led governments to close borders and enforce quarantines, many are discovering that the region is becoming a less welcoming place.”⁵²

In summary, Venezuela continues to be in a humanitarian emergency. Venezuela continues to face economic contraction, poverty, high levels of unemployment, reduced access to and shortages of food and medicine, a severely weakened medical system, a collapse in basic services, political polarization, institutional and political tensions, human rights abuses and repression, crime and violence, corruption, and increased human mobility and displacement. The continuing extraordinary and temporary conditions supporting Venezuela's TPS designation remain.

Section 4.4 Extensions of Designations Under INA § 244(b)(3)(C) and Redesignation Under INA § 244(b)(1) and (c)(I)(A)(i)

This section provides details about TPS actions announced by the Secretary in CY 2022 regarding foreign states for which the most recent action by the Secretary, as of December 31, 2022, was an extension of the state’s existing TPS designation and redesignation of the state.

Burma

On September 27, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the extension of the TPS designation for Burma and the redesignation of Burma for 18 months, effective November 26, 2022, through May 25, 2024.⁵³

⁴⁸ Venezuela: Calculated repression: Correlation between stigmatization and politically motivated arbitrary detentions, Amnesty International, p.11, Feb. 10, 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/5133/2022/en/> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

⁴⁹ Venezuela: Calculated repression: Correlation between stigmatization and politically motivated arbitrary detentions, Amnesty International, p.52, Feb. 10, 2022, <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/amr53/5133/2022/en/> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

⁵⁰ *Id.*

⁵¹ International Organization for Migration, UN Migration, Venezuelan Refugee and Migrant Crisis, <https://www.iom.int/venezuelan-refugee-and-migrant-crisis> (last visited Aug. 15, 2022).

⁵² Paula Dupraz-Dobias, The New Humanitarian, Nowhere left to turn, part 2: In a region hit hard by COVID, the welcome for Venezuelan migrants wears thin, July 12, 2022, <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2022/07/14/South-America-Venezuelan-migrants-COVID> (last visited Aug. 18, 2022).

⁵³ See 87 FR 58515 (September 27, 2022) (18-month extension of Burma’s TPS designation through May 25, 2024, and redesignation of Burma for TPS through May 25, 2024).

The information below describing the reasons for these actions has been excerpted from the September 27, 2022 FRN that announced the extension and redesignation.

DHS reviewed country conditions in Burma. Based on the review, including consultation with DOS and other U.S. Government agencies, the Secretary determined that an 18-month TPS extension is warranted because extraordinary and temporary conditions supporting Burma's TPS designation remain. The Secretary further determined that redesignating Burma for TPS under section 244(b)(3)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(C), is warranted and is changing the “continuous residence” and “continuous physical presence” dates that applicants must meet to be eligible for TPS.

DHS has conducted a thorough review of country conditions in Burma. Since the February 1, 2021 military coup d'état, the military regime has widely committed human rights violations and abuses, including arbitrary detentions and the unwarranted use of deadly force against unarmed individuals.⁵⁴ As a result, more than 974,000 people have been internally displaced since the coup, bringing the total number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) to nearly 1.3 million people when including pre-coup displacements, and more than 45,500 additional persons have sought refuge outside Burma since the coup.⁵⁵ Internally displaced persons and other vulnerable populations throughout the country now lack adequate and secure access to shelter, food, water and sanitation, health care, and education and are therefore also increasingly vulnerable to trafficking.

In the period following the coup, fighting between the Burmese military and groups (many of them newly formed) resisting the military's seizure of power have expanded to most parts of the country, even regions where clashes had not been seen in decades.⁵⁶ For example, shortly after its inception, the group known as the “National Unity Government,” created an armed component to purportedly lead overall direction for resistance forces, which it refers to as the People's Defense Force (PDF).⁵⁷ However, the growing capacity of the PDF and other forces opposed to military rule has coincided with greater instability, with hundreds of civilians killed in clashes between the military and the PDF and hundreds of thousands displaced.⁵⁸

Additionally, “nearly 26,000 civilian properties, including houses, churches, monasteries, and schools are estimated to have been destroyed during hostilities, although figures are difficult to

⁵⁴ Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, U.N. Human Rights Council, Mar. 16, 2022, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4976-report-special-rapporteur-situation-human-rights-myanmar-thomas> (last accessed May 27, 2022).

⁵⁵ Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 21, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), September 2, 2022, p. 2., available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-21-2-september-2022> (last visited Sep. 13, 2022).

⁵⁶ Myanmar's Coup Shakes Up Its Ethnic Conflicts, International Crisis Group, Jan. 12, 2022, available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/319-myanmars-coup-shakes-its-ethnic-conflicts> (last accessed May 27, 2022).

⁵⁷ Conflict seen escalating in Myanmar on anniversary of PDF, Radio Free Asia, May 11, 2022, available at: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/anniversary-05112022202816.html> (last visited May 24, 2022).

⁵⁸ Conflict seen escalating in Myanmar on anniversary of PDF, Radio Free Asia, May 11, 2022, available at: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/anniversary-05112022202816.html> (last visited May 24, 2022).

verify.”⁵⁹ Since the coup, an additional 1,835 persons were killed and 10,600 arrested due to activities unrelated to the ongoing fighting, mainly during the continuing anti-coup protests.⁶⁰ On October 21, 2021, the Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED) reported that over 60 percent of the world’s demonstrators killed by state actors died in Burma, thus naming it “the deadliest country for demonstrators.”⁶¹

On March 15, 2022, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Michelle Bachelet, asked the international community to take “concerted, immediate measures to stem the spiral of violence [in Burma],”⁶² referencing a report from OHCHR finding that the Burmese military forces target civilians and continue to use explosive weapons with wide-ranging effects in populated areas.⁶³ On March 16, 2022, the United Nations Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar issued a report detailing human rights abuses committed by the Burmese military since the February 2021 coup. The report noted that the military has escalated what it labeled “indiscriminate attacks against civilians using jet fighters, attack helicopters and heavy artillery.”⁶⁴ It added that “soldiers have burned entire villages to the ground. Civilians and combatants have been tortured, raped, executed, and used as human shields.”⁶⁵ The U.S. Institute of Peace observed that, one year after the coup, “the violence has descended into full-scale civil war,” with devastating effects on civilians as the Burmese military used “heavy weapons and air assaults, wiping out entire villages in attempts to dislodge ethnic armed organizations and PDFs.”⁶⁶

The coup pushed Burma into a volatile political and security situation “heavily impact[ing] [Burma’s] emerging economy and the [country’s] already fragile public service sector, further restricting people’s access to essential services and children’s access to education.”⁶⁷ “This multi-

⁵⁹ Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 21, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), September 2, 2022, p. 2., available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-21-2-september-2022> (last visited Sep. 14, 2022).

⁶⁰ Conflict seen escalating in Myanmar on anniversary of PDF, Radio Free Asia, May 11, 2022, available at: <https://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/anniversary-05112022202816.html> (last visited May 24, 2022).
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⁶¹ Deadly Demonstrations: Fatalities from State Engagement on the Rise, Armed Conflict Location and Event Database (ACLED), Oct. 21, 2022, available at: <https://acleddata.com/2021/10/21/deadly-demonstrations/> (last visited May 23, 2022).

⁶² Myanmar: ‘Appalling’ violations demand ‘unified and resolute international response’, U.N. News, Mar. 15, 2022, available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113972> (last visited May 25, 2022).

⁶³ Myanmar: ‘Appalling’ violations demand ‘unified and resolute international response’, U.N. News, Mar. 15, 2022, available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113972> (last visited May 25, 2022).

⁶⁴ Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, U.N. Human Rights Council, Mar. 16, 2022, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4976-report-special-rapporteur-situation-human-rights-myanmar-thomas> (last accessed May 27, 2022).

⁶⁵ Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Myanmar, Thomas H. Andrews, U.N. Human Rights Council, Mar. 16, 2022, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/country-reports/ahrc4976-report-special-rapporteur-situation-human-rights-myanmar-thomas> (last accessed May 27, 2022).

⁶⁶ Myanmar Study Group: Final Report—Anatomy of the Military Coup and Recommendations for U.S. Response, U.S. Institute for Peace, Feb. 1, 2022, p.5, available at <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/02/myanmar-study-group-final-report> (last accessed May 27, 2022).

⁶⁷ Myanmar Humanitarian Needs Overview 2022, December 31, 2021, p. 6, available at https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/mmr_humanitarian_needs_overview_2022.pdf (last visited Aug. 12, 2022).

dimensional humanitarian crisis [has] affect[ed] the whole country,”⁶⁸ causing large numbers of persons to flee the country as refugees or to be displaced internally. Displacement has increased exponentially since February 2021.⁶⁹

Furthermore, though estimates are difficult to verify, about “26,000 civilian properties, including houses, churches, monasteries, and schools”⁷⁰ appear to have been destroyed since the start of the violence, a level of destruction that “will make IDP returns more difficult even if the situation improves.”⁷¹

The 2021 DOS Country Report on Human Rights Practices indicated there were reports that the military regime's security forces and some resistance organizations have engaged in “killings, disappearances, excessive use of force, disregard for civilian life, sexual violence, and other abuses.”⁷² According to the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, as of June 2, 2022, there were 10,870 people currently under detention in connection with the February 2021 coup.⁷³ As of June 2, 2022, 13,926 had been arrested in connection with the coup, 3,035 persons had been released from detention, and 1,883 persons had been killed in connection with the coup.⁷⁴

The coup has also exacerbated the precarious human rights situation of members of the ethnic minority Rohingya. In March 2022, the U.S. Secretary of State determined that members of the Burmese military had committed genocide and crimes against humanity against Rohingya.⁷⁵ Rohingya are forbidden by law from relocating within Burma and have been arrested since the 2021 coup when they have attempted to do so.⁷⁶ Rohingya attempting to flee Burma by boat have also perished at sea, as happened in May 2022 when 14 people died when their boat capsized as they were attempting to make the journey from Rakhine state to Malaysia.⁷⁷

⁶⁸ *Id.*

⁶⁹ Myanmar Emergency Overview Map, UNHCR, July 4, 2022, available at: <https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/2851> (last visited Aug. 3, 2022).

⁷⁰ Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 18, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), May 31, 2022, p. 2., available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-18-31-may-2022> (last visited Jun. 8, 2022).

⁷¹ *Id.*

⁷² 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Burma, U.S. Department of State, Apr. 12, pg. 15, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/burma/> (last visited Jun. 2, 2022).

⁷³ Daily Briefing in Relation to the Military Coup, Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, Jun. 2, 2022, available at: <https://aappb.org/?p=21971> (last visited Jun. 2, 2022).

⁷⁴ *Id.*

⁷⁵ Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Crimes Against Humanity in Burma, U.S. Department of State, undated, available at: <https://www.state.gov/burma-genocide/> (last visited May 25, 2022).

⁷⁶ Myanmar's military coup prolongs misery for Rohingya in Rakhine, Al-Jazeera, Jan. 6, 2022, available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/6/rohingya-myanmar-restrictions-on-freedom-of-movement> (last visited May 31, 2022).

⁷⁷ At Least 17 Perish as Refugee Boat Capsizes Off Myanmar Coast, The Diplomat, May 24, 2022, available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/at-least-17-perish-as-refugee-boat-capsizes-off-myanmar-coast/> (last visited May 31, 2022).

As of May 31, 2022, 4.1 million persons were estimated to face moderate to severe food insecurity with the greatest needs in violence-affected rural areas.⁷⁸ Access to adequate food and nutrition is a major unmet need. Severe acute malnutrition is a threat to life, with only two percent of the 39,477 children aged six to 59-months old targeted for assistance having received treatment.⁷⁹ In some places, relief agencies are only recently beginning to be able to provide assistance to those rendered vulnerable by the destruction of civilian property. It was only in April 2022, for example, that the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) became the first UN agency to gain access to Kayah state, at which time they began to distribute relief supplies, including supplies related to shelter, food and sanitation, to persons in need, including internally displaced persons and returnees.⁸⁰ Lack of resources, strong storms and heavy rain, and access and movement restrictions limit the UN and its partners from providing assistance to all of those in need.⁸¹ As of September 2022, only 50 percent (3.1 million people) of those targeted for relief in the UN's 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (6.2 million people) had been reached with humanitarian assistance.⁸²

The ongoing violence and the resulting displacement in Burma have caused major vulnerabilities related to: (1) shelter, (2) food security and nutrition, (3) water, sanitation and hygiene, (4) health, and (5) education.⁸³ Lack of personnel, facilities, and supplies is contributing to a “worsening of maternal and child health outcomes,” as well as to “poor emergency care” for pregnant women, victims of fighting, and persons with other related and unrelated injuries, all of which is anticipated to result in increased numbers of avoidable deaths.⁸⁴

The coup and the ensuing protests repudiating it by the Burmese (within and outside of Burma) have deteriorated Burma's economic conditions, worsening the humanitarian crisis. The Burmese currency, the kyat, has experienced extreme volatility since the coup, as Burma's

⁷⁸ Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 18, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), May 31, 2022, p. 8, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-18-31-may-2022> (last visited Jun. 8, 2022).

⁷⁹ Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 18, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), May 31, 2022, p. 9, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-18-31-may-2022> (last visited Jun. 8, 2022).

⁸⁰ Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 18, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), May 31, 2022, p. 3, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-18-31-may-2022> (last visited Jun. 8, 2022).

⁸¹ Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 18, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), May 31, 2022, p. 2., available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-18-31-may-2022> (last visited Jun. 8, 2022).

⁸² Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 21, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), September 2, 2022, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-21-2-september-2022> (last visited Sep. 14, 2022).

⁸³ Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 18, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), May 31, 2022, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-18-31-may-2022> (last visited Jun. 8, 2022).

⁸⁴ Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 18, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), May 31, 2022, p. 8-9, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-18-31-may-2022> (last visited Jun. 8, 2022).

economy shrank by 18 percent in the year leading up to September 2021.⁸⁵ Critical services such as banking, telecommunications, health, and education were disrupted, and economic sanctions that had been lifted as Burma had transitioned toward democracy were reimposed.⁸⁶ Increasing commodity prices, particularly for food and fuel, are causing distress for thousands of people across the country. In addition to affecting Burmese people's purchasing power for essential items such as food, rising prices are beginning to affect the work of relief agencies, particularly those supplying food and shelter.⁸⁷

In summary, more than a year after the Burmese military perpetrated a coup, human rights violations and abuses including sexual violence, disappearances, excessive use of force, and killings are occurring in most parts of the country. As a result, more than 974,000 people are currently internally displaced throughout the country, while more than 45,500 remain in neighboring countries after fleeing since the coup. Burma was economically vulnerable when the coup took place, but has since “suffered further economic decline, with mass job losses, business closures and the weakening of the [country's] currency, which has affected households across the country.”⁸⁸ As a result, major vulnerabilities related to shelter, food security, human trafficking risks, and the country's economy have arisen as Burmese families have lost on average, more than half of their income since the February 2021.

Haiti

On December 5, 2022, DHS publicly announced that Secretary Mayorkas had decided to extend the TPS designation of Haiti and redesignate Haiti for TPS, to be effective February 4, 2023, through August 3, 2024. The FRN announcing this decision published on January 26, 2023.⁸⁹

The information below describing the reasons for these actions has been excerpted from the January 26, 2023, FRN that announced the extension and redesignation.

DHS has reviewed country conditions in Haiti. Based on the review, including consultation with DOS and other U.S. Government agencies, the Secretary has determined that an 18-month TPS extension is warranted because the extraordinary and temporary conditions supporting Haiti's TPS designation remain and that such extension is not contrary to the national interest of the United States. The Secretary has further determined that redesignating Haiti for TPS based on extraordinary and temporary conditions under INA section 244(b)(3)(C), 8 U.S.C.

⁸⁵ Myanmar Central Bank Orders Government Agencies to Stop Using Foreign Currencies, *The Diplomat*, May 27, 2022, available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/myanmar-central-bank-orders-government-agencies-to-stop-using-foreign-currencies/> (last visited May 31, 2022).

⁸⁶ Myanmar Central Bank Orders Government Agencies to Stop Using Foreign Currencies, *The Diplomat*, May 27, 2022, available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2022/05/myanmar-central-bank-orders-government-agencies-to-stop-using-foreign-currencies/> (last visited May 31, 2022).

⁸⁷ Myanmar Humanitarian Update No. 18, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), May 31, 2022, p. 2, 7-8, 14, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-humanitarian-update-no-18-31-may-2022> (last visited Jun. 8, 2022).

⁸⁸ Families in Myanmar lose more than half their income in year of conflict, says Save the Children, Jul. 28, 2022, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/families-myanmar-lose-more-half-their-income-year-conflict-says-save-children> (last visited Aug. 12, 2022).

⁸⁹ See 88 FR 5022 (January 26, 2023) (18-month extension of Haiti's TPS designation and redesignation through August 3, 2024).

1254a(b)(1)(C), is warranted, including a determination that redesignation is not contrary to the national interest of the United States, and is changing the “continuous residence” and “continuous physical presence” dates that applicants must meet to be eligible for TPS.

Overview

DHS has conducted a thorough review of country conditions in Haiti. Haiti is experiencing economic, security, political, and health crises simultaneously. Haitian gangs are the primary source of violence and instability in Haiti and pose an increasing threat as they expand their influence and geographic presence over portions of metropolitan Port-au-Prince.⁹⁰ Haitian political and business elites have long cultivated relationships with gang leaders to further their agendas and destabilize Haiti.⁹¹ While elites often operationalize gangs, the gangs typically function as mercenaries responsive to the highest bidder.⁹² Moreover, some gangs earn sufficient funds from kidnapping for ransom operations to function as independent criminal organizations.⁹³ At the same time, Haiti is confronting a humanitarian crisis, with many citizens having limited access to safety, healthcare, food, water, and economic opportunity. These circumstances continue to make return to Haiti dangerous for Haitian nationals living in the United States.

Political Situation

The Haitian parliament was dissolved in January 2020, as the mandates of two thirds of Senate members and all Chamber of Deputies members expired, and no new elections were held.⁹⁴ On July 7, 2021, President Jovenel Moïse was assassinated in his private residence in Port-au-Prince. Subsequently, Ariel Henry, whom Moïse had appointed prime minister days before the assassination, was installed as head of a new government.⁹⁵

Since then, Prime Minister (PM) Henry and opposition groups have engaged in intermittent negotiations about a political path towards elections. On December 21, 2022, representatives of civil society, the private sector, and political groups began signing a revised political agreement known as the “December Accord,” which was supported by PM Henry.⁹⁶ Some opposition members, including many members of the Citizen Conference for a Haitian Solution to the

⁹⁰ Diego Da Rin, *New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists*, International Crisis Group (July 27, 2022), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/new-gang-battle-lines-scar-haiti-political-deadlock-persists>.

⁹¹ *Id.*

⁹² D.C. Beer, *Chapter 3 Haiti: The Gangs of Cité Soleil*, PRISM: National Defense University, May 24, 2016, <https://cco.ndu.edu/News/Article/780129/chapter-3-haiti-the-gangs-of-cit-soleil/>.

⁹³ Jennifer Jelly and Tatiana Vasquez, *The Rise of Kidnappings for Ransom in Haiti*, The Counterterrorism Group, Dec. 13, 2021, <https://www.counterterrorismgroup.com/post/the-rise-of-kidnappings-for-ransom-in-haiti>.

⁹⁴ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2022—Haiti* (Feb. 28, 2022), <https://freedomhouse.org/country/haiti/freedom-world/2022>.

⁹⁵ Human Rights Watch, *World Report 2022—Haiti* (Jan. 13, 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/haiti>.

⁹⁶ Haiti Libre, *Haiti—FLASH: The PM signed a historic consensus for an inclusive transition*, Dec. 22, 2022, <https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-38427-haiti-flash-the-pm-signed-a-historic-consensus-for-an-inclusive-transition.html>.

Crisis, also known as Montana Group members, had not yet agreed to the accord as of January 4, 2023.⁹⁷

The Haitian government has long been accused of corruption and ineptitude. Politicians and the business elite in Haiti have historically relied on gangs to obtain and exert power, but the gangs have grown more autonomous in recent years.⁹⁸ An April 2021 report by Harvard Law School's International Human Rights Clinic alleged that the Moïse government funneled money, weapons, uniforms, and vehicles to gangs like the G9, in exchange for them repressing political opponents, often brutally, and maintaining the peace in poorer neighborhoods.⁹⁹ A July 2022 International Crisis Group report stated “collusion between state security forces and illegal armed groups has flourished in the absence of political will to hold corrupt officers accountable and because of efforts of those in power to deploy the police (as well as gangs) to serve their personal interests.”¹⁰⁰

Security Situation

Since President Moïse's assassination, Haiti has experienced a sharp deterioration in an already fragile security situation. Gang violence and kidnappings have spiked throughout the country, particularly in the capital, Port-au-Prince. The United Nations (UN) documented 934 killings, 684 injuries, and 680 kidnappings in Port-au-Prince from January to June 2022.¹⁰¹ In one 10-day period in July 2022, more than 200 people were killed in gang violence in Port-au-Prince; nearly half of the decedents had no gang ties.¹⁰² Human rights organizations have said there were more than 1,200 kidnappings in 2021, almost twice the number reported in 2020 and five times more than in 2019.¹⁰³

There are around 200 gangs across Haiti, 95 of which operate in metropolitan Port-au-Prince. Many of Haiti's gangs have coalesced around two main alliances: the G9 and the GPèp. A struggle for dominance by various gangs has superseded the old local rivalries. Gangs have decapitated opponents in public, burnt corpses in the street, set fire to houses, and used sexual

⁹⁷ Juno7, *Accord du 21 décembre 2022: les violons ne s'accordant pas au sein de l'accord de Montana*, Dec. 29, 2022, <https://www.juno7.ht/accord-du-21-decembre-2022-violons-laccord-de-montana/>.

⁹⁸ Diego Da Rin, *New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists*, International Crisis Group (July 27, 2022), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/new-gang-battle-lines-scar-haiti-political-deadlock-persists>.

⁹⁹ Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic, *Killing with Impunity: State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti* (April 2021), http://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2021/04/Killing_With_Impunity-1.pdf.

¹⁰⁰ Diego Da Rin, *New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists*, International Crisis Group (July 27, 2022), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/new-gang-battle-lines-scar-haiti-political-deadlock-persists>.

¹⁰¹ Haiti: UN sounds alarm over worsening gang violence across Port-au-Prince, UN News, July 16, 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/07/1122662#:~:text=%E2%80%9CWe%20have%20so%20far%20documented,Soleil%20area%20of%20the%20city.%E2%80%9D>.

¹⁰² BBC News, *Haiti Gang Violence: 209 killed in Cité Soleil in 10 days*, July 26, 2022, <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-62292007>.

¹⁰³ Diego Da Rin, *New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists*, International Crisis Group (July 27, 2022), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/new-gang-battle-lines-scar-haiti-political-deadlock-persists>.

violence to intimidate residents out of collaborating with their rivals.¹⁰⁴ Clashes between rival gangs led to particularly high levels of gang violence in April and May 2022, leading to the temporary closure of dozens of schools, medical centers, businesses, and markets, making it difficult for people to find basic products including food, water, and medicines.¹⁰⁵ In May 2022, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Michelle Bachelet described armed violence in Haiti as “unimaginable and intolerable” and stated that “violence has had a severe impact on the most basic human rights of people.”¹⁰⁶ Also in May, Doctors Without Borders warned that kidnappings for ransom that target many residents of Port-au-Prince, including medical personnel, were making it increasingly difficult for the population to access healthcare.¹⁰⁷ Gangs in Port-au-Prince targeted homeless and at-risk teens as participants in gang violence.¹⁰⁸ In July 2022, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimated that more than a third of Port-au-Prince was under the control of gangs.¹⁰⁹

Haitian gangs have also attacked religious and government infrastructure. On June 10, 2022, a gang known as 5 Seconds took temporary control of the Court of First Instance, the main courthouse in Port au Prince. While the courthouse had not been used for criminal trials for several years due to persistent insecurity, the gang nevertheless forced judicial officials out and stole computers, desks, and other assets. The gang appears to have stolen or destroyed case files and evidence that the president of the Association of Haitian Magistrates said would be impossible to recover as Haitian courts do not have digital copies of files.¹¹⁰ On July 27, 2022, gang members set Port-au-Prince's transitional cathedral on fire and deployed tear gas during a clash in Bel Air neighborhood, in which several people were killed and others injured by stray bullets. Local sources denounced the use of state-owned machinery by the G9 as well as a lack of action by state forces. In the Ouest department, the region in which Port-au-Prince is located, members of the 400 Mawozo gang set a public prosecutor's office on fire in Croix-de-Bouquets district near the capital on the night of July 25, 2022.¹¹¹

In mid-September, gangs blocked access to the Varreux Terminal in Port-au-Prince, the main entry point for fuel in Haiti, cutting off millions of gallons of diesel and gasoline and causing a

¹⁰⁴ *Id.*

¹⁰⁵ Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, *Press Release: Haiti: Bachelet deeply disturbed by human rights impact of deteriorating security situation in Port-au-Prince* (May 17, 2022), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/05/haiti-bachelet-deeply-disturbed-human-rights-impact-deteriorating-security>.

¹⁰⁶ *Id.*

¹⁰⁷ Doctors Without Borders, *Haiti: Attacks on medical staff leave many people without health care* (May 22, 2022), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/haiti-attacks-medical-staff-leave-many-people-without-health-care>.

¹⁰⁸ InSight Crime, *Haiti Gangs Recruiting, Arming More Children* (June 3, 2022), <https://insightcrime.org/news/haiti-gangs-recruiting-arming-more-children/>.

¹⁰⁹ UNOCHA, *Haiti: Impact of the deteriorating security situation on humanitarian access: Background note—8 July 2022* (July 9, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-impact-deteriorating-security-situation-humanitarian-access-background-note-8-july-2022>.

¹¹⁰ HRW, *Haiti: Wave of Violence Deepens Crisis* (July 22, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-wave-violence-deepens-crisis>.

¹¹¹ ACLED, *ACLED Regional Overview—Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean (23-29 July 2022)* (July 29, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/acled-regional-overview-mexico-central-america-and-caribbean-23-29-july-2022>.

severe fuel shortage.¹¹² The fuel blockage paralyzed Haiti's economy.¹¹³ Health centers and hospitals had to close, and the distribution of water was interrupted.¹¹⁴ The lack of access to clean water contributed to the outbreak of cholera in early October, and complicated efforts to respond to and contain the outbreak.¹¹⁵ On October 7, the government of Haiti requested assistance from the international community to confront gangs and address the humanitarian crisis.¹¹⁶ In an October 12, 2022 Press Statement, U.S. Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, emphasized the critical nature of the humanitarian situation in Haiti, noting that the United States is committed to continuing to help Haiti address the crisis through multiple avenues.¹¹⁷ On October 15, the U.S. and Canada delivered Haitian National Police-purchased armored vehicles and other law enforcement equipment to assist in re-taking the terminal.¹¹⁸ A Haitian National Police operation in early November successfully re-gained control of the fuel terminal.¹¹⁹ The relatively small size of the Haitian National Police remains concerning. Out of 14,161 officers, approximately 13,000 officers are assigned to law enforcement activities.¹²⁰ Haiti has just over one police officer assigned to law enforcement activities per 1,000 inhabitants, well below the 2.2 officers per 1,000 recommended by the UN.¹²¹

Environmental Situation

Several recent environmental disasters have contributed to the extraordinary and temporary conditions in Haiti. On August 14, 2021, a 7.2 magnitude earthquake hit the southern region of Haiti, killing more than 2,200 people, injuring 12,700, destroying 130,000 homes, and leaving thousands of people in urgent need of assistance.¹²² Two days later, Tropical Storm Grace's torrential rains caused floods and landslides in the same departments affected by the earthquake,

¹¹² PBS NewsHour, *Haiti reaches a breaking point as the economy tanks and violence soars* (Oct. 4, 2022), <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/haiti-reaches-a-breaking-point-as-the-economy-tanks-and-violence-soars>.

¹¹³ Brian Ellsworth and Harold Isaac, *UN calls for 'humanitarian corridor' in Haiti as gang blockade drags on*, Reuters, Oct. 6, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/un-calls-humanitarian-corridor-haiti-gang-blockade-drags-2022-10-06/>.

¹¹⁴ UN News, *Haiti: Fuel crisis prompts appeal for humanitarian corridor amid cholera outbreak*, Oct. 6, 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129317>.

¹¹⁵ *Id.*

¹¹⁶ Reuters, *Haiti's situation is dire and cannot persist, State Department says*, Oct. 11, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haitis-situation-is-dire-cannot-persist-state-department-says-2022-10-11/>.

¹¹⁷ U.S. Department of State, Press Statement, Steps to Address the Humanitarian and Security Situation in Haiti, Oct. 12, 2022, <https://www.state.gov/steps-to-address-the-humanitarian-and-security-situation-in-haiti/>.
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¹¹⁸ Reuters, *U.S., Canada deliver armored vehicles to Haitian police to fight gangs*, Oct. 15, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-canada-deliver-armored-vehicles-haitian-police-2022-10-15/>.
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¹¹⁹ Reuters, *Haitians hope for fuel supplies after police break up gang blockade at terminal*, Nov. 5, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haitians-hope-fuel-supplies-after-police-break-up-gang-blockade-terminal-2022-11-05/>.

¹²⁰ United National Security Council, Letter dated 8 October 2022 from the Secretary-General addresses to the President of the Security Council, Oct. 10, 2022, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3990649?ln=en>.

¹²¹ *Id.*

¹²² UNICEF, *Massive earthquake leaves devastation in Haiti* (last updated Oct. 4, 2021), <https://www.unicef.org/emergencies/massive-earthquake-devastation-haiti>.

as well as in Sud-Est.¹²³ According to the 2021 Global Climate Risk Index, Haiti was third among the countries most affected by extreme weather events between 2000 and 2019 and continues to remain vulnerable.¹²⁴ Widespread deforestation has left the country especially prone to flooding and mudslides, which strike Haiti at twice the rate as the Dominican Republic.¹²⁵

Humanitarian Situation

Haiti has one of the highest levels of chronic food insecurity in the world with more than half of its total population chronically food insecure and 22 percent of children chronically malnourished, according to a September 2022 report.¹²⁶ As of October 2022, the total number of people in acute food insecurity stood at 4.7 million people, including 1.8 million people in the “emergency” phase on the UN World Food Programme’s (WFP) Integrated Food Security Classification Index.¹²⁷ For the first time ever, 19,000 Haitians are considered to be in the “catastrophe” phase (the most severe classification).¹²⁸

Armed clashes between gangs destroyed water networks and disrupted water truck deliveries in several Port-au-Prince neighborhoods during 2022. A Doctors Without Borders project coordinator noted that in addition to an epidemic of scabies directly connected to the lack of water since the beginning of 2022, people could only “afford small quantities of drinking water, but they [couldn’t] access clean water in quantities needed for hygiene.”¹²⁹ Adding to the struggle Haitians face to meet their basic needs, two WFP warehouses were looted and pillaged in September 2022, resulting in the loss of approximately \$6 million of relief assistance, including 2,000 tons of food.¹³⁰

Haiti continues to face many health challenges. The United States Agency for International Development’s (USAID’s) most recent Strategic Framework report stated: “health challenges for preventable diseases worsened after the 2010 cholera epidemic and there has been limited progress in improving health outcomes.”¹³¹ As of August 1, 2022, 1.4 percent of the country’s

¹²³ FAO, *Haiti: Urgent call for funding (September 2021-May 2022)—Emergency response to households affected by the earthquake and Tropical Storm Grace* (Sept. 10, 2021), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-urgent-call-funding-september-2021-may-2022-emergency-response-households>.

¹²⁴ Germanwatch, *Global Climate Risk Index 2021* (Jan. 25, 2021), <https://reliefweb.int/report/world/global-climate-risk-index-2021>.

¹²⁵ Council on Foreign Relations, *Haiti’s Troubled Path to Development* (Sept. 17, 2021), <https://www.cfr.org/background/haitis-troubled-path-development>.

¹²⁶ WFP, *WFP Haiti Country Brief, September 2022* (Sept. 30, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/wfp-haiti-country-brief-september-2022>.

¹²⁷ UN News, ‘Catastrophic’ hunger recorded in Haiti for first time, UN warns, Oct. 14, 2022, [https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129537#:~:text=](https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129537#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20latest%20IPC,in%20Catastrophe%20phase%2C%20phase%205)

[According%20to%20the%20latest%20IPC,in%20Catastrophe%20phase%2C%20phase%205](https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129537#:~:text=According%20to%20the%20latest%20IPC,in%20Catastrophe%20phase%2C%20phase%205).

¹²⁸ *Id.*

¹²⁹ Doctors Without Borders, *Returning to Haiti means death* (Aug. 12, 2022), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/returning-haiti-means-death>.

¹³⁰ Reuters, *Haiti looting caused loss of some \$6 million in relief supplies, WFP says*, Sept. 26, 2022, <https://www.reuters.com/world/haiti-looting-caused-loss-some-6-mln-relief-supplies-wfp-says-2022-09-26/>.

¹³¹ USAID, *Haiti Strategic Framework December 23, 2020-December 23, 2022* (July 29, 2021), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Strategic_Framework_-_Haiti_-_December_2020-2022.pdf.

population was fully vaccinated against COVID-19.¹³² Haiti ranks among the world's bottom 10 countries in terms of COVID-19 vaccination coverage.¹³³

The UN Nations and the Haitian government have reported a new cholera outbreak, with the first cases detected between October 1-2, 2022.¹³⁴ As of November 15, 2022, there were 8,146 hospitalized suspected cases and 821 confirmed cases of cholera, resulting in 188 deaths.¹³⁵ The end of the two-month fuel terminal seizure allowed hospitals, water treatment plants, commercial water suppliers, and transportation networks to resume functioning, allowing for better access to cholera prevention and treatment. However, the availability of fuel also allowed for resumed mobility among the general population, potentially leading to increased cholera transmission.¹³⁶ In November 2022, the UN launched a “Flash Appeal” requesting \$145.6 million to contain the outbreak and respond to other humanitarian needs throughout Haiti.¹³⁷

Economic Situation

Amidst the political, security, and environmental crises, Haiti's economy has floundered. Haiti is among the countries with the greatest inequality in the region. The richest 20 percent of its population holds more than 64 percent of its total wealth, while the poorest 20 percent has less than 1 percent.¹³⁸ Latest estimates put the 2021 poverty rate at 52.3 percent, up from 51 percent in 2020.¹³⁹ In 2021, Haiti had a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of \$1,815, the lowest in the Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) region and less than a fifth of the LAC average of \$15,092.¹⁴⁰ On the UN's Human Development Index,¹⁴¹ Haiti ranked 170 out of 189 in 2020.¹⁴²

¹³² Congressional Research Service, *Haiti: Political Conflict and U.S. Policy Overview* (Aug. 2, 2022), <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12182>.

¹³³ World Bank, *The World Bank approved \$35 million to improve Haiti's COVID-19 response* (June 11, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/world-bank-approved-35-million-improve-haitis-covid-19-response>.

¹³⁴ Widlore Mérancourt, Kelly Kasulis Cho, and Amanda Coletta, *The Washington Post*, *Cholera Resurfaces in Haiti as gangs hinder access to water, hospitals*, Oct. 3, 2022, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/10/03/haiti-cholera-gang-violence-water/>.

¹³⁵ Pan American Health Organization, *Cholera Outbreak in Hispaniola, Situation Report #6*, Nov. 17, 2022, <https://www.paho.org/en/documents/cholera-outbreak-hispaniola-2022-situation-report-6>.

¹³⁶ PBS NewsHour, *Cholera overwhelms Haiti, experts warn outbreak could worsen as fuel blockade lifts*, Nov. 16, 2022, <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/cholera-overwhelms-haiti-experts-warn-outbreak-could-worsen-as-fuel-blockade-lifts>.

¹³⁷ UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Haiti 2022 Cholera Flash Appeal (Mid Oct 2022-Mid Apr 2023)*, Nov. 15, 2022, <https://reliefweb.int/report/haiti/haiti-2022-cholera-flash-appeal-mid-oct-2022-mid-apr-2023>.

¹³⁸ World Bank, *The World Bank in Haiti Overview* (last updated June 14, 2022), <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview>.

¹³⁹ *Id.*

¹⁴⁰ *Id.*

¹⁴¹ The Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, being knowledgeable and have a decent standard of living. *See* UNDP, *Human Development Index (HDI)* (last visited Aug. 15, 2022), <https://hdr.undp.org/data-center/human-development-index#/indicies/HDI>.

¹⁴² World Bank, *The World Bank in Haiti Overview* (last updated June 14, 2022), <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/haiti/overview>.

In summary, Haiti is experiencing extraordinary and temporary conditions resulting from grave insecurity and gang crime, as well as socio-economic and humanitarian conditions, including those resulting from environmental disasters aggravating food insecurity.

South Sudan

On March 3, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the extension of the TPS designation for South Sudan and the redesignation of South Sudan for 18 months, effective May 3, 2022, through November 3, 2023.¹⁴³

The information below describing the reasons for these actions has been excerpted from the March 3, 2022 FRN that announced the extension and redesignation.

DHS has reviewed country conditions in South Sudan. Based on the review, including consultation with DOS, the Secretary has determined that an 18-month extension is warranted because the ongoing armed conflict and extraordinary and temporary conditions supporting South Sudan's TPS designation persist. The Secretary has further determined that the conditions support redesignating South Sudan for TPS under section 244(b)(1)(A) and (C) of the Act and is changing the “continuous residence” and “continuous physical presence” dates that applicants must meet to be eligible for TPS. Armed conflict and extraordinary and temporary conditions in South Sudan persist. Armed conflict poses a serious threat to the safety of returning nationals in South Sudan. Despite a 2018 ceasefire of South Sudan's civil war, ongoing fighting between the major armed groups continue to result in violence against civilians, including civilian casualties and gender-based violence, in several large areas of the country. Extraordinary and temporary conditions that further prevent South Sudanese nationals from returning in safety include an exceptional level of intercommunal violence, a humanitarian crisis involving severe food insecurity, record-setting flooding, and large-scale displacement of civilians.

Since February 2020, limited implementation of the September 2018 Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS)¹⁴⁴ “has hindered improvements in the protection of civilians and prospects for long-term peace” in South Sudan.¹⁴⁵ Moreover, ongoing political disputes and disagreements between the two main signatories—the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), led by President Salva Kiir Mayardit, and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-Army in Opposition (SPLM/A-IO), led

¹⁴³ See 87 FR 12190 (18-month extension of South Sudan’s TPS designation through November 3, 2023, and redesignation of South Sudan for TPS through November 2023).

¹⁴⁴ The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) was signed on September 12, 2018 by President Kiir, current First Vice President Riek Machar Teny, and other representatives of certain opposition groups. A prior peace agreement was signed in 2015 and a unity government was formed; however, fighting ensued between the parties in July 2016 and Machar left South Sudan shortly thereafter. The R-ARCSS addresses various political, security, and transitional justice issues, including the establishment of a unity government. However, not all of South Sudan's opposition leaders signed the agreement, including a key opposition group, the National Salvation Front (NAS). South Sudan Security Situation, EASO, April 24, 2020, pg. 3, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2028851/2020_04_Q8_COI_South_Sudan_Security_Situation.pdf.

¹⁴⁵ Panel of Experts on South Sudan, United Nations (UN) Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 2, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

by the First Vice-President, Riek Machar Teny, “has widened existing political, military and ethnic divisions in the country and has led to multiple incidents of violence” between the two parties.¹⁴⁶ Political divisions among the non-signatories¹⁴⁷ to The Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS) have also not been resolved.¹⁴⁸ Moreover, the SPLM/A-IO has begun to break apart and new splinter groups have formed,¹⁴⁹ resulting in increased violence.¹⁵⁰

Thus, South Sudan faces increasing violence¹⁵¹ from both government security forces and armed groups.¹⁵² In 2020, the UN and international organizations reported on “widespread killings, mutilations, and sexual violence, disproportionately committed by government forces but also by the National Salvation Front¹⁵³ (NAS), a key opposition group.”¹⁵⁴ In March 2021, the UN OHCHR in South Sudan noted that armed clashes at the local level also resulted in the mass displacement of the civilian population, particularly women and girls.¹⁵⁵ Children are among those feeling the greatest impact of this violence, which—along with other factors—is exposing them to protection risks and life-threatening diseases.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, sexual violence—including rape, gang rape, abduction, sexual slavery, and sexual mutilation remain “consistent features of the conflict in South Sudan since 2013, and are now being replicated in conflict at the local level.”¹⁵⁷

¹⁴⁶ Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 2, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

¹⁴⁷ Previously united under one umbrella group—the South Sudan Opposition Movements Alliance—non-signatories of the R-ARCSS have divided into two factions, one led by General Thomas Cirillo Swaka, the leader of the National Salvation Front (“NAS”), and another led by General Pagan Amum and General Paul Malong Awan Anei. Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15 2021, pg. 9, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>

¹⁴⁸ Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 9, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

¹⁴⁹ See id.

¹⁵⁰ SURFACE TENSION: ‘COMMUNAL’ VIOLENCE AND ELITE AMBITIONS IN SOUTH SUDAN, ACLED, August 19, 2021, available at: <https://acleddata.com/2021/08/19/surface-tension-communal-violence-and-elite-ambitions-in-south-sudan/>.

¹⁵¹ See id.

¹⁵² Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 15, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

¹⁵³ The opposition group NAS is led by General Thomas Cirillo Swaka, and has maintained a significant security presence and support in Central Equatoria. NAS is not a signatory to the R-ARCSS, maintaining that the root causes of the conflict in South Sudan have not been addressed in the peace agreement. See *Final report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan*, UN Security Council, April 28, 2020, pg. 16, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

¹⁵⁴ 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Sudan, U.S. Department of State, March 31, 2021, section 1, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-sudan/>.

¹⁵⁵ Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, UN Human Rights Council, February 4, 2021, pg. 14, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2046934/A_HRC_46_53_E.pdf.

¹⁵⁶ South Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report, UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), December 30, 2021, pg. 2, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/unicef-south-sudan-humanitarian-situation-report-no-163-1-30-november-2021>.

¹⁵⁷ Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, UN Human Rights Council, February 4, 2021, pg. 14; available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2046934/A_HRC_46_53_E.pdf.

Humanitarian organizations in South Sudan continue to face security and bureaucratic barriers that affect the delivery of and access to humanitarian aid and pose “serious personal risks to aid workers.”¹⁵⁸

Moreover, in 2021, “widespread flooding, ongoing violence, and subsequent displacement continued to deepen humanitarian needs in South Sudan.”¹⁵⁹ As a result, South Sudan is also facing “one of the direst food crises the country has faced since its independence in 2011.”¹⁶⁰ Chronic food shortages, a deepening economic crisis, insecurity, and limited agricultural production have led to high levels of acute malnutrition.¹⁶¹ South Sudan's health care infrastructure also remains inadequate.¹⁶² Facilities are limited, often inaccessible, and facing staffing shortages amongst ongoing insecurity and violence.¹⁶³

Numbers at a Glance

USAID provided the following key statistics for South Sudan in a January 19, 2022 Fact Sheet:¹⁶⁴

- *Number of people in need of Humanitarian Assistance:* 8,300,000¹⁶⁵ (per UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) as of March 2021)
- *Number of estimated internally displaced persons (IDPs):* 2,000,000 (per UNOCHA as of January 2022)
- *Number of people affected by ongoing floods since May 2021:* 835,000 (per UNOCHA as of January 2022)
- *Estimated number of refugees from South Sudan in neighboring countries:* 2,300,000 (per UNHCR as of November 2021)

¹⁵⁸ Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 16, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

¹⁵⁹ Situation in South Sudan; Report of the Secretary-General, UN Security Council, December 7, 2021 pg. 5, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2065323/S_2021_1015_E.pdf.

¹⁶⁰ Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 15, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

¹⁶¹ South Sudan Humanitarian Fund Annual Report 2020, UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), July 6, 2021, pg. 7, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-fund-annual-report-2020>.

¹⁶² South Sudan—Strengthening primary health care in fragile settings, World Health Organization, May 20, 2021, available at: <https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/south-sudan-2021>.

¹⁶³ South Sudan—Strengthening primary health care in fragile settings, World Health Organization, May 20, 2021, available at: <https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/south-sudan-2021>.

¹⁶⁴ South Sudan—Crisis, Fact Sheet #2 Fiscal Year 2022, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), January 19, 2022, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-2-fiscal-year-fy-2022>.

¹⁶⁵ According to UNOCHA, as of January 2021 the total population of South Sudan is 12.1 million. South Sudan—Crisis, Fact Sheet #2 Fiscal Year 2022, USAID, January 19, 2022, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-2-fiscal-year-fy-2022>.

Security Situation

In June 2021, the UN reported that “the overall implementation of the R-ARCSS is progressing slowly.”¹⁶⁶ Political gridlock over implementation of the political and security aspects of the R-ARCSS have also contributed to insecurity in South Sudan.¹⁶⁷ The UN further assessed that weak or absent State governance has allowed “perennial communal and ethnic cleavages,” while entrenched insecurity contributes to a vicious cycle of livestock raiding and subsequent food insecurity. A weakened rule of law and flagging economic conditions have resulted in increased criminality and the targeting of humanitarian workers.¹⁶⁸

The lack of adequate financial resources and logistical support for the unification, training, and deployment of the South Sudan armed forces, as outlined in the R-ARCSS, remains a significant security challenge.¹⁶⁹ A key component of the R-ARCSS is the long-term garrisoning (cantonment), registration, screening, selection, training and redeployment of opposition forces and the creation of a unified army of 83,000 soldiers. South Sudanese military cantonment sites and training centers¹⁷⁰ have made little progress in establishing a unified force, further contributing to a security vacuum in the country.¹⁷¹ Security forces in the few cantonment sites often lack access to basic services, such as food, water, sanitation and health care.¹⁷² In addition, the proliferation and availability of small amounts of ammunition across South Sudan¹⁷³ has “enabled armed groups not associated with government security forces, such as local militias and cattle-raiding groups, to perpetuate instability” in the country.¹⁷⁴

DOS noted in its 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for South Sudan that:

The UN, international cease-fire monitors, human rights organizations, and media, reported the government, or its agents, committed numerous arbitrary or unlawful killings. Security forces,

¹⁶⁶ Marking a Decade of Independence, South Sudan Faces Slow Progress, Lingering Violence, Secretary-General's Special Representative Tells Security Council, UN Security Council, June 22, 2021, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/marking-decade-independence-south-sudan-faces-slow-progress-lingering-violence>.

¹⁶⁷ Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 2, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

¹⁶⁸ Marking a Decade of Independence, South Sudan Faces Slow Progress, Lingering Violence, Secretary-General's Special Representative Tells Security Council, UN Security Council, June 22, 2021, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/marking-decade-independence-south-sudan-faces-slow-progress-lingering-violence>.

¹⁶⁹ Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, UN Human Rights Council, March 4, 2021, pg. 4, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2046934/A_HRC_46_53_E.pdf.

¹⁷⁰ Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, United Nations General Assembly, January 31, 2020, pg. 6, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2025863/A_HRC_43_56_E.pdf.

¹⁷¹ Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, UN Human Rights Council, March 4, 2021, pg. 13, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2046934/A_HRC_46_53_E.pdf.

¹⁷² Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan [A/HRC/46/53] UN Human Rights Council, March 4, 2021, pg. 4, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2046934/A_HRC_46_53_E.pdf.

¹⁷³ Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 21, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

¹⁷⁴ Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 21, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

opposition forces, armed militias affiliated with the government and the opposition, and ethnically based groups, were also responsible for widespread extrajudicial killings.¹⁷⁵

Moreover, in 2020, ongoing violence in Jonglei and the Greater Pibor Administration Area was “the worst recorded since the outbreak of the national conflict in South Sudan in December 2013, with waves of attacks and reprisals that left hundreds of South Sudanese women, men and children dead, maimed or destitute.”¹⁷⁶ In March 2021, the OHCHR in South Sudan assessed that “gross human rights violations and abuses amounting to serious violations of international humanitarian law were committed in the context of localized conflicts by armed militias affiliated to the primary parties in conflict—the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement—In Opposition (SPLA-IO).”¹⁷⁷ These acts included those: perpetrated against civilians, includ[ing] abductions, forced recruitment (including of children), murder, sexual violence, ill-treatment, looting and the unnecessary destruction of property. Many of these attacks revealed a shocking disregard for civilian lives.¹⁷⁸

In 2021, Upper Nile, Warrap, Lakes, Central Equatoria, and Western Equatoria states were particularly affected by violence “resulting in displacement, increased protection risks and rights violations, as well as diminished humanitarian access.”¹⁷⁹

Violence Against Children

Children in South Sudan continued to be victims of what the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict refers to as “grave violations” against children.¹⁸⁰ According to the UN Security Council’s 2021 Children and Armed Conflict in South Sudan report, children were recruited by the SPLM/A-IO and the SSPDF.¹⁸¹ In addition, hundreds of girls and boys continue to be abducted.¹⁸² Perpetrators of child abduction included

¹⁷⁵ 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Sudan, U.S. Department of State, March 31, 2021, section 1, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-sudan/>.

¹⁷⁶ Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan UN Human Rights Council, March 4, 2021, pg. 7, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2046934/A_HRC_46_53_E.pdf.

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¹⁷⁷ Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, UN Human Rights Council, March 4, 2021, pg. 9, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2046934/A_HRC_46_53_E.pdf.

¹⁷⁸ Id.

¹⁷⁹ Situation in South Sudan, UN Security Council, September 9, 2021, pg. 4, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060682/S_2021_784_E.pdf.

¹⁸⁰ To better monitor, prevent, and end these attacks, the United Nations Security Council has identified and condemned six grave violations against children in times of war: Killing and maiming of children; recruitment or use of children in armed forces and armed groups; attacks on schools or hospitals; rape or other grave sexual violence; abduction of children; and denial of humanitarian access for children, The Six Grave Violations, Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, <https://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/six-grave-violations/> (last visited on January 13, 2022).

¹⁸¹ Id.

¹⁸² Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, United Nations General Assembly, February 4, 2021, pg. 7, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/report-commission-human-rights-south-sudan-ahrc4653>.

the NAS, SPLM/A-IO, and SSPDF.¹⁸³ Child abuse, including sexual abuse, was reportedly also widespread in South Sudan.¹⁸⁴

Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Sexual and gender-based violence remains a “hallmark of the conflict in South Sudan.”¹⁸⁵ In February 2021, OHCHR in South Sudan reported that:

As of September 2020, South Sudan had seen an estimated 88 percent increase in the number of women victims of conflict-related sexual violence since the previous quarter and a 119 percent rise in the number of abductions since the previous quarter. The upsurge in localized conflict in Central Equatoria (Yei and surrounding areas), Jonglei and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area and Warrap (Tonj West and North) saw women and girls targeted by all sides.¹⁸⁶

In addition, rural communities often abducted women and children during cattle raids.¹⁸⁷ Girls who are abducted have been reportedly “forced into sexual slavery, tortured and repeatedly gang raped.”¹⁸⁸ According to credible reports, perpetrators of forced marriage and sexual violence include security forces, community-based militias, civil defense groups, and other armed groups.¹⁸⁹

Humanitarian Situation

In 2020, continued violence, particularly in Jonglei, Warrap, and the Greater Equatoria region, resulted in “sustained mass population displacement, both within the country and into neighboring countries, and high levels of humanitarian and protection needs.”¹⁹⁰ Insecurity and COVID-related restrictions also further hampered humanitarian organizations' ability to deploy and respond to medical and other emergency needs in the area.¹⁹¹

¹⁸³ Children and armed conflict in South Sudan, United Nations Security Council, May 6, 2021, pg. 21, available at: https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2021/437&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC.

¹⁸⁴ 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Sudan, U.S. Department of State, March 31, 2021, section 5, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-sudan/>.

¹⁸⁵ Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, UN Human Rights Council, February 4, 2021, pg. 13, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2046934/A_HRC_46_53_E.pdf.

¹⁸⁶ Id.

¹⁸⁷ 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Sudan, U.S. Department of State, March 31, 2021, section 5, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-sudan/>.

¹⁸⁸ Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, United Nations General Assembly, February 4, 2021, pg. 7, <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/report-commission-human-rights-south-sudan-ahrc4653>.

¹⁸⁹ UNHCR Position on Returns to South Sudan, UNHCR, October 2021, pg. 7, <https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/617676f04.pdf>.

¹⁹⁰ 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: South Sudan, U.S. Department of State, March 31, 2021, section 5, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/south-sudan/>.

¹⁹¹ South Sudan—Violence, floods, displacement in Jonglei, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, August 11, 2020, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-violence-floods-displacement-jonglei-dg-echo-ocha-media-echo-daily>.

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In January 2021, the UNOCHA assessed that “more people in South Sudan than ever are in need of humanitarian assistance,” resulting in an “estimated 8.5 million people, over two thirds of the population, in need of humanitarian assistance, compared to 7.5 million in 2020 and 7.1 million in 2019.”¹⁹² South Sudan is also facing high levels of food insecurity and violence, coupled with flooding and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.¹⁹³

Displacement

Civilians faced significant conflict-related forced displacement in South Sudan.¹⁹⁴ In August 2020, UNOCHA estimated that since February 2020, 157,000 people had been displaced in several counties in Jonglei state, as a result of the ongoing violence and revenge attacks among the warring parties.¹⁹⁵ In 2021, fighting between armed forces, ongoing violence, and cattle raids in Central and Western Equatoria, Jonglei, the Greater Pibor Administrative Area, and Upper Nile states “uprooted people and disrupted humanitarian activities.”¹⁹⁶ In Western Equatoria, an estimated 80,000 people were displaced in Tambura country.¹⁹⁷ In early July 2021, fighting in Warrap state displaced around 10,000 people and left hundreds without any shelter.¹⁹⁸ In Upper Nile, in August 2021, fighting among factions of SPLM/A-IO displaced some 2,000 people.¹⁹⁹

Food Insecurity²⁰⁰ and Floods

South Sudan remains one of the most food-insecure countries in the world.²⁰¹ The overall food security situation deteriorated towards the end of 2020.²⁰² Between April and July 2021, an estimated 7.2 million people, 60 percent of the population, faced high levels of acute food

¹⁹² Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 16, <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

¹⁹³ Situation in South Sudan, UN Security Council, September 9, 2021, pg. 6, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060682/S_2021_784_E.pdf.

¹⁹⁴ Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 25, <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

¹⁹⁵ South Sudan—Violence, floods, displacement in Jonglei, European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, August 11, 2020, <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-violence-floods-displacement-jonglei-dg-echo-ocha-media-echo-daily>.

¹⁹⁶ Situation in South Sudan, UN Security Council, September 9, 2021, pg. 6-7, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060682/S_2021_784_E.pdf.

¹⁹⁷ Situation in South Sudan; Report of the Secretary-General, UN Security Council, December 7, 2021, pg. 5, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2065323/S_2021_1015_E.pdf.

¹⁹⁸ Situation in South Sudan, UN Security Council, September 9, 2021, pg. 6, https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060682/S_2021_784_E.pdf.

¹⁹⁹ *Id.* at pg. 7.

²⁰⁰ According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the lack of “regular access to enough safe and nutritious food for normal growth and development and an active and healthy life. This may be due to unavailability of food and/or lack of resources to obtain food. Food insecurity can be experienced at different levels of severity.” Hunger and food security, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), <https://www.fao.org/hunger/glossary> (last visited January 13, 2022).

²⁰¹ South Sudan Humanitarian Fund Annual Report 2020, UNOCHA, July 6, 2021, pg. 7, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-fund-annual-report-2020>.

²⁰² South Sudan Humanitarian Fund Annual Report 2020, UNOCHA, July 6, 2021, pg. 7, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-fund-annual-report-2020>.

insecurity.²⁰³ Malnutrition in particular remains a pressing issue in South Sudan, with approximately 1.9 million women and children acutely malnourished.²⁰⁴ Malnutrition levels among children under five years of age are above emergency thresholds in many parts of the country, and 1.4 million children are estimated to be acutely malnourished.²⁰⁵ The main factors driving food insecurity and malnourishment are the ongoing conflicts, flooding, and COVID-19.²⁰⁶ Moreover, COVID-19 mitigation efforts also disrupted access to supply chains for commercial and humanitarian assistance, further contributing to food insecurity.²⁰⁷

In October 2021, the WFP reported that South Sudan faced a third year of unprecedented flooding.²⁰⁸ The flooding was exacerbated by standing water from major floods in the previous two years, most of which had not fully receded.²⁰⁹ The most recent flooding has led to “widespread displacement, destruction of livelihoods and contamination of water sources, compounding existing insecurity issues in many regions.”²¹⁰ In its December 2021 report, UNOCHA reported that the number of people affected by floods since May 2021 was 835,000,²¹¹ up from the 380,000 reported in August 2021.²¹² In its February 2021 report, the OHCHR in South Sudan reported that “since the onset of the floods in July 2020, more than one million South Sudanese have been affected by the flooding and more than 856,000 people were displaced and forced to seek refuge on higher ground.”²¹³ The Commission further noted that:

The floods also destroyed hectares of crops and led to the loss of livestock indispensable to the survival of local populations. Moreover, vital water sources became heavily contaminated, rendering vulnerable communities unable to flee at severe risk of contracting life-threatening waterborne diseases, including typhoid and cholera.²¹⁴

²⁰³ Situation in South Sudan, UN Security Council, September 9, 2021, pg. 6, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060682/S_2021_784_E.pdf.

²⁰⁴ South Sudan Situation Report, World Food Programme, October 29, 2021, pg.1, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/wfp-south-sudan-situation-report-296-29-october-2021>.

²⁰⁵ Situation in South Sudan, UN Security Council, September 9, 2021, pg. 6, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060682/S_2021_784_E.pdf.

²⁰⁶ South Sudan Humanitarian Fund Annual Report 2020, UNOCHA, July 6, 2021, pg. 7, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-fund-annual-report-2020>.

²⁰⁷ Id.

²⁰⁸ South Sudan Situation Report, World Food Programme, October 29, 2021, pg.1, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/wfp-south-sudan-situation-report-296-29-october-2021>.

²⁰⁹ South Sudan Situation Report, REACH, December 2021, pg. 2, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-flooding-trends-counties-particular-concern-food-insecurity-december>.

²¹⁰ Id. at pg. 1.

²¹¹ South Sudan Situation Report, UNOCHA, December 2021, pg. 1, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-december-2021>.

²¹² South Sudan Humanitarian Snapshot, UNOCHA, August 2021, pg. 1, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-snapshot-august-2021>.

²¹³ Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, United Nations General Assembly, February 4, 2021, pg. 10, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/report-commission-human-rights-south-sudan-ahrc4653>.

²¹⁴ Report of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan, United Nations General Assembly, February 4, 2021, pg. 11, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/report-commission-human-rights-south-sudan-ahrc4653.1>.

Access to Humanitarian Assistance

Insecurity continued to affect access to humanitarian assistance, particularly in parts of Central and Western Equatoria, Jonglei, and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area.²¹⁵ In addition, in 2021 humanitarian workers and facilities continued to be targeted and at risk of attack,²¹⁶ resulting in the disruption and suspension of humanitarian action.²¹⁷ In December 2021, the UN assessed that between September and November 2021, “89 humanitarian access incidents were reported, including 13 ambushes and five [5] lootings, a 47 percent increase compared with the previous reporting period [published in June 2021].”²¹⁸ In Western Equatoria, health facilities were looted and destroyed; since the beginning of 2021, more than 911 metric tons of food items and nutritional supplements have been looted or destroyed.²¹⁹ Moreover, recurring violence in Jonglei and Greater Pibor Administrative Area affected the delivery of critical humanitarian assistance to highly food-insecure people.²²⁰ In addition, poor road conditions, compounded by heavy rain and ongoing floods, have led to access challenges and slowed the response in the flood-affected areas.²²¹ The government of South Sudan also has limited access to humanitarian aid by establishing an intentionally complex bureaucratic system for the delivery of aid and has failed to guarantee the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. In particular, multiple sources raised serious concerns about the Government's deliberate policy of denying or delaying the issuance of visas for hundreds of international humanitarian staff who had been evacuated from South Sudan owing to COVID-19.²²²

Healthcare and COVID-19

In August 2020, OHCHR reported that “about 56 percent of South Sudan's population does not have access to primary healthcare services.”²²³ In addition, less than two percent of South Sudan's national budget is spent on healthcare,²²⁴ resulting in poorly equipped health facilities

²¹⁵ Situation in South Sudan, UN Security Council, September 9, 2021, pg. 7, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060682/S_2021_784_E.pdf.

²¹⁶ Situation in South Sudan, UN Security Council, September 9, 2021, pg. 7, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060682/S_2021_784_E.pdf.

²¹⁷ Situation in South Sudan; Report of the Secretary-General, UN Security Council, December 7, 2021, pg. 7, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2065323/S_2021_1015_E.pdf.

²¹⁸ Situation in South Sudan; Report of the Secretary-General, UN Security Council, December 7, 2021, pg. 5-6, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2065323/S_2021_1015_E.pdf.

²¹⁹ Situation in South Sudan, UN Security Council, September 9, 2021. pg. 7, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060682/S_2021_784_E.pdf.

²²⁰ Situation in South Sudan, UN Security Council, September 9, 2021, pg. 6-7, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060682/S_2021_784_E.pdf.

²²¹ Situation in South Sudan; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/1015], UN Security Council, December 7, 2021, pg. 5-6, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2065323/S_2021_1015_E.pdf.

²²² Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Security Council, April 15, 2021, pg. 16-17, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/final-report-panel-experts-south-sudan-submitted-pursuant-resolution-2521-2020>.

²²³ Renewed violence and delayed implementation of the peace agreement severely threaten peace and stability in South Sudan, UN experts note, UNHCR, August 14, 2020, available at <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2036539.html>.

²²⁴ South Sudan—Strengthening primary health care in fragile settings, World Health Organization, May 20, 2021, available at <https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/south-sudan-2021>.

with limited staff.²²⁵ In January 2021, UNOCHA reported that “out of approximately 2,300 health facilities, more than 1,300 are non-functional. Of the functioning health facilities, 57 percent are supported by humanitarian and development partners and many remain in areas that are not easily accessible by the communities.”²²⁶ South Sudan also continues to face “regular outbreaks of infectious diseases like measles, water-borne diseases such as diarrhea and Hepatitis E virus, and vector-borne diseases like malaria and yellow fever,” in addition to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic.²²⁷ According to the WFP, the “COVID-19 pandemic continues to present serious risks to an already fragile situation, threatening to further exacerbate acute food insecurity.”²²⁸ As of January 3, 2022, 16,607 people had contracted COVID-19, including 136 associated deaths.²²⁹

Economic Situation

According to the World Bank, South Sudan is facing “concurrent setbacks in the economy” due to rising poverty, food insecurity and a resurgence of conflict.²³⁰ Moreover, falling global oil prices have also affected South Sudan's oil revenues.²³¹ South Sudan's economy is heavily oil-dependent, with oil accounting for 90 percent of government revenue and nearly all exports.²³² This situation has caused a “great percentage of South Sudanese people to lose their sources of livelihood and has left some communities facing catastrophic needs.”²³³ Moreover, urgent and essentials measures to manage the COVID-19 pandemic, “worsened economic conditions, disrupting livelihoods and affecting vulnerable households' access to markets, food and adequate income.”²³⁴

²²⁵ South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021 (January 2021), UNOCHA, January 2021, pg. 12, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2045425/south_sudan_2021_humanitarian_needs_overview.pdf.

²²⁶ South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021 (January 2021), UNOCHA, January 2021, pg. 12, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2045425/south_sudan_2021_humanitarian_needs_overview.pdf.

²²⁷ Strengthening public health surveillance and response using the third Edition Integrated Disease Surveillance and Response guidelines in South Sudan, World Health Organization, November 27, 2021, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/strengthening-public-health-surveillance-and-response-using-third-edition>.

²²⁸ South Sudan Country Brief, World Food Programme, November 2021, pg. 1, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/wfp-south-sudan-country-brief-november-2021>.

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²²⁹ South Sudan COVID-19 Dashboard, World Health Organization, <https://covid19.who.int/region/emro/country/sd> (last visited on January 19, 2022).

²³⁰ South Sudan Economic Update, June 2021: Pathways to Sustainable Food Security, The World Bank, July 2, 2021, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-economic-update-june-2021-pathways-sustainable-food-security>.

²³¹ South Sudan Economic Update, June 2021: Pathways to Sustainable Food Security, The World Bank, July 2, 2021, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-economic-update-june-2021-pathways-sustainable-food-security>.

²³² South Sudan Humanitarian Needs Overview 2021 (January 2021), UNOCHA, January 2021, pg. 12, available at https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2045425/south_sudan_2021_humanitarian_needs_overview.pdf.

²³³ South Sudan Economic Update, June 2021: Pathways to Sustainable Food Security, The World Bank, July 2, 2021, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-economic-update-june-2021-pathways-sustainable-food-security>.

²³⁴ South Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan, FAO, May 2021, pg. 2, available at <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/south-sudan-humanitarian-response-plan-2021>.

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The R-ARCSS was signed on September 12, 2018, by President Kiir, current First Vice President Riek Machar Teny, and other representatives of certain opposition groups. A prior peace agreement was signed in 2015 and a unity government was formed; however, fighting ensued between the parties in July 2016 and Machar left South Sudan shortly thereafter. The R-ARCSS addresses various political, security, and transitional justice issues, including the establishment of a unity government. However, not all of South Sudan's opposition leaders signed the agreement, including a key opposition group, the NAS.²³⁵

Syria

On August 1, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the extension of the TPS designation for Syria and the redesignation of Syria for 18 months, effective October 1, 2022, through March 31, 2024.²³⁶

The information below describing the reasons for these actions has been excerpted from the August 1, 2022 FRN that announced the extension and redesignation.

DHS has reviewed country conditions in Syria. Based on the review, including input received from and other U.S. Government agencies, the Secretary has determined that an 18-month TPS extension is warranted because the ongoing armed conflict and extraordinary and temporary conditions supporting Syria's TPS designation remain. The Secretary has further determined that the conditions support redesignating Syria for TPS under section 244(b)(3)(C) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. 1254a(b)(3)(C), and is changing the “continuous residence” and “continuous physical presence” dates that applicants must meet to be eligible for TPS.

Overview

DHS conducted a thorough review of country conditions in Syria. The ongoing civil war resulted in large-scale destruction of infrastructure, mass displacement of civilians, high levels of food insecurity, limited access to water and medical care, and widespread civilian casualties. These impacts have been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic which contributed to the further breakdown of the economy and strained an already overburdened healthcare system. The UN verified that at least 350,209 identified civilians and combatants were killed between March 2011 and March 2021, including 26,727 women and 27,126 children, but it has warned that this figure “indicates a minimum verifiable number” and is an “undercount of the actual number.”²³⁷ The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR), a UK-based monitoring group with a network of sources on the ground, had documented the deaths of 494,438 people as of

²³⁵ See South Sudan Security Situation, EASO, April 24, 2020, pg. 3, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2028851/2020_04_Q8_COI_South_Sudan_Security_Situation.pdfhttps://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2028851/2020_04_Q8_COI_South_Sudan_Security_Situation.pdf.

²³⁶ See 87 FR 46982 (August 1, 2022) (18-month extension of Syria’s TPS designation through March 31, 2024, and redesignation of Syria for TPS through March 31, 2024).

²³⁷ This count includes “only those people identifiable by full name, with an established date of death, and who died in an identified governorate” and was sourced from OHCHR's own data, records maintained by civil society organizations, and information from the Syrian government. UNOHCHR, “Oral update on the extent of conflict-related deaths in the Syrian Arab Republic | OHCHR” (September 24, 2021), <https://www.ohchr.org/en/statements/2021/09/oral-update-extent-conflict-related-deaths-syrian-arab-republic?LangID=E&NewsID=27531>.

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June 2021, and said that at least 159,774 civilians had been killed.²³⁸ The group estimated that the actual toll from the war was more than 606,000, saying 47,000 civilians were believed to have died of torture in government-run prisons.²³⁹ Another monitoring group, the Violations Documentation Center, which relies on information from activists across the country, had documented 239,251 battle-related deaths, including 145,240 civilians, as of June 2022.²⁴⁰ Additionally, the ongoing military operations have injured more than 2.1 million Syrian civilians with varying injuries, wounds, and permanent disabilities.²⁴¹

Eleven years of war have inflicted immense suffering on the Syrian people. More than half of Syria's pre-war population of 22 million have either fled the country or are displaced within its borders.²⁴² Syria remains the world's largest displacement crisis.²⁴³ The number of Syrian IDPs to date is approximately 7 million people.²⁴⁴

Harm to civilians has been widespread, but the magnitude of violence has varied greatly by location. Parties to the Syrian conflict killed 1,271 civilians in 2021, including 299 children and 134 women.²⁴⁵ Both government and opposition forces reportedly engage in indiscriminate attacks through the use of airstrikes, explosives, snipers, and rocket and mortar attacks, killing thousands and leaving many without the means or ability to escape the violence.²⁴⁶ Since 2021, cities as far north as Idlib, and as far south as Daraa have seen heavy civilian casualties as well as damage to civilian objects.²⁴⁷

Multiple actors in the conflict have been accused of targeting civilians and civilian facilities. In January 2022, Russia conducted airstrikes on the Al Arshani Water Pump Station located west of Idlib city, injuring at least one station worker, causing substantial damage to the station's buildings and equipment, and forcing the station's main water pumping pipe temporarily out of

²³⁸ SOHR, “Total death toll | Over 606,000 people killed across Syria since the beginning of the “Syrian Revolution”, including 495,000 documented by SOHR (June 1, 2021), <https://www.syriahr.com/en/217360/>.

²³⁹ SOHR, “Total death toll | Over 606,000 people killed across Syria since the beginning of the “Syrian Revolution”, including 495,000 documented by SOHR (June 1, 2021), <https://www.syriahr.com/en/217360/>.

²⁴⁰ Violation Documentation Center, “Monthly statistical on casualties in Syria, June 2022” (June 2022), <https://scm.bz/en/violations-watch/monthly-statistical-on-casualties-in-syria-june-2022>.

²⁴¹ SOHR, “Total death toll | Over 606,000 people killed across Syria since the beginning of the “Syrian Revolution”, including 495,000 documented by SOHR (June 1, 2021), <https://www.syriahr.com/en/217360/>.

²⁴² UNHCR, “Eleven years on, mounting challenges push many displaced Syrians to the brink” (March 15, 2022), <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2022/3/623055174/eleven-years-mounting-challenges-push-displaced-syrians-brink.html>.

²⁴³ UNHCR, “Eleven years on, mounting challenges push many displaced Syrians to the brink” (Mar 15, 2022), <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2022/3/623055174/eleven-years-mounting-challenges-push-displaced-syrians-brink.html>.

²⁴⁴ USAID, “Syria—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #4, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022” (Mar 4, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-4-fiscal-year-fy-2022>.

²⁴⁵ Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021” (Jan 21, 2022), https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/Eleventh_Annual_Report_The_Most_Notable_Human_Rights_Violations_in_Syria_in_2021_en.pdf.

²⁴⁶ Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Events of 2021” (Jan. 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/syria>.

²⁴⁷ Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Events of 2021” (Jan. 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/syria>.

service.²⁴⁸ In February 2022, there were at least six incidents of attacks impacting vital civilian facilities, among them, a school, two markets, a park, and a livestock farm.²⁴⁹ In April 2022, ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack on civilians gathering for an iftar meal during Ramadan, killing seven people and wounding four.²⁵⁰ Also in April 2022, Syrian government forces shelled a village in north Idlib countryside, killing at least three students on their way to school.²⁵¹ According to the Syrian Civil Defense, Russian and Syrian forces and allied militias have launched 130 air and artillery attacks on northwestern Syria during the first quarter of 2022.²⁵² These attacks struck civilian homes, public buildings, and service facilities, killing 47 people and wounding more than 100 others.²⁵³

Mandatory military service has been the law in Syria since 2007.²⁵⁴ Men from the ages of 18 to 42 are required to serve, and women may enlist voluntarily.²⁵⁵ Conscripts are required to serve for 18 to 21 months, depending on their level of education.²⁵⁶ Syria has intermittently declared amnesties for military service evaders to encourage returns, however, “returnees have found themselves back on conscription lists in as little as seven days, after the government exploited a loophole in the decree,” thereby rendering the amnesty provisions meaningless.²⁵⁷ In February 2021, the Syrian regime announced an amendment to the military conscription laws. Under the amended law, those who did not do military service before the age of 43 must pay \$8,000, or lose their property without notice any right to appeal.²⁵⁸

The Syrian Democratic Forces and other entities in Syria have also been accused of forced conscription: “[The Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR)] ...recorded Syrian Democratic Forces kidnapping two children [in January 2022] with the aim of taking them to its training and

²⁴⁸ Syrian Archive, “Airstrikes on the Al Arshani Water Pump Station in Idlib” (February 14, 2022), <https://syrianarchive.org/en/investigations/arshani>.

²⁴⁹ Syrian Network for Human Rights, “The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in February 2022,” (Mar. 4, 2022), <https://snhr.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/M220303E.pdf>.

²⁵⁰ Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “SOHR: Daesh kills 7 Syrians at Ramadan iftar meal” (Apr. 29, 2022), <https://www.syriahr.com/en/249367/>.

²⁵¹ Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, “Regime offensive | Three students killed in regime rocket attack on area in Idlib countryside” (Apr. 4, 2022), <https://www.syriahr.com/en/245693/>.

²⁵² Euro-Med Monitor, “Killing 4 children in Syrian regime bombardment may amount to war crime” (Apr 5, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/killing-4-children-syrian-regime-bombardment-may-amount-war-crime-enar>.

²⁵³ Euro-Med Monitor, “Killing 4 children in Syrian regime bombardment may amount to war crime,” (April 6, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/killing-4-children-syrian-regime-bombardment-may-amount-war-crime-enar>.

²⁵⁴ The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, “TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law” (Aug 22, 2019), <https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-brief-conscription-law/>.

²⁵⁵ The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, “TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law” (Aug 22, 2019), <https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-brief-conscription-law/>.

²⁵⁶ The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy, “TIMEP Brief: Conscription Law” (Aug 22, 2019), <https://timep.org/reports-briefings/timep-brief-conscription-law/>.

²⁵⁷ Human Rights Watch, “Our Lives are Like Death” (Oct. 2021), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/10/syria1021_web.pdf.

²⁵⁸ Human Rights Watch, “Syrian ‘Military Evaders’ Face Unlawful Seizure of Property, Assets” (Feb 9, 2021), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/09/syrian-military-evaders-face-unlawful-seizure-property-assets>.

recruitment camps and forcibly conscripting them ...”²⁵⁹ Further, compulsory recruitment under the “Law on Mandatory Self-Defense Duty” was first introduced in 2014 and is confined to the areas of northern and eastern Syria under the control of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration.²⁶⁰ Under this law, conscription is mandatory for all male residents, both Syrian nationals and stateless Kurds, after reaching 18 years old. Syrians from other parts of the country who have resided in the area longer than five years are obligated to join as well.²⁶¹

Syrian children have suffered disproportionately since the start of the conflict. At least 29,661 children have been killed in Syria since March 2011, including 181 due to torture, in addition to 5,036 arrested or forcibly disappeared children.²⁶² The SNHR estimates that there are at least 1,374 children currently serving in the Syrian regime forces.²⁶³ Other actors in the conflict are also accused of engaging in forced conscription of children. These include: Hay'at Tahrir al Sham, Syrian Democratic Forces, factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA), Al-Nusra Front, ISIS, as well as Iranian militias or militias supported by Iran.²⁶⁴ According to the UNHCR, there are currently at least 2.5 million displaced children in Syria.²⁶⁵ UNICEF reported 6.5 million children in need of humanitarian assistance in a March 2022 report.²⁶⁶

Human rights abuses continue to be rampant in Syria. One report cites 2,218 cases of arbitrary arrest or detention, including 85 children and 77 women, committed by parties to the conflict and controlling forces in 2021, almost half of which were attributed to the Assad regime.²⁶⁷ The same report notes that at least 104 individuals were documented as dying as a result of torture in 2021 at the hands of Syrian regime forces, Syrian Democratic Forces, Hay'at Tahrir al Sham,

²⁵⁹ Syrian Network for Human Rights, “143 Arbitrary Arrests/Detentions Documented in Syria in January 2022,” including 2 children, (Feb. 2, 2022), https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/143_Arbitrary_Arrests_Detentions_Documented_in_Syria_in_January_2022_Including_Two_Children_en.pdf.

²⁶⁰ European Union Agency for Asylum, “Persons fearing forced or child recruitment by Kurdish forces,” (last updated Sept. 2020), <https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-syria/26-persons-fearing-forced-or-child-recruitment-kurdish-forces>.

²⁶¹ European Union Agency for Asylum, “Persons fearing forced or child recruitment by Kurdish forces,” (last updated Sept. 2020), <https://euaa.europa.eu/country-guidance-syria/26-persons-fearing-forced-or-child-recruitment-kurdish-forces>.

²⁶² Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR). “On World Children's Day; Tenth Annual Report on Violations against Children in Syria” (Nov. 20, 2021), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/world-children-s-day-tenth-annual-report-violations-against-children>.

²⁶³ Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR). “On World Children's Day; Tenth Annual Report on Violations against Children in Syria” (Nov. 20, 2021), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/world-children-s-day-tenth-annual-report-violations-against-children>.

²⁶⁴ Syrian Network for Human Rights (SNHR). “On World Children's Day; Tenth Annual Report on Violations against Children in Syria” (Nov. 20, 2021), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/world-children-s-day-tenth-annual-report-violations-against-children>.

²⁶⁵ Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021” (Jan 21, 2022), https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/Eleventh_Annual_Report_The_Most_Notable_Human_Rights_Violations_in_Syria_in_2021_en.pdf.

²⁶⁶ UNICEF, “Whole of Syria Humanitarian Situation Report: March 2022,” (May 15, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/unicef-whole-syria-humanitarian-situation-report-march-2022>.

²⁶⁷ Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021” (Jan. 21, 2022), https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/Eleventh_Annual_Report_The_Most_Notable_Human_Rights_Violations_in_Syria_in_2021_en.pdf.

factions of the SNA as well as other parties to the conflict.²⁶⁸ Furthermore, individuals returning to Syria have reported that the Syrian government or its affiliated militias subjected them or their family members to arbitrary arrest or detention, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, kidnappings, and extrajudicial killings after their return to Syria.²⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch has reported “21 cases of arrest and arbitrary detention ...” 13 cases of torture, 3 kidnappings, 5 extrajudicial killings, and 17 enforced disappearances between 2017 and 2021 among refugees who had returned to Syria from Jordan and Lebanon.”²⁷⁰

After 11 years of conflict, Syria's healthcare system has suffered gravely. As of March 2022, Physicians for Human Rights has documented and verified 601 attacks hitting at least 350 health facilities since the start of the conflict.²⁷¹ A January 2022 report states that more than 50 percent of healthcare workers are estimated to have left the country in the last decade.²⁷² Out of the almost 1,800 available public health centers, 45 percent were not fully functioning as of September 2021, at a time when the Syrian people needed them the most amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.²⁷³ Seven medical personnel were killed in Syria in 2021 at the hands of parties to the conflict and controlling forces in Syria.²⁷⁴ The COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated shortcomings in an already weakened healthcare system. The UN identifies Syria as one of the countries in the Middle East most severely affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly as low vaccine availability, vaccine hesitancy, infections among frontline health workers, high transmission rates in IDP camps, oxygen supply shortages, inadequate testing materials, and limited cold chain and technical capacity hamper infection prevention, monitoring, and response efforts.²⁷⁵ As of March 2022, 11.4 percent of the total population had received at least one dose of the COVID-19 vaccine, and only 6.6 percent were fully vaccinated.²⁷⁶

According to the WFP, at least 12.4 million Syrians, out of an estimated population of 16 million, are food insecure.²⁷⁷ This 2021 estimate reflects an increase of 3.1 million food insecure

²⁶⁸ Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021” (Jan. 21, 2022), [https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/Eleventh Annual Report The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021 en.pdf](https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/Eleventh%20Annual%20Report%20The%20Most%20Notable%20Human%20Rights%20Violations%20in%20Syria%20in%202021%20en.pdf).

²⁶⁹ Human Rights Watch. “Our Lives are Like Death” (Oct. 2021), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/10/syria1021_web.pdf.

²⁷⁰ Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Events of 2021” (Jan. 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/syria>.

²⁷¹ International Rescue Committee, “11 years of violence against health care in Syria” (Mar. 31, 2022), <https://www.rescue.org/resource/11-years-violence-against-health-care-syria>.

²⁷² UNOCHA, “Situation Report #35: Recent Developments in Northwest Syria and RAATA” (Jan. 2022), <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/stima/document/situation-report-35-recent-developments-northwest-syria-and-raata-january>.

²⁷³ International Rescue Committee, “11 years of violence against health care in Syria” (Mar. 31, 2022), <https://www.rescue.org/resource/11-years-violence-against-health-care-syria>.

²⁷⁴ Syrian Network for Human Rights, “Eleventh Annual Report: The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021” (Jan 21, 2022), [https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/Eleventh Annual Report The Most Notable Human Rights Violations in Syria in 2021 en.pdf](https://snhr.org/wp-content/pdf/english/Eleventh%20Annual%20Report%20The%20Most%20Notable%20Human%20Rights%20Violations%20in%20Syria%20in%202021%20en.pdf).

²⁷⁵ USAID, “Syria—Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #4, Fiscal Year (FY) 2022” (Mar. 4, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-complex-emergency-fact-sheet-4-fiscal-year-fy-2022>.

²⁷⁶ World Health Organization, “Monthly COVID-19 Bulletin: March 2022,” (Mar. 26, 2022), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/monthly_covid-19_bulletin-march_2022.pdf.

²⁷⁷ Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Events of 2021” (Jan. 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/syria>.

people in one year.²⁷⁸ Moreover, according to the same report, more than 600,000 children are chronically malnourished.²⁷⁹ The UNOCHA reports that routine shortages in basic goods, including bread and fuel, have become commonplace and the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance increased by 21 percent in 2021—reaching a total of 13.4 million people, with 1.48 million in “catastrophic” need.²⁸⁰ The price of the national food basket²⁸¹ increased by 24 percent from February to March 2022, the greatest monthly increase and the highest price recorded since tracking began in 2013.²⁸²

In 2021, Syria was impacted by several climate and natural resource-related shocks. Erratic rainfall as well as historically low water levels in the Euphrates River have reduced access to water for drinking and domestic use for over five million people.²⁸³ In addition, this has triggered substantial harvest and income losses, decreased hydroelectricity generation, and increased water-borne illnesses.²⁸⁴ Northern Syria is experiencing severe water shortages as a result of higher-than-average temperatures.²⁸⁵ Of 1,087 UNICEF beneficiaries surveyed across Syria in February and March 2022, 15 percent reported water availability once a week or less and 19 percent reported no water availability.²⁸⁶

In October 2021, the World Bank estimated that the Syrian economy had shrunk by more than 60 percent since 2010.²⁸⁷ Between October 2019 and October 2021, the Syrian pound lost 82 percent of its value against the dollar.²⁸⁸ UNOCHA estimated that, in 2021, 90 percent of the

²⁷⁸ Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Events of 2021” (Jan. 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/syria>.

²⁷⁹ Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Events of 2021” (Jan. 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/syria>.

²⁸⁰ Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Events of 2021” (Jan. 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/syria>.

²⁸¹ The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) issues a monthly food price index, a measure of change in international prices of a basket of food commodities. See United Nations, “Global Issues: Food” (last visited June 27, 2022), <https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/food>. A national food basket is a group of essential food commodities. In Syria, the food basket is set at a group of dry goods providing 2,060 kcal a day for a family of five during a month. The basket includes 37 kg bread, 19 kg rice, 19 kg lentils, 5 kg of sugar, and 7 liters of vegetable oil. See World Food Program, “Syria Country Office Market Price Watch Bulletin Issue 88, March 2022, (Apr. 27, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-country-office-market-price-watch-bulletin-issue-88-march-2022>.

²⁸² UNICEF, “Whole of Syria Humanitarian Situation Report: March 2022,” (May 15, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/unicef-whole-syria-humanitarian-situation-report-march-2022>.

²⁸³ UNOCHA, “2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic” (Feb. 22, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/2022-humanitarian-needs-overview-syrian-arab-republic-february-2022>.

²⁸⁴ UNOCHA, “2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic” (Feb. 22, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/2022-humanitarian-needs-overview-syrian-arab-republic-february-2022>.

²⁸⁵ International Rescue Committee, “Crisis in Syria: Economic crisis compounds over a decade of war” (Mar. 15, 2022), <https://www.rescue.org/article/crisis-syria-economic-crisis-compounds-over-decade-war>.

²⁸⁶ UNICEF, “Whole of Syria Humanitarian Situation Report: March 2022,” (May 15, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/unicef-whole-syria-humanitarian-situation-report-march-2022>.

²⁸⁷ Human Rights Watch, “Our Lives Are Like Death” (Oct. 2021), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/media_2021/10/syria1021_web.pdf.

²⁸⁸ International Rescue Committee, “Crisis in Syria: Economic crisis compounds over a decade of war” (Mar. 15, 2022), <https://www.rescue.org/article/crisis-syria-economic-crisis-compounds-over-decade-war>

population lived below the poverty line.²⁸⁹ An April 2022 World Bank report indicates that “the continued depreciation of the local currency has led to rampant inflation, worsening already high food insecurity and pushing more people into poverty.”²⁹⁰ A UN report from April 2022 estimates that 14.6 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, which is a 9 percent increase from the previous year.²⁹¹

In summary, the ongoing conflict, compounded by economic downturn, food insecurity, water insecurity, the COVID-19 pandemic, a weakened healthcare system, weakened civilian infrastructure, human rights violations and abuses, violations of the law of armed conflict, forced conscription and mass displacement have an enormous human cost for the Syrian people.

Yemen

On December 30, 2022, DHS publicly announced that the Secretary decided to extend the TPS designation of Yemen and redesignate Yemen for TPS, effective March 4, 2023, through September 3, 2024. The FRN announcing this decision published on January 3, 2023.²⁹²

The information below describing the reasons for these actions has been excerpted from the January 3, 2023 FRN that announced the extension and redesignation.

DHS has reviewed country conditions in Yemen. Based on the review, including input received from DOS and other U.S. Government agencies, the Secretary has determined that an 18-month extension is warranted because the ongoing armed conflict and extraordinary and temporary conditions supporting Yemen's TPS designation remain. The Secretary has further determined that redesignating Yemen for TPS under INA section 244(b)(1)(A) and (C), [8 U.S.C. 1254a\(b\)\(1\)\(A\)](#) and [\(C\)](#), is warranted. The Secretary is accordingly updating the “continuous residence” and “continuous physical presence” dates that applicants must meet to be eligible for TPS.

The ongoing armed conflict has deepened Yemen's difficult economic and humanitarian situation. It has directly affected the physical security of the civilian population, including from attacks involving artillery, missiles, mortars, rockets, and landmines.²⁹³ Over 4 million people have been internally displaced within Yemen, 286,000 of them in 2021 alone;²⁹⁴ children

²⁸⁹ Human Rights Watch, “Syria: Events of 2021” (Jan. 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/syria>.

²⁹⁰ World Bank. “Macro Poverty Outlook for Syria: April 2022” (April 2022), <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/099039004242232398/IDU0107dbcc10f799044b70bc070ac75483e6628>.

²⁹¹ UNHCR, “Syria: UNHCR Operational Update, April 2022” (May 12, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/syria-unhcr-operational-update-april-2022>.

²⁹² See 88 FR 94 (January 3, 2023) (18-month extension of Yemen’s TPS designation and redesignation through September 3, 2024).

²⁹³ World Report 2022—Yemen Events of 2021, Human Rights Watch World Report, available at: https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/yemen?gclid=EA1aIQobChMIo86n6cvx-QIVL3FvBB3bpQduEAAYASAAEgI9C_D_BwE (last visited Oct. 21, 2022).

²⁹⁴ Yemen Fact Sheet, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), June 2022, available at: <https://reporting.unhcr.org/document/3030> (last visited Oct. 21, 2022).

account for half of the IDP population, approximately 2 million.²⁹⁵ Terrorist organizations operating inside of Yemen also pose a danger to civilians.²⁹⁶

The protracted conflict had carried on for years until a truce backed by the UN came into effect on April 2, 2022.²⁹⁷ During the truce period, armed confrontation decreased; however, the risk to civilians, particularly from unexploded ordinance, remained significant.²⁹⁸ Between April and September 2022, the ACLED recorded an average of more than 200 reported deaths per month from organized political violence across the country.²⁹⁹ Although much lower than what was recorded before the truce, this number is still alarmingly high.³⁰⁰ The truce was extended twice, once effective June 2, 2022, and once effective August 2, 2022,³⁰¹ before ultimately expiring on October 2, 2022.³⁰²

Notably, the truce did not reduce the need for humanitarian aid across Yemen. The UN reports that 24.1 million people (approximately 80 percent of the population) are in need of humanitarian assistance as a result of armed conflict.³⁰³ The conflict continues to cause high levels of food insecurity, limited access to water and medical care,³⁰⁴ and the large-scale destruction of Yemen's infrastructure and cultural heritage.³⁰⁵

The six months of the truce did have a positive impact on the safety and security of most civilians, with the number of civilian deaths declining by 60 percent and displacement decreasing

²⁹⁵ UNICEF Yemen Humanitarian Situation Report: January—December 2021, Reliefweb, Mar. 16, 2022, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/unicef-yemen-humanitarian-situation-report-january-december-2021-enar> (last visited Oct. 21, 2022).

²⁹⁶ Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering, Council on Foreign Relations, Oct. 21, 2022, available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis> (last visited Dec. 6, 2022).

²⁹⁷ Yemen truce renewed for another two months, UN News, Aug. 2, 2022, available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1123832> (last visited Aug. 22, 2022).

²⁹⁸ Save the Children, Yemen: Explosive remnants of war the biggest killer of children since truce began, June 30, 2022, available at: <https://www.savethechildren.net/news/yemen-explosive-remnants-war-biggest-killed-children-truce-began> (last visited Oct. 25, 2022).

²⁹⁹ Violence in Yemen During the UN-Mediated Truce: April-October 2022, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Oct. 14, 2022, available at: <https://acleddata.com/2022/10/14/violence-in-yemen-during-the-un-mediated-truce-april-october-2022/> (last visited Oct. 25, 2022).

³⁰⁰ *Id.*

³⁰¹ Yemen truce renewed for another two months, UN News, Aug. 2, 2022, Available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/08/1123832> (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).

³⁰² Department of State, Press Release, UN Truce Expiration in Yemen, Oct. 3, 2022, available at: <https://www.state.gov/un-truce-expiration-in-yemen/> (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).

³⁰³ The United Nations in Yemen, available at: <https://yemen.un.org/en/about/about-the-un> (last visited Aug. 31, 2022).

³⁰⁴ Yemen's Tragedy: War, Stalemate, and Suffering, Council on Foreign Relations, Aug. 22, 2022, available at: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/yemen-crisis> (last visited Aug. 31, 2022).

³⁰⁵ Heritage at Risk in Yemen, UNESCO, available at: <https://en.unesco.org/galleries/heritage-risk-yemen> (last visited Aug. 31, 2022).

by nearly 50 percent.³⁰⁶ However, political violence continued even during the truce.³⁰⁷ The April 2022 truce terms included “a halt to all offensive ...military operations, inside and outside of Yemen”³⁰⁸ but there were 2,977 reported violations of the truce and 504 reported fatalities from truce violation events.³⁰⁹ These reported violations included 2,208 shelling/artillery/missile attacks, 374 air/drone strikes, 369 armed clashes, and 26 disrupted weapons use.³¹⁰

Even prior to the expiration of the truce on October 2, 2022, Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs), which consist of Unexploded Ordnances, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and landmines, remained a significant threat to civilians in Yemen.³¹¹ Despite the truce, July 2022 was the deadliest month due to ERWs in over two years.³¹² Since April 2, 2022, ERWs have been the “biggest killers of children in Yemen”³¹³ as a “result of families moving to previously inaccessible areas following the decrease in hostilities.”³¹⁴ According to Save the Children, landmines and unexploded munition were responsible for over 75 percent of all war-related casualties among children.³¹⁵ DOS estimates that as of April 2021, “Houthi forces (have) laid over one million landmines and IEDs across the country.”³¹⁶ According to a 2018 UN experts report, those mines “represent a hazard for commercial shipping and sea lines of communication that could remain for as long as six to 10 years.”³¹⁷ Landmines and other explosive hazards have continued to be the main cause of civilian casualties.³¹⁸

³⁰⁶ End of Yemen's truce leaves civilians afraid dark days are back, Al-Jazeera, Oct. 7, 2022, available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/7/end-yemen-truce-leaves-civilians-afraid-dark-days-back> (last visited Oct. 7, 2022).

³⁰⁷ Violence in Yemen During the UN-Mediated Truce: April-October 2022, ACLED, Oct. 14, 2022, available at: <https://acleddata.com/2022/10/14/violence-in-yemen-during-the-un-mediated-truce-april-october-2022/> (last visited Oct. 25, 2022).

³⁰⁸ Yemen Truce Monitor, ACLED, available at: <https://acleddata.com/middle-east/yemen/yemen-truce-monitor/> (last visited Oct. 19, 2022).

³⁰⁹ *Id.*

³¹⁰ *Id.*

³¹¹ Yemen: Explosive remnants of war the biggest killer of children since truce began, Save the Children, June 30, 2022, available at: <https://www.savethechildren.net/news/yemen-explosive-remnants-war-biggest-killed-children-truce-began> (last visited Aug. 31, 2022).

³¹² Thematic Report: A review of how flooding can exacerbate civilian vulnerabilities to the ERW threat in Yemen, Civilian Impact Monitoring Center, Aug. 2022, available at: https://civilianimpactmonitoring.org/onewebmedia/20220826_CIMP%20Thematic%2008_Flooding%20and%20ERW.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2022).

³¹³ Yemen: Explosive remnants of war the biggest killer of children since truce began, Save the Children, June 30, 2022, available at: <https://www.savethechildren.net/news/yemen-explosive-remnants-war-biggest-killed-children-truce-began> (last visited Aug. 31, 2022).

³¹⁴ *Id.*

³¹⁵ *Id.*

³¹⁶ Daniel Gurley, Small Steps Have a Big Impact for Yemeni Civilians, DOS Dipnote: Military and Security, Apr. 6, 2021, available at: <https://www.state.gov/dipnote-u-s-department-of-state-official-blog/small-steps-have-a-big-impact-for-yemeni-civilians/> (last visited Sept. 6, 2022).

³¹⁷ Land mines will be hidden killer in Yemen decades after war, AP, Dec. 24, 2018, available at: <https://www.apnews.com/bce0a80324d040f09843ceb3e4e45c1e> (last visited Sept. 6, 2022).

³¹⁸ UN chief urges Yemen's warring parties to extend truce, AP, Oct. 13, 2022, available at: <https://apnews.com/article/middle-east-united-nations-abu-dhabi-yemen-civil-wars-abde5c3c4247328a8d38f6d65ad85231> (last visited Nov. 17, 2022).

The UN considers the humanitarian crisis in Yemen to be the largest in the world.³¹⁹ As of April 2022, “19.7 million people lack access to basic health services. Only 51 percent of the health facilities in Yemen are fully functioning and of those, most lack operational specialists, equipment, and basic medicines.”³²⁰ As of September 2021, “over 80 percent of the population face[d] significant challenges in reaching food, drinking water and access to health care services. Shortages of human resources, equipment, and supplies are severely hindering healthcare provision.”³²¹ The lack of specialists has been an increasing problem; as of March 2022, fewer than 2,000 medical specialists were left in all of Yemen.³²² Healthcare for mothers and their babies in Yemen is categorized by the UN as “highly vulnerable;” according to the World Bank, approximately one woman and six newborns in Yemen die every two hours due to complications during pregnancy or childbirth.³²³

Historically, Yemen has relied on imported foodstuffs.³²⁴ Yemen imports 90 percent of its basic food needs.³²⁵ The WFP estimated that 19 million Yemenis (or more than 60 percent of the population) would be food insecure over the second half of 2022,³²⁶ and 1.6 million people in Yemen “[were] expected to fall into emergency levels of hunger, taking the total to 7.3 million people by the end of the year.”³²⁷ Currently, 2.2 million children (approximately half of Yemeni children under age five) are under threat of acute malnutrition.³²⁸ The UNHCR has stated that Yemen is on the brink of famine, and IDPs are “four times more likely to go hungry than the rest of the population.”³²⁹

³¹⁹ The United Nations in Yemen, available at: <https://yemen.un.org/en/about/about-the-un> (last visited Aug. 31, 2022).

³²⁰ Yemen Health Factsheet, USAID, Apr. 25, 2022, available at: <https://www.usaid.gov/yemen/fact-sheets/health-fact-sheet> (last visited Oct. 21, 2022).

³²¹ Health Care Sector in Yemen—Policy Note, World Bank, Sept. 14, 2021, available at <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/health-sector-in-yemen-policy-note> (last visited Sept. 1, 2022).

³²² Yemen's hospitals in crisis as doctors flee country, Middle East Eye, Mar. 29, 2022, available at: <https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/yemens-hospitals-crisis-doctors-flee-country> (last visited Sept. 1, 2022).

³²³ Health Care Sector in Yemen—Policy Note, World Bank, Sept. 14, 2021, available at <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/yemen/publication/health-sector-in-yemen-policy-note> (last visited Sept. 1, 2022).

³²⁴ Missiles and Food: Yemen's man-made food security crisis, Oxfam, Dec. 2017, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/bn-missiles-food-security-yemen-201217-en.pdf> (last visited Sept. 6, 2022).

³²⁵ Democratizing Development in Yemen: Beyond Food Aid, Wilson Center, Aug. 8, 2022, available at: <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/democratizing-development-yemen-beyond-food-aid> (last visited Nov. 17, 2022).

³²⁶ Yemen—World Food Programme, June 2022, available at: <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000141295/download/> (last visited Oct. 21, 2022).

³²⁷ Brutal War on Yemen: Dire Hunger Crisis Teetering on the Edge of Catastrophe, IPS, Mar. 18, 2022, available at: https://www.ipsnews.net/2022/03/brutal-war-yemen-dire-hunger-crisis-teetering-edge-catastrophe/?utm_source=rss&utm_medium=rss&utm_campaign=brutal-war-yemen-dire-hunger-crisis-teetering-edge-catastrophe (last visited Oct. 21, 2022).

³²⁸ Yemen—World Food Programme, June 2022, available at: <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000141295/download/> (last visited Sept. 2, 2022).

³²⁹ Get to know Fattoum, a displaced Yemeni mother who struggles to take care of her orphaned children, UNHCR, Apr. 22, 2022, available at: <https://zakat.unhcr.org/blog/en/beneficiaries/fattoum> (last visited Oct. 21, 2022).

The World Bank reported that as of April 14, 2022, “[e]conomic conditions continue to deteriorate, and the acute humanitarian crisis persists.”³³⁰ Official statistics about the status of Yemen’s economy are scarce, and there is limited reliable economic information.³³¹ Available data indicates an economy that continues to weaken.³³² The ongoing armed conflict has damaged civilian infrastructure, including houses, hospitals, agricultural infrastructure, energy infrastructure, roads, bridges and water systems.³³³ Yemen is highly dependent on imports,³³⁴ and the conflict in Ukraine has negatively impacted the ability of Yemenis to import key commodities.³³⁵

In summary, the ongoing armed conflict and stream of challenges that flow from it have not been resolved. Civilians continue to be killed and displacement is substantial and widespread. Deteriorating humanitarian conditions and protracted internal conflict continue to adversely affect Yemen’s civilian population.

Section 4.5 Designations under INA § 244(b)(1)

The Secretary designated Afghanistan, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Ukraine for TPS in CY 2022.

Afghanistan

On May 20, 2022, DHS announced via *Federal Register* notice (FRN) the designation of Afghanistan for TPS, effective May 20, 2022, through November 20, 2023.³³⁶

The information below describing the reasons for Afghanistan’s TPS designation has been excerpted from the May 20, 2022 FRN that announced the designation.

DHS has reviewed conditions in Afghanistan. Based on this review, and after consulting with DOS, the Secretary has determined that an 18-month designation is warranted because of ongoing armed conflict and the extraordinary and temporary conditions described below.

³³⁰ Republic of Yemen, World Bank Economic Update, Apr. 14, 2022, available at: <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/de816119d04a4e82a9c380bfd02dbc3a-0280012022/original/mpo-sm22-yemen-yem-kcm.pdf> (last visited Sept. 1, 2022).

³³¹ *Id.*

³³² *Id.*

³³³ Saudi-led attacks devastated Yemen’s civilian infrastructure, dramatically worsening the humanitarian crisis, The Washington Post, Feb. 22, 2021, available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2021/02/22/saudi-led-attacks-devastated-yemens-civilian-infrastructure-dramatically-worsening-humanitarian-crisis/> (last visited Sept. 6, 2022).

³³⁴ Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, Congressional Research Service, Sept. 17, 2019, available at: <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R43960.pdf> (last visited Sept. 6, 2022).

³³⁵ Republic of Yemen, World Bank Economic Update, Apr. 14, 2022, available at: <https://thedocs.worldbank.org/en/doc/de816119d04a4e82a9c380bfd02dbc3a-0280012022/original/mpo-sm22-yemen-yem-kcm.pdf> (last visited Sept. 1, 2022).

³³⁶ See 87 FR 30976 (May 20, 2022) (18-month designation of Afghanistan for TPS through November 20, 2023).

Overview

In August 2021, the Taliban took over Kabul after waging a 20-year insurgency against the government of Afghanistan, and U.S. and NATO forces. Armed conflict and insurgency continue throughout the country of Afghanistan.³³⁷ The Taliban is seen as both ill-equipped and unwilling to meet the country's numerous challenges including the current security situation, economic collapse, a crumbling healthcare system, severe food insecurity, and respect for human rights.³³⁸ Afghanistan is undergoing a humanitarian disaster. The UN has called the current situation “unparalleled, with more than 24.4 million people requiring humanitarian assistance to survive.”³³⁹ “Half the population [is] facing acute hunger, including 9 million people in emergency food insecurity—the highest number globally [with] [m]alnutrition on the rise, and livelihoods [that] have been destroyed.”³⁴⁰

Armed Conflict and Security Situation

The Taliban controlled most of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001, invoking Sharia law to remove women from public life, enforce strict moral codes, and exact draconian punishments for transgressions including dismemberment and public executions.³⁴¹ In response to the Taliban harboring al-Qaida and Osama bin Laden after the attacks of September 11, 2001,³⁴² U.S. forces began airstrikes and a ground invasion that, by mid-November 2001, in concert with actions by remaining Mujahideen fighters under the Northern Alliance, drove the Taliban from most of Afghanistan. Following a transition of security responsibility from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF),³⁴³ the Taliban expanded its presence across larger parts of the country³⁴⁴ and by 2017,

³³⁷ Afghanistan's Collapsing Economy Heightens 'Risk of Extremism,' UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 18, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyons-assets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³³⁸ Nilofar Sakhi, The humanitarian and human security crises in Afghanistan, Middle East Institute (MEI), Oct. 12, 2021, available at: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/humanitarian-and-human-security-crises-afghanistan> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³³⁹ Afghanistan Conference 2022, UN Web TV, Mar. 31, 2022, available at: <https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1p/k1puubpv5u> (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).

³⁴⁰ Afghanistan Conference 2022, UN Web TV, Mar. 31, 2022, available at: <https://media.un.org/en/asset/k1p/k1puubpv5u> (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).

³⁴¹ Carter Malkasian, *The American War in Afghanistan*, pp. 43 (Oxford University Press, 2021).

³⁴² Carter Malkasian, *The American War in Afghanistan*, pp. 53-67 (Oxford University Press, 2021).

³⁴³ Inteqal: Transition to Afghan lead, NATO, updated Nov. 17, 2020, available at: https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_87183.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁴⁴ Afghanistan: Growing Challenges, International Crisis Group, Apr. 30, 2017, available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/afghanistan-growing-challenges> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-Khorasan Province (ISIS-K) emerged, adding “a new, dangerous dimension” to the situation.³⁴⁵

Beginning in 2019, the United States engaged with the Taliban to establish an agreement to withdraw troops, with various efforts over the next two years seeking assurances that the Taliban would meet counter-terrorism pledges and participate in intra-Afghan peace talks.³⁴⁶ In April 2021, President Biden announced a complete U.S. military withdrawal by September 11, 2021, and in early July 2021, U.S. troops began withdrawal operations, including from their largest base at Bagram.³⁴⁷ The Taliban began rapidly taking territory including regional urban centers, and beginning August 6, provincial capitals.³⁴⁸ The Taliban took over Kabul on August 15, and on August 30, 2021, the last U.S. forces departed Afghanistan.³⁴⁹

Before the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops, armed conflict had taken a high toll on Afghan civilians. The UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) recorded 116,076 civilian deaths and injuries due to armed conflict from 2009 until June 2021 with record numbers of girls and women killed and injured, as well as record numbers of overall child casualties.³⁵⁰

Civilians face continuing risk of harm due to ground engagements between the Taliban and ISIS-K, as well as direct punitive targeting by Taliban fighters reportedly taking retaliatory action against people associated with the Ashraf Ghani administration³⁵¹ and sectarian attacks on the Shiite minority by ISIS-K.³⁵² It is reported that “attacks on civilians made up 36 percent of all

³⁴⁵ Special report on the strategic review of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Report of the Secretary-General, A/72/312-S/2017/696, UN Security Council, p. 3, Aug. 10, 2017, available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/special_report_on_the_strategic_review_of_the_united_nations_assistance_mission_in_afghanistan.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁴⁶ The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999-2021, Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, available at: <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan> (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).

³⁴⁷ Thomas Gibbons-Neff, U.S. Leaves Its Last Afghan Base, Effectively Ending Operations, N.Y. Times, Jul. 4, 2021, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/02/world/asia/afghanistan-bagram-us-withdrawal.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁴⁸ The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999-2021, Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, available at: <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan> (last visited on Apr. 12, 2022).

³⁴⁹ The U.S. War in Afghanistan: 1999-2021, Council on Foreign Relations, 2021, available at: <https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan> (last visited Apr. 12, 2022).

³⁵⁰ Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict—Annual Report 2020, U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Feb. 2021, available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/afghanistan_protection_of_civilians_report_2020_revs3.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Afghanistan: Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict—Midyear Update: 1 January to 30 June 2021, U.N. Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, Jul. 2021, available at: https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_report_2021_26_july.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁵¹ “No Forgiveness for People Like You” Executions and Enforced Disappearances in Afghanistan under the Taliban, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 30, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2021/11/30/no-forgiveness-people-you/executions-and-enforced-disappearances-afghanistan> (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).

³⁵² See Afghanistan Security situation update, Country of Origin Information Report, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Sept. 9, 2021, available at: https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

disorder events, indicating that civilians will continue to remain at heightened risk of violence under” the Taliban.³⁵³

i. Taliban

Following the withdrawal of U.S. and NATO troops and collapse of the Afghan military, armed conflict continues in Afghanistan as the Taliban attempts to impose their rule across the country.³⁵⁴ Taliban forces have clashed with remaining resistance fighters in Panjshir Province³⁵⁵ and unknown and little-known groups, including “Anonymous Fighters” and “Turkistan Freedom Tigers,” have targeted Taliban forces, notably in Jowzjan and Takhar provinces.³⁵⁶

Despite their pledge not to do so, reports indicate that the Taliban are targeting old adversaries including former Afghan police and military personnel, increasing the potential for escalating armed conflict.³⁵⁷ General instability in the country, including instability caused by an economic crisis, increases the difficulty of establishing security and thwarting the rise of further extremism.³⁵⁸

The Taliban appear committed to maintaining its methods of warfare that have taken a heavy toll on civilians, including retaining a contingent of trained suicide bombers, as central to its combat and political strategy.³⁵⁹ Though the Taliban pledged to not allow al-Qaida to “threaten the security of the United States and its allies” from Afghan soil, veteran Taliban leaders with deep relationships with al-Qaida organizers have returned to positions of power, raising concern that

³⁵³ 10 Conflicts to Worry About in 2022, High risk of violence targeting civilians under Taliban rule, The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Jan. 2022, available at: <https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/afghanistan/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁵⁴ See Afghanistan Security situation update, Country of Origin Information Report, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Sept. 9, 2021, available at: https://coi.easo.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁵⁵ Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 5-11 March 2022, ACLED, Mar. 2022, available at: <https://acleddata.com/2022/03/16/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-5-11-march-2022/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 19-25 February, ACLED, Feb. 2022, available at: <https://acleddata.com/2022/03/03/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-19-25-february-2022/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁵⁶ Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 26 February to 4 March 2022, ACLED, Mar. 2022, available at: <https://acleddata.com/2022/03/10/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-26-february-4-march-2022/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 5-11 February 2022, ACLED, Feb. 2022, available at: <https://acleddata.com/2022/02/17/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-5-11-february-2022/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁵⁷ Radio Azadi, Michael Scollon, Taliban Takes Revenge On Former Afghan Security Forces, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 12, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-revenge-afghan-security-forces/31505696.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁵⁸ Afghanistan's Collapsing Economy Heightens 'Risk of Extremism,' UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 18, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyons-assets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁵⁹ Abubakar Siddique, As Taliban Attempts to Transform from Insurgency to Government, Suicide Bombers Remain Key to Its Strategy, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, November 4, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-suicide-bombings-afghanistan/31546216.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

the Taliban will once again create a safe space for global jihadists.³⁶⁰ The Taliban have announced the appointment to positions of power members of the Haqqani family, known for operating a brutal terrorist network during the Taliban insurgency,³⁶¹ and veteran Taliban leaders with ties to al-Qaida.³⁶²

ii. Islamic State-Khorasan

The threat of ISIS-K is growing, with increasing risk to civilians. DOS designated ISIS-K as a “foreign terrorist organization” in January 2016, and U.S. forces engaged in significant operations to reduce its numbers and to reclaim the small swaths of territory that it held.³⁶³ The Taliban have long engaged in efforts to eradicate the organization, and they continue to fight a renewed ISIS-K insurgency, frequently resulting in civilian casualties.³⁶⁴ ISIS-K claimed responsibility for the August 26, 2021, suicide attack outside Kabul airport, and has been behind some of the deadliest operations against Afghan civilians.³⁶⁵ A feature of ISIS-K's attacks is large-scale IED and suicide bombings of Hazara Shia mosques and gatherings, which are dramatically increasing sectarian violence in Afghanistan.³⁶⁶

UN Special Representative for Afghanistan, Deborah Lyons, indicated that the Taliban have been unable to stem the expansion of ISIS-K, and that it now appears to be present in nearly all provinces.³⁶⁷ As of November 17, 2021, she stated that the number of attacks attributed to ISIS-K has increased significantly from 60 last year to 334 this year.³⁶⁸ The ACLED, a non-profit data collection, analysis, and crisis mapping project, reports multiple recent attacks by ISIS-K during

³⁶⁰ Abubakar Siddique & Abdul Hai Kakar, Al-Qaeda Could Flourish With New Strategy Under Taliban Rule, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Sept. 30, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-al-qaeda-taliban/31486256.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Driss El-Bay, Afghanistan: The pledge binding al-Qaeda to the Taliban, BBC News, Sept. 7, 2021, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58473574> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁶¹ Hardliners get key posts in new Taliban government, BBC News, Sept. 7, 2021, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58479750> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁶² Hardliners get key posts in new Taliban government, BBC News, Sept. 7, 2021, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58479750> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁶³ Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic State-Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Aug. 27, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-explainer/31431763.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁶⁴ Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic State-Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Aug. 27, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-explainer/31431763.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁶⁵ Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic State-Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Aug. 27, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-explainer/31431763.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁶⁶ Golnaz Esfandiari, Explainer: Who Are Islamic State-Khorasan and What Are They After?, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Aug. 27, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/islamic-state-khorasan-explainer/31431763.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁶⁷ Afghanistan's Collapsing Economy Heightens ‘Risk Of Extremism,’ UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 18, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyons-assets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁶⁸ Afghanistan's Collapsing Economy Heightens ‘Risk Of Extremism,’ UN Envoy Warns, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Nov. 18, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-un-lyons-assets-humanitarian-crisis-hunger/31567075.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

the months of October and November 2021, including engagements with the Taliban and targeting of civilians.³⁶⁹

iii. Destruction of Infrastructure

Afghanistan faces significant challenges due to the destruction of vital infrastructure during armed conflict. There are numerous reports that the Taliban targeted power stations and distribution equipment, dug up roads and destroyed bridges, destroyed cell towers and communications infrastructure, and damaged schools, medical facilities, and government buildings during their insurgency.³⁷⁰ The education system is also at risk of complete collapse due to the economic crisis.³⁷¹

During the Taliban insurgency in the first half of 2021, the “39 electricity pylons that bring imported power into Afghanistan [were] damaged.”³⁷² Power supply subsequently became “extremely erratic even in the capital Kabul,” with notable disruptions to Kunduz, Baghlan, Kabul, Nangarhar and Parwan provinces.³⁷³ “Millions of Afghans have become intimately familiar with regular power cuts and being forced to navigate daily tasks and chores with just a few hours of electricity supply.”³⁷⁴

In July 2021, the Taliban reportedly frequently attacked power and communications infrastructure in their advance, blowing up fiber optics systems and destroying

³⁶⁹ Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 30 October to 5 November 2021, ACLED, Nov. 2021, available at: <https://acleddata.com/2021/11/11/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-30-october-5-november-2021/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁷⁰ Statement on Continuation of Assassinations, Kidnappings, and Destruction of Vital Infrastructure, US Embassy in Afghanistan, Jan. 31, 2021, available at: <https://af.usembassy.gov/statement-on-continuation-of-assassinations-kidnappings-and-destruction-of-vital-infrastructure/> (last visited May 3, 2022); Secretary-General's press encounter on Afghanistan, U.N. Secretary-General, Aug. 13, 2021, available at: <https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/secretary-general/E2%80%99s-press-encounter-afghanistan> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Sayed Salahuddin, 10 killed in twin Kabul blasts, power supply disrupted across Afghanistan, Arab News, Jun. 2, 2021, available at: <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1869436/world> (last visited May 3, 2022); Anisa Shaheed, Taliban Destroyed, Damaged Infrastructure in 116 Districts: IARCS, TOLONews, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: <https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-173540> (last visited May 3, 2022); Country of Origin Information Report: Afghanistan Security Situation Update, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Sep. 2021, available at: https://coi.euaa.europa.eu/administration/easo/PLib/2021_09_EASO_COI_Report_Afghanistan_Security_situation_update.pdf (last visited May 3, 2022).

³⁷¹ Four Ways to Support Girls' Access to Education in Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 20, 2022, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/20/four-ways-support-girls-access-education-afghanistan> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁷² Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan's crucial power, IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁷³ Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan's crucial power, IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁷⁴ Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan's crucial power, IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Blasts cut power to millions in Afghanistan before Eid holiday, Al Jazeera, Apr. 30, 2022, available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/4/30/blasts-cut-power-to-millions-in-afghanistan-ahead-of-eid> (last visited May 4, 2022).

telecommunications antennas across the country, seriously affecting digital and mobile communication.³⁷⁵ The Taliban reportedly either torched or destroyed 260 government buildings and assets in 116 districts,³⁷⁶ leaving more than 13 million people without access to public services and halting “hundreds of development projects such as the reconstruction of water supply networks, roads, retaining walls, the construction of schools, bridges, hospitals, stadiums, cold storage facilities, [and] drilling wells.”³⁷⁷ The armed conflict left the Afghan countryside “littered with abandoned and decaying power plants, prisons, schools, factories, office buildings and military bases.”³⁷⁸

iv. Danger From Explosive Remnants of War Including Landmines

Explosive remnants of war (ERW) which failed to detonate, including landmines, pose a significant risk to civilians in Afghanistan, killing or injuring tens of thousands during the past three decades.³⁷⁹ These munitions “from more recent armed clashes caused over 98 percent of the [ERW] casualties recorded in 2021,” of which more than 79 percent were children.³⁸⁰ And “[d]ue to evolving conflict dynamics, Afghanistan's humanitarian mine action needs are now as great as they have ever been.”³⁸¹ The Taliban have reportedly agreed to permit the HALO Trust (Hazardous Area Life-Support Organization), a British-American charity in Afghanistan that has been clearing land mines for decades, to continue its work,³⁸² yet in June 2021, ISIS-K militants attacked HALO staff members, killing 10, suggesting that they continue to face substantial risk.³⁸³ In addition, the organization reports that new mines and explosive devices were laid and left behind in the battles leading up to the Taliban's takeover of Kabul.³⁸⁴

³⁷⁵ Ruchi Kumar, Taliban targeting Afghanistan's crucial power, IT infrastructure, Al Jazeera, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/7/15/taliban-afghanistan-it-electricity-power> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁷⁶ Anisa Shaheed, Taliban Destroyed, Damaged Infrastructure in 116 Districts: IARCS, TOLO News, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: <https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-173540> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁷⁷ Anisa Shaheed, Taliban Destroyed, Damaged Infrastructure in 116 Districts: IARCS, TOLO News, Jul. 15, 2021, available at: <https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-173540> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁷⁸ Daniel Nasaw, U.S. Left Afghanistan Littered With Decaying Factories, Schools, Offices, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 6, 2021, available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-left-afghanistan-littered-with-decaying-factories-schools-offices-11630933200> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁷⁹ Afghanistan, The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Mar. 2022, available at: <https://www.unmas.org/en/programmes/afghanistan> (last visited May 4, 2022).

³⁸⁰ Afghanistan, The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Mar. 2022, available at: <https://www.unmas.org/en/programmes/afghanistan> (last visited May 4, 2022).

³⁸¹ Afghanistan, The United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), Mar. 2022, available at: <https://www.unmas.org/en/programmes/afghanistan> (last visited May 4, 2022).

³⁸² Clearing Afghanistan's Landmines One Careful Step a Time, Voice of America (VOA) News, Nov. 21, 2021, available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/clearing-afghanistan-s-landmines-one-careful-step-a-time/6318080.html> (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).

³⁸³ Najim Rahim & Mike Ives, Attack in Afghanistan Kills 10 From Charity That Clears Land Mines, N.Y. Times, Jun. 9, 2021, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/09/world/asia/afghanistan-land-mines-halo-trust.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁸⁴ Clearing Afghanistan's Landmines One Careful Step a Time, Voice of America (VOA) News, Nov. 21, 2021, available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/clearing-afghanistan-s-landmines-one-careful-step-a-time/6318080.html> (last visited Apr. 28, 2022).

v. Rising Internal Displacement

Rising internal displacement emanates from the ongoing armed conflict and the unstable security situation in Afghanistan. Land pressures and related disputes have also been a challenge in Afghanistan, fueling displacements, and complicating the security and relocation options for IDPs.³⁸⁵ As of March 15, 2022, OHCHR reported there were approximately 3.4 million conflict-induced IDPs in Afghanistan—with 736,889 of those added in 2021.³⁸⁶ UNOCHA noted that these IDPs are from 33 out of the 34 provinces in Afghanistan, and 79 percent of those added in 2021 are women and children.³⁸⁷ UNOCHA further stated, “[i]nadequate shelter, food insecurity, insufficient access to sanitation and health facilities, as well as a lack of protection, often result in precarious living conditions that jeopardizes the well-being and dignity of affected families.”³⁸⁸ Reports reflect that the Taliban exacerbated the IDP problem by forcing thousands of people from their homes, including Hazaras as well as former government officials, and redistributing their property to Taliban supporters.³⁸⁹

Economic Collapse and Health Concerns

i. Economic Impacts of Taliban Takeover

Economic ramifications of the Taliban takeover in August 2021, include “millions of dollars in lost income, spiking prices, a liquidity crisis, and shortages of cash.”³⁹⁰ The cessation of purchasing power of the Afghan population as a result of the termination of international assistance once used to pay salaries has caused an “enormous number of Afghan households [to] immediately los[e] their primary sources of income. According to a WFP survey released in February 2022, four out of five households reported no income or significantly reduced incomes in January 2022.”³⁹¹ In October 2021, the World Bank noted that “the sudden loss of public

³⁸⁵ See Land, People, and the State in Afghanistan: 2002-2012, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), Feb. 2013, available at: <http://www.refworld.org/docid/5136fbc72.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Gulamaiz Sharifi, Abubakar Siddique, Afghan Hazaras Fear The Worst After Forced Taliban Evictions, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 6, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-hazaras-taliban/31496224.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁸⁶ Flash External Update: Afghanistan Situation #15, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Mar. 15, 2022, available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/91524> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁸⁷ Afghanistan: Conflict Induced Displacements, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Nov. 21, 2021, available at: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/idps> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁸⁸ Afghanistan: Conflict Induced Displacements, U.N. Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), Nov. 21, 2021, available at: <https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/afghanistan/idps> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁸⁹ Emma Graham-Harrison, Taliban ‘forcibly evicting’ Hazaras and opponents in Afghanistan, The Guardian, Oct. 23, 2021, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/23/taliban-forcibly-evicting-hazaras-and-opponents-in-afghanistan> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁹⁰ Afghanistan Facing Famine, UN, World Bank, US Should Adjust Sanctions, Economic Policies, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 11, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/11/afghanistan-facing-famine> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁹¹ Afghanistan: Economic Roots of the Humanitarian Crisis, Questions and Answers on Human Costs of Sanctions, Banking Restrictions, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 1, 2022, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/01/afghanistan-economic-roots-humanitarian-crisis?gclid=Cj0KCQjw5->

sector activity will have impacts throughout the economy, especially in the service and construction sectors (which account for 58 percent of GDP).”³⁹²

In November 2021, the Taliban banned the use of foreign currency, which may “further disrupt an economy on the brink of collapse.”³⁹³ Banking officials note that “most Afghan banks cannot cover withdrawals by private actors and aid organizations” and “[e]ven when funds are transmitted electronically into banks, the lack of cash means that money is not physically available and therefore cannot flow into the country's economy.”³⁹⁴ When compared to the Taliban's previous peak in the 1990s, “poverty this time can only be predicted to be worse and more keenly felt.”³⁹⁵ As of February 2022, the UN Development Programme could not access its funds in the Afghanistan International Bank (AIB) for program implementation because the Taliban-run AIB cannot convert it to Afghani currency.³⁹⁶ Of the \$4 billion worth of afghanis, in the economy, only \$500 million worth was in circulation, “hindering humanitarian operations in Afghanistan, where more than half the country's 39 million people suffer extreme hunger and the economy, education and social services face collapse.”³⁹⁷

ii. Access to Food, Potable Water, and Healthcare

Rising prices, increasing unemployment, and a drop in the value of the local currency exacerbate food insecurity trends.³⁹⁸ The Executive Director of the WFP described the likelihood of widespread famine in Afghanistan as “the worst humanitarian crisis on Earth.”³⁹⁹ One in three Afghan nationals are acutely food insecure.⁴⁰⁰ For the first time, urban and rural areas now

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³⁹² The World Bank in Afghanistan Overview, The World Bank, Oct. 8, 2021, available at: <https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/afghanistan/overview#1> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁹³ Taliban bans foreign currencies in Afghanistan, BBC News, Nov. 3, 2021, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/business-59129470> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁹⁴ Afghanistan Facing Famine, UN, World Bank, US Should Adjust Sanctions, Economic Policies, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 11, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/11/afghanistan-facing-famine> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁹⁵ Kate Clark, Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg: Afghanistan's economic distress post-15 August, Afghanistan Analysts Network, Nov. 11, 2021, available at: <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/killing-the-goose-that-laid-the-golden-egg-afghanistans-economic-distress-post-15-august/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁹⁶ Michelle Nichols, U.N. has millions in Afghanistan bank, but cannot use it, Reuters, Feb. 3, 2022, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-has-millions-afghanistan-bank-cannot-use-it-2022-02-03/> (last visited May 4, 2022).

³⁹⁷ Michelle Nichols, U.N. has millions in Afghanistan bank, but cannot use it, Reuters, Feb. 3, 2022, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/un-has-millions-afghanistan-bank-cannot-use-it-2022-02-03/> (last visited May 4, 2022).

³⁹⁸ In the grip of hunger: Only 5 percent of Afghan families have enough to eat, World Food Programme, Sept. 23, 2021, available at: <https://www.wfp.org/stories/grip-hunger-only-5-percent-afghan-families-have-enough-eat> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

³⁹⁹ John Simpson, Afghans facing ‘hell on earth’ as winter looms, BBC News, Nov. 8, 2021, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59202880> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁰⁰ Federica Marsi, Medics overwhelmed as Afghanistan healthcare crumbles, Al Jazeera, Sept. 28, 2021, available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/features/2021/9/28/medics-in-afghanistan-face-tough-choices-as-healthcare-crumbles> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

experience similar rates of food insecurity.⁴⁰¹ According to recent WFP surveys, “only five percent of households in Afghanistan have enough to eat every day” and “half reported they had run out of food altogether at least once, in the past two weeks.”⁴⁰² As a result of current circumstances, some families are selling their children, especially girls, to obtain food.⁴⁰³

The Afghan government officially declared a drought on June 22, 2021.⁴⁰⁴ Considered “one of the worst droughts of the last two decades,” the resulting conditions “are particularly severe in the south, western, and northwestern parts of the country.”⁴⁰⁵ Severe drought has impacted 7.3 million people across 25 out of 34 provinces.⁴⁰⁶ The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction reports that “drought conditions are likely to persist and even worsen into 2022, further deteriorating food security among Afghans.”⁴⁰⁷ The current drought also “inhibits hydroelectric production in Afghanistan,” exacerbating the country's reliance on electricity imports that it can no longer afford.⁴⁰⁸ In 2021, “reduced winter snowfall” and “below average spring rainfall in the west” contributed to “low river flows and insufficient water in existing reservoirs and dams.”⁴⁰⁹ Some drinking water wells in Kabul went dry due to decreasing groundwater levels, and “...the groundwater table (meaning the level of the water naturally stored underground) in Kabul city has dropped by 12 meters in 2021 alone.”⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰¹ Afghanistan's healthcare system on brink of collapse, as hunger hits 95 per cent of families, UN News, Sept. 22, 2021, available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100652> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁰² Afghanistan's healthcare system on brink of collapse, as hunger hits 95 per cent of families, UN News, Sept. 22, 2021, available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100652> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁰³ Afghanistan Facing Famine, UN, World Bank, US Should Adjust Sanctions, Economic Policies, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 11, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/11/afghanistan-facing-famine> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁰⁴ Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR—Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Oct. 30, 2021, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10-30qr.pdf> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁰⁵ Global Warming and Afghanistan: Drought, hunger, and thirst expected to worsen, Afghanistan Analysts Network, Nov. 6, 2021, available at: <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/global-warming-and-afghanistan-drought-hunger-and-thirst-expected-to-worsen/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁰⁶ ‘Shah Meer Baloch, ‘The challenge for us now is drought, not war’: Livelihoods of millions of Afghans at risk, The Guardian, Sept. 21, 2021, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/sep/21/drought-war-livelihoods-afghan-farmers-risk-taliban-security-forces-kandahar> (last visited on Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁰⁷ Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR—Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Oct. 30, 2021, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10-30qr.pdf> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁰⁸ Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR—Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Oct. 30, 2021, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10-30qr.pdf> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁰⁹ Global Warming and Afghanistan: Drought, hunger, and thirst expected to worsen, Afghanistan Analysts Network, Nov. 6, 2021, available at: <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/global-warming-and-afghanistan-drought-hunger-and-thirst-expected-to-worsen/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴¹⁰ Global Warming and Afghanistan: Drought, hunger, and thirst expected to worsen, Afghanistan Analysts Network, Nov. 6, 2021, available at: <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/en/reports/economy-development-environment/global-warming-and-afghanistan-drought-hunger-and-thirst-expected-to-worsen/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

An insufficiently staffed healthcare system predated the Taliban takeover of Kabul.⁴¹¹ In 2018, Afghanistan “had a nationwide average of only 4.6 medical doctors, nurses, and midwives per 10,000 people, far below the WHO threshold of 23 per 10,000 people,” indicating a critical shortage that was more pronounced in rural areas.⁴¹² By September 2021, the WHO asserted that the healthcare system was on the brink of collapse.⁴¹³ The World Bank and other organizations froze approximately \$600 million in health care aid, leaving at risk the effective deployment of a variety of treatments, surgeries, immunizations, and procedures.⁴¹⁴ While there have been recent dispersals of international aid, “including \$308 million in relief authorized by the United States, they have not been enough to cover 1,200 health facilities and 11,000 health workers.”⁴¹⁵

Declining staffing levels is a factor during the recent conflict as doctors, nurses, and midwives have “stopped working or fled the country”⁴¹⁶ and there have been reported incidents of insurgent groups targeting healthcare workers with threats, intimidation, abduction, and killings.⁴¹⁷ Additionally, Taliban restrictions requiring that women be escorted to health appointments by male family members and bans on male healthcare professionals treating women are further compromising women's access to health care.⁴¹⁸ The International Rescue Committee has predicted that 90 percent of health clinics in Afghanistan will likely close in the near future as a result of the Taliban takeover and the freezing of international funding.⁴¹⁹

⁴¹¹ Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR—Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, p. 139, Oct. 30, 2021, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10-30qr.pdf> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴¹² Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, SIGAR—Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, p. 139, Oct. 30, 2021, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2063773/2021-10-30qr.pdf> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴¹³ Afghanistan's healthcare system on brink of collapse, as hunger hits 95 per cent of families, UN News, Sept. 22, 2021, available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/09/1100652> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴¹⁴ Apoorva Mandavilli, Health Care in Afghanistan Is Crumbling, Aid Groups Warn, N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 2021, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/12/health/afghanistan-health-taliban.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴¹⁵ Afghanistan's Health Care System Is Collapsing Under Stress, N.Y. Times, Feb. 06, 2022, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/06/world/asia/afghanistans-health-care-system.html> (last visited May 3, 2022).

⁴¹⁶ Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Medical treatment and healthcare, UK Home Office, p. 10, Oct. 2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2062549/AFG_CPIN_Medical_and_healthcare.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022) (citing Giving birth under the Taliban, BBC News, Sept. 20, 2021, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58585323>).

⁴¹⁷ Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common analysis and guidance note, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), p. 65, Nov. 2021. available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴¹⁸ Afghanistan: Economic Roots of the Humanitarian Crisis, Questions and Answers on Human Costs of Sanctions, Banking Restrictions, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 1, 2022, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/01/afghanistan-economic-roots-humanitarian-crisis?gclid=Cj0KCQjw5-WRBhCKARIsAAId9Fnpi5weaKquaERnky8T0Ry0t9F5OsR2mWY_nGA5NmEA3iRzIL8BjF4aAkmGEALw_wcB#Why_did_the (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴¹⁹ Crisis in Afghanistan: Unprecedented hunger after the conflict, International Rescue Committee, Jan. 7, 2022, available at: <https://www.rescue.org/article/crisis-afghanistan-unprecedented-hunger-after-conflict> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

Human Rights Abuses and Repression

The Taliban exclude women, as well as non-Pashtuns with only a few exceptions,⁴²⁰ and have been described as highly totalitarian.⁴²¹ The Taliban's takeover presents significant concerns about the stability of human rights and safety for segments of the population.

i. Women and Girls

Despite substantial improvements in the social, political, and economic conditions for women and girls since 2001, violence targeting women and girls remained pervasive in Afghanistan before the Taliban takeover.⁴²² Even before the Taliban takeover of Kabul, “discrimination, harassment, and violence against women” were “endemic in government-controlled areas and in government ministries.”⁴²³ Studies cited by the former Ministry of Women's Affairs showed that greater than half of Afghan women reported physical abuse, and 17 percent reported sexual violence, with rampant underreporting.⁴²⁴ Since August 2021, the status of women and girls has become “increasingly precarious,” with reports of new restrictions placed on women.⁴²⁵ In September 2021, the Taliban announced the revival of the so-called Ministry for the Propagation of Virtue and Prevention of Vice,⁴²⁶ which when it previously existed, “became a notorious symbol of abuse, particularly against women and girls.”⁴²⁷ These developments exist within a broader context of “traditional, restrictive views of gender roles and rights, including some views

⁴²⁰ Alissa J. Rubin, Taliban Complete Interim Government, Still Without Women, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 2021, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/21/world/asia/taliban-women-government.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴²¹ Nilofar Sakhi, The Humanitarian and Human Security Crises in Afghanistan, Middle East Institute (MEI), Oct. 12, 2021, available at: <https://www.mei.edu/publications/humanitarian-and-human-security-crises-afghanistan> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴²² Country Guidance: Afghanistan—Common analysis and guidance note, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), p. 78, Nov. 2021, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴²³ Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, Congressional Research Service, p. 1, updated Aug. 18, 2021, available at: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11646> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴²⁴ Alissa J. Rubin, Threats and Fear Cause Afghan Women's Protections to Vanish Overnight, N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 2021, updated October 7, 2021, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/04/world/middleeast/afghanistan-women-shelter-taliban.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴²⁵ Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, Congressional Research Service, p. 1, updated Aug. 18, 2021, available at: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11646> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴²⁶ Afghanistan: Taliban `Vice' Handbook Abusive, Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 29, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistan-taliban-vice-handbook-abusive> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Haq Nawaz Khan, Ellen Francis, and Adam Taylor, The Taliban is bringing back its feared ministry of `vice' and `virtue', The Washington Post, Sept. 8, 2021, available at:

<https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/09/08/afghan-vice-virtue-ministry/> (last visited Apr. 15, 2022); Kathy Gannon, Taliban replace ministry for women with `virtue' authorities, AP News, Sept. 18, 2021, available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/09/08/afghan-vice-virtue-ministry/> (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).

⁴²⁷ Afghanistan: Taliban `Vice' Handbook Abusive, Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 29, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistan-taliban-vice-handbook-abusive> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

consistent with the Taliban's former practices...especially in rural areas and among younger men.”⁴²⁸

Since August 2021, specialized courts and prosecution units, “responsible for enforcing the 2009 Law on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, have been discontinued.”⁴²⁹ Many legal professionals involved with women's protections from sexual, domestic, and other violence went into hiding or fled the country, and most domestic violence shelters have closed.⁴³⁰ As shelters closed some survivors were reportedly sent to detention centers while individuals convicted of gender-based violence were released by the Taliban.⁴³¹

Afghan women are becoming “socially invisible” in public life.⁴³² The By-Law of the Commission for Preaching and Guidance, Recruitment and Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, a manual used by the Taliban in a number of provinces since August 2021, and now across the country, place “tough restrictions on the conduct of women and girls.”⁴³³ These authorities provide instruction on which family members qualify to be a *mahram*, or chaperone, for women and older girls, and commands women to wear a veil when in the presence of non- *mahrms*.⁴³⁴ In some parts of the country, women have been barred from leaving their home without a *mahram*⁴³⁵ and have been attacked or blocked from receiving social services such as healthcare when leaving their home without a *mahram*.⁴³⁶ The manual also

⁴²⁸ Afghan Women and Girls: Status and Congressional Action, Congressional Research Service, pg. 1, updated Aug. 18, 2021, available at: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11646> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴²⁹ Experts decry measures to ‘steadily erase’ Afghan women and girls from public life, United Nations News, Jan. 17, 2022, available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/01/1109902> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴³⁰ Fereshta Abbasi, Afghan Women Fleeing Violence Lose Vital Protection, For Survivors of Abuse, Shelters Offered Lifeline, Human Rights Watch, Sept. 24, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/24/afghan-women-fleeing-violence-lose-vital-protection> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

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⁴³¹ Freedom of the World 2022, Afghanistan, Freedom House, Feb. 28, 2022, available at: <https://freedomhouse.org/country/afghanistan/freedom-world/2022> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴³² Marie McAuliffe, Struggling to Survive: Gender, Displacement, and Migration in Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan, Center for Strategic & International Studies, Feb. 23, 2022, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggling-survive-gender-displacement-and-migration-taliban-controlled-afghanistan> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴³³ Afghanistan: Taliban ‘Vice’ Handbook Abusive, Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 29, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistan-taliban-vice-handbook-abusive> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴³⁴ Afghanistan: Taliban ‘Vice’ Handbook Abusive, Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 29, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistan-taliban-vice-handbook-abusive> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴³⁵ Country of Origin Information (COI) Brief Report, Afghanistan: Recent developments in the security situation, impact on civilians and targeted individuals, Ministry of Immigration and Integration, The Danish Immigration Service, p. 1, Sept. 2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060188/Afghanistan_Targetedindivid_FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴³⁶ Heather Barr, Afghan Women Watching the Walls Close In, Taliban Crushes Women's Freedom of Movement and Other Rights, Human Rights Watch, Mar. 2, 2022, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/03/02/afghan-women-watching-walls-close> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

requires women to wear a hijab and veil in public.⁴³⁷ As punishments for non-conformity, the Taliban has carried out lashings and executions.⁴³⁸

Reports indicate that women were forced to marry Taliban fighters prior to the takeover of Kabul in 2021.⁴³⁹ Although the Taliban has denied the occurrence of forced marriage, local activists report the practice occurs, stating that women are being married as “sexual slaves.”⁴⁴⁰ A statement shared on social media featuring Taliban insignia instructed religious leaders in Takhar and Badakhshan “to refer girls older than 15 and widows younger than 45” to the “Mujahideen Cultural Commission” for marriage to Taliban fighters.⁴⁴¹

The Taliban have banned girls from attending secondary school past the sixth grade,⁴⁴² although the Taliban permitted women to attend universities in February 2022.⁴⁴³ Rules segregating teachers and classes according to gender “exacerbated a severe teacher shortage and threaten to eliminate higher education opportunities for girls.”⁴⁴⁴

⁴³⁷ Afghanistan: Taliban `Vice' Handbook Abusive, Discriminatory Rules, Ignored Protections, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 29, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/29/afghanistan-taliban-vice-handbook-abusive> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴³⁸ Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common analysis and guidance note, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), p. 78, Nov. 2021, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴³⁹ Country of Origin Information (COI) Brief Report, Afghanistan: Recent developments in the security situation, impact on civilians and targeted individuals, Ministry of Immigration and Integration, The Danish Immigration Service, p. 1, Sept. 2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2060188/Afghanistan_Targetedindivid_FINAL.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022) (citing Lynne O'Donnell, As Taliban Expand Control, Concerns About Forced Marriage and Sex Slavery Rise, Foreign Policy, Jul. 23, 2021, available at: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/07/23/afghanistan-taliban-women-gender/>; and Frud Bezhan Mustafa Sarwar, Return To The `Dark Days': Taliban Reimposes Repressive Laws On Women In Newly Captured Areas in Afghanistan, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Jul. 14, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/taliban-repression-afghan-women/31358597.html>).

⁴⁴⁰ Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban [Version 1.0], UK Home Office, p. 33-34, Oct. 2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2061589/AFG_CPIN_Fear_of_the_Taliban.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022) (citing Taliban trying to force Afghan girls as young as 13 into marriage, The National, Aug. 3, 2021, <https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/2021/08/03/taliban-trying-to-force-afghan-girls-as-young-as-13-into-marriage/>).

⁴⁴¹ Country Policy and Information Note Afghanistan: Fear of the Taliban [Version 1.0], UK Home Office, p. 33-34, Oct. 2021, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2061589/AFG_CPIN_Fear_of_the_Taliban.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022) (citing Taliban trying to force Afghan girls as young as 13 into marriage, The National, August 3, 2021, available at: <https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/asia/2021/08/03/taliban-trying-to-force-afghan-girls-as-young-as-13-into-marriage/>).

⁴⁴² Fereshta Abbasi, Afghan Girls' Education: 'I Don't Think I Have a Future,' Closing Secondary Schools to Girls Causing Lasting Harm, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 31, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/31/afghan-girls-education-i-dont-think-i-have-future> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁴³ Ayaz Gul, All Public Universities in Afghanistan Open to Male, Female Students, Voice of America (VOA), Feb. 26, 2022, available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/all-public-universities-in-afghanistan-open-to-male-female-students/6461202.html> (last visited Apr. 15, 2022); The Taliban closes Afghan girls' schools hours after reopening, Al Jazeera, Mar. 23, 2022, available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/3/23/taliban-orders-girls-schools-shut-hours-after-reopening> (last visited May 3, 2022).

⁴⁴⁴ Christina Goldbaum, Taliban Allow Girls to Return to Some High Schools, but With Big Caveats, N.Y. Times, Oct. 27, 2021, updated Nov. 3, 2021, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/27/world/asia/afghan-girls-school-taliban.html?searchResultPosition=8> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

Afghan women are unable to hold positions of authority in almost all spheres of public life.⁴⁴⁵ They have been “barred from paid employment, except as teachers for girls and health-care workers.”⁴⁴⁶ Women aid employees are allowed to work unconditionally in just three out of 34 provinces.⁴⁴⁷ In the remaining provinces, “women aid workers face severe restrictions, such as requirements for a male family member to escort them while they do their jobs, making it difficult or impossible for them to do their job effectively.”⁴⁴⁸ In the legal field, female lawyers and judges “have left the courts under Taliban pressure” and “live in a state of perpetual fear that they or their loved ones could be tracked down and killed.”⁴⁴⁹ Although Taliban representatives claim that female lawyers and judges are protected by a general amnesty for all former government workers, these women fear retribution for their work.⁴⁵⁰

Women activists and former members of public life have been targeted with severe violence since the Taliban takeover of Kabul. Protests by women “outraged by the ...hard-line” nature of the Taliban's so-called “caretaker government” have been met by violence from the Taliban fighters.⁴⁵¹ According to ACLED, during the week of October 30 to November 5, 2021, “the bodies of four women civil society activists were recovered in Balkh province, including a well-known women's rights defender ... [allegedly] killed by an organized network targeting civil society activists, who introduced themselves as representatives of a human rights organization.”⁴⁵²

ii. Targeted Killings and Evictions of Hazaras

Hazaras have been “historic victims of prejudice on religious and ethnic grounds.”⁴⁵³ Though they made progress in achieving parity with other ethnic groups over the last two decades,

⁴⁴⁵ Marie McAuliffe, *Struggling to Survive: Gender, Displacement, and Migration in Taliban-Controlled Afghanistan*, Center for Strategic International Studies, Feb. 23, 2022, available at: <https://www.csis.org/analysis/struggling-survive-gender-displacement-and-migration-taliban-controlled-afghanistan> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁴⁶ HRW Says Donors Should Link Afghan Aid to Taliban's Observing Rights for Girls, Women, Gandahara Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Mar. 21, 2022, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/hrw-donors-afghan-aid-taliban-womens-rights/31762920.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁴⁷ Afghanistan: Taliban Blocking Female Aid Workers, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 4, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/04/afghanistan-taliban-blocking-female-aid-workers> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁴⁸ Afghanistan: Taliban Blocking Female Aid Workers, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 4, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/11/04/afghanistan-taliban-blocking-female-aid-workers> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁴⁹ David Zucchino, *Afghan Women Who Once Presided Over Abuse Cases Now Fear for Their Lives*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2021, updated Oct. 22, 2021, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/world/asia/afghan-judges-women-taliban.html?searchResultPosition=5> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁵⁰ David Zucchino, *Afghan Women Who Once Presided Over Abuse Cases Now Fear for Their Lives*, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 2021, updated Oct. 22, 2021, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/21/world/asia/afghan-judges-women-taliban.html?searchResultPosition=5> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁵¹ Yaroslav Trofimov, *Afghan Women Protest Hard-Line Taliban Government, Face Violent Crackdown*, The Wall Street Journal, Sep. 8, 2021, available at: <https://www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-women-protest-talibans-all-male-government-face-violent-crackdown-11631105098> (last visited May 3, 2022), cited by: Taliban Government in Afghanistan: Background and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, p. 20, Nov. 2, 2021, available at: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46955> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁵² Regional Overview: South Asia and Afghanistan 30 October to 5 November 2021, ACLED, Nov. 2021, available at: <https://acleddata.com/2021/11/11/regional-overview-south-asia-and-afghanistan-30-october-5-november-2021/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁵³ Thomas Barfield, *Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History*, pg.26, (Princeton University Press, 2010).

Hazaras were particular targets of harm by the Taliban during the Taliban's period of rule from 1996-2001. Recently, Taliban fighters massacred nine ethnic Hazara men after taking control of Ghazni province in July 2021.⁴⁵⁴ Hazaras, an ethnic Shia minority, are also enduring a pattern of increasing sectarian attacks from ISIS-K, which over the last several years “has been blamed for dozens of bombings and gun attacks on mosques, shrines, schools ...[as] the group views Shiites as apostates.”⁴⁵⁵

Human Rights Watch and other sources have reported that the Taliban has begun forcibly evicting Hazaras from their homes, including 700 from the central province of Daikundi in late September 2021,⁴⁵⁶ hundreds of families from the southern Helmand province and northern Balkh province,⁴⁵⁷ and others from Daikundi, Uruzgan, and Kandahar provinces.⁴⁵⁸ Human Rights Watch stated that ISIS-K “has repeatedly carried out devastating attacks that appear designed to spread terror and inflict maximum suffering particularly on Afghanistan's Hazara community.”⁴⁵⁹ Reuters reported that “[w]ith more than 400 Shi'ite mosques in Kabul alone, total security is impossible and no one knows where the next attack will come.”⁴⁶⁰

iii. Restrictions and Risks in Cases of Nonconformity

Optimism that the current Taliban may be more moderate than the Taliban was from 1996-2001 has faded, as they are reportedly targeting journalists,⁴⁶¹ artists and musicians,⁴⁶² barbers and

⁴⁵⁴ Afghanistan: Taliban responsible for brutal massacre of Hazara men—new investigation, Amnesty International, Aug. 19, 2021, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/08/afghanistan-taliban-responsible-for-brutal-massacre-of-hazara-men-new-investigation/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁵⁵ Pamela Constable, After Kabul school attack, Afghans fear a return to violence, The Washington Post, Apr. 20, 2022, available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/04/20/afghanistan-school-attack-isis-hazara/> (last visited May 3, 2022).

⁴⁵⁶ Gulamaiz Sharifi, Abubakar Siddique, Afghan Hazaras Fear The Worst After Forced Taliban Evictions, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Oct. 6, 2021, available at: <https://gandhara.rferl.org/a/afghanistan-hazaras-taliban/31496224.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁵⁷ Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia, Hazaras, Former Civil Servants Targets of Collective Punishment, Land-Grabbing, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 22, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/22/afghanistan-taliban-forcibly-evict-minority-shia> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁵⁸ Afghanistan: Taliban Forcibly Evict Minority Shia, Hazaras, Former Civil Servants Targets of Collective Punishment, Land-Grabbing, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 22, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/22/afghanistan-taliban-forcibly-evict-minority-shia> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁵⁹ Afghanistan: Surge in Islamic State Attacks on Shia, ISIS Affiliate's Targeted Killings Amount to Crimes Against Humanity, Human Rights Watch, Oct. 25, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/10/25/afghanistan-surge-islamic-state-attacks-shia> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁶⁰ Gibran Naiyyar Peshimam, For Afghan Hazaras, where to pray can be life and death choice, Reuters, Oct. 21, 2021, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-hazaras-where-pray-can-be-life-death-choice-2021-10-21/> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁶¹ Afghanistan: Journalists tell of beatings by Taliban, BBC News, Sept. 9, 2021, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58500579> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁶² Javier C. Hernández, Musicians Flee Afghanistan, Fearing Taliban Rule, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17, 2021, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/03/arts/music/afghanistan-musicians-flee.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022); Afghanistan: Gunmen attack wedding to stop music being played, BBC News, Oct. 31, 2021, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-59107046> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

those working in fashion,⁴⁶³ civil society participants and protestors.⁴⁶⁴ According to Amnesty International, these actions have created a climate of fear and intimidation that has caused many Afghan nationals to engage in self-censoring, adopting conservative attire, and abandoning former employment and public life.⁴⁶⁵ For example, according to the chairperson of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, those formerly employed as “[l]awyers, judges and prosecutors are mostly in hiding.”⁴⁶⁶ The Taliban have announced that they will once again carry out executions and amputations of hands for criminal offenses, and have begun doing so.⁴⁶⁷

iv. Challenges for Individuals With Disabilities

At least one in five households in Afghanistan includes an adult or child with a serious sensory, psychosocial, intellectual, or physical disability, making Afghanistan one of the largest per capita populations of individuals with disabilities in the world.⁴⁶⁸ Unlike many other marginalized populations, merely the removal of discrimination does not automatically enable equal participation in society; rather there are often necessary accommodations or remediations that must happen in physical, communications, or other infrastructures.⁴⁶⁹ Access to physical rehabilitation services is “...complicated by poverty, poor quality roads, and danger along the way due to armed conflict.”⁴⁷⁰ After the Taliban takeover in 2021, any strides that Afghanistan had made in protecting the rights of the disabled through the signing and ratifying of conventions under the administrations of Hamid Karzai and Ashraf Ghani “have been virtually abandoned” as the withdrawal of foreign aid has “reduced both the funds to implement these programs and

⁴⁶³ The Taliban Order Barbers Not To Shave Beards In Afghan Province Of Helmand, NPR, Sept. 27, 2021, available at: <https://www.npr.org/2021/09/27/1041025238/the-taliban-order-barbers-not-to-shave-beards-in-afghan-province-of-helmand> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁶⁴ Matthieu Aikins et al., As Taliban Crush Dissent, New Leaders Face Cascading Challenges, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 2021, available at: <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/08/world/asia/taliban-protests-pakistan.html?referringSource=articleShare> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁶⁵ Afghanistan: Taliban wasting no time in stamping out human rights says new briefing, Amnesty International, Sept. 21, 2021, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/09/afghanistan-taliban-wasting-no-time-in-stamping-out-human-rights-says-new-briefing/> (last visited May 4, 2022).

⁴⁶⁶ Public Displays of Corpses Signal Return of Hard-Line Afghan Taliban, Voice of America (VOA) News, Sept. 27, 2021, available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/public-displays-of-corpses-signal-return-of-hard-line-afghan-taliban-6248297.html> (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁶⁷ Taliban Official Says Strict Punishment And Executions Will Return, NPR, Sept. 24, 2021, available at: <https://www.npr.org/2021/09/24/1040339286/taliban-official-says-strict-punishment-and-executions-will-return> (last Apr. 8, 2022); The Taliban's Sharia is the Most Brutal of All, Foreign Policy, Oct.13, 2021, available at <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/10/13/the-talibans-sharia-is-the-most-brutal-of-all/> (last visited May 4, 2022).

⁴⁶⁸ “Disability Is Not Weakness,” Discrimination and Barriers Facing Women and Girls with Disabilities in Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, p. 1, Apr. 2020, available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/afghanistan0420_web_0.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁶⁹ Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, The United Nations Human Rights Office (OHCHR), Dec. 13, 2006, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/convention-rights-persons-disabilities> (last visited May 4, 2022).

⁴⁷⁰ “Disability Is Not Weakness,” Discrimination and Barriers Facing Women and Girls with Disabilities in Afghanistan, Human Rights Watch, p. 17, Apr. 2020, available at: https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/afghanistan0420_web_0.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

international commitments[,] and the Afghan leadership's interest in carrying them out.”⁴⁷¹ The European Asylum Support Office (EASO) confirms the stigmatization of individuals with physical and mental disabilities, with “women, displaced persons and returned migrants with mental health issues” being particularly vulnerable.⁴⁷² EASO also notes the “lack of appropriate infrastructure and specialist care that covers the needs of people with disabilities.”⁴⁷³

Cameroon

On June 7, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the TPS designation for Cameroon for 18 months, effective June 7, 2022, through December 7, 2023.⁴⁷⁴

The information below describing the reasons for Cameroon’s TPS designation has been excerpted from the June 7, 2022 FRN that announced the designation.

Based on DHS's review of country conditions in Cameroon, and in consultation with DOS, the Secretary has determined that an 18-month TPS designation is warranted because of ongoing armed conflict and the extraordinary and temporary conditions described below.

Overview

The extreme violence between government forces and armed separatists in the English-speaking regions (Northwest and Southwest) of Cameroon, as well as deadly attacks by the terrorist organization Boko Haram (including its breakaway faction, ISIS-West Africa (ISWAP) and vigilante self-defense groups in the Far North Region) continue to negatively impact the populations in the affected regions and beyond.⁴⁷⁵ Thousands of people have been killed in the English-speaking regions, and hundreds of thousands more remain in internally displaced person camps, while tens of thousands have sought refuge in the neighboring country of Nigeria. Moreover, the government has increased restrictions on political opposition groups and civil society and there are reports that the government of Cameroon has committed human rights violations and abuses. As detailed below, the crisis in the English-speaking regions, instability in the Far North Region, and restrictions on political space and reports of human rights violations

⁴⁷¹ Chris Fitzgerald, Humanitarian Crisis And Neglect In Afghanistan Puts People With Disabilities At Risk, The Organization for World Peace, Jan. 19, 2022, available at: <https://theowp.org/reports/humanitarian-crisis-and-neglect-in-afghanistan-puts-people-with-disabilities-at-risk/> (last visited May 3, 2022).

⁴⁷² Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common analysis and guidance note, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), p. 88, Nov. 2021, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁷³ Country Guidance: Afghanistan, Common analysis and guidance note, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), p. 88, Nov. 2021, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/sites/default/files/Country_Guidance_Afghanistan_2021.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2022).

⁴⁷⁴ See 87 FR 34706 (June 7, 2022) (18-month designation of Cameroon for TPS through December 7, 2023).

⁴⁷⁵ CAMEROON 2021, Amnesty International, 2022, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/cameroon/report-cameroon/> (last visited May 13, 2022); *Cameroon: Boko Haram Attacks Escalate in Far North*, Human Rights Watch, Apr. 5, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/05/cameroon-boko-haram-attacks-escalate-far-north> (last visited May 13, 2022); *Human Rights in Africa: Review of 2019—Cameroon [AFR 01/1352/2020]*, Amnesty International, 2020, Apr. 8, 2020, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2028266.html> (last visited May 13, 2022).

and abuses have led to various challenges, including violence against civilians, a humanitarian crisis, and economic decline.⁴⁷⁶

Security Situation

i. The Crisis in the English-Speaking Regions

The English-speaking regions—the Southwest and Northwest—make up approximately 20% of the country's population.⁴⁷⁷ The two regions continue to suffer from extreme violence, a crisis more severe than any other in contemporary Cameroon.⁴⁷⁸ In 2016, the peaceful protests calling for federalism led to fighting and to a demand for full independence after the government clamped down on protest leaders.⁴⁷⁹ On October 1, 2017, separatist groups unilaterally declared an independent state called the Republic of Ambazonia.⁴⁸⁰ The declaration escalated confrontation and paved the way for more human rights abuses in the two English-speaking regions.

Since 2017, confrontation between government forces and separatists has “killed more than 3,000 people, forced over 900,000 people from their homes, and kept around 800,000 children out of school.”⁴⁸¹ In 2020, the United Kingdom Home Office report assessed, “[o]ne in 3 people in the Anglophone regions are in need of humanitarian aid, including assistance with education, food, healthcare, shelter, water and sanitation. Many of the IDPs remain in the English-speaking regions, hiding in remote bush areas. Sexual assault, exploitation, and rape are frequently reported by female IDPs, and humanitarian assistance is hampered by the volatile security situation, especially in remote areas.”⁴⁸² According to Amnesty International, both the Cameroonian armed forces and the various separatist groups involved in the fighting in

⁴⁷⁶ See generally *CAMEROON 2021*, Amnesty International, 2022, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/cameroon/report-cameroon/> (last visited May 13, 2022); *Cameroon: Boko Haram Attacks Escalate in Far North*, Human Rights Watch, Apr. 5, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/05/cameroon-boko-haram-attacks-escalate-far-north> (last visited May 13, 2022); *Human Rights in Africa: Review of 2019—Cameroon [AFR 01/1352/2020]*, Amnesty International, 2020, Apr. 8, 2020, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2028266.html> (last visited May 13, 2022).

⁴⁷⁷ *Cameroon: Witness testimony and satellite images reveal the scale of devastation in Anglophone regions*, Amnesty International, Jul. 28, 2021, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/07/cameroon-satellite-images-reveal-devastation-in-anglophone-regions/> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁷⁸ *Cameroon's Anglophone Crisis at the Crossroads*, International Crisis Group, Aug. 2, 2017, available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/250-camerouns-anglophone-crisis-crossroads/> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁷⁹ “*These Killings Can Be Stopped*”, Human Rights Watch, Jul. 19, 2018, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/07/19/these-killings-can-be-stopped/abuses-government-and-separatist-groups-camerouns> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁸⁰ *Ambazonia Defense Forces*, Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, May 2019, available at: <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/mappingmilitants/profiles/ambazonia-defense-forces> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁸¹ *Ahead of peace talks, a who's who of Cameroon's separatist movements*, The Humanitarian, Jul. 8, 2020, available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/07/08/Cameroon-Ambazonia-conflict-peace-whos-who> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁸² *Country Policy and Information Note: Cameroon: North-West/South-West crisis*, UK Home Office, Dec. 2020, available at: <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1345186/download> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

Cameroon's English-speaking regions have engaged in human rights abuses, and civilians are caught in the middle.⁴⁸³

Separatist groups kill security forces and commit serious abuses against civilians, including unlawful killings, often involving mutilations.⁴⁸⁴ They have targeted civil servants, relatives of members of defense and security forces, and ordinary people who fail to adhere to lockdowns (referred to as “ghost towns”) and instructions to close schools.⁴⁸⁵ Ghost town operations require businesses to close and residents to largely stay home, limiting much economic activity. As of September 2021, “deadly attacks by various separatist groups on military posts and vehicles of the Cameroonian army continue to be a daily occurrence.”⁴⁸⁶

Regarding abuses by the Cameroonian government, its security forces have targeted civilians, leading analysts to note that “killing civilians and looting their homes in the name of security are serious human rights crimes that fuel the escalating cycles of violence and abuse in Cameroon's Anglophone regions.”⁴⁸⁷

In September 2019, amid increasing violence and following sustained international pressure, President Biya called for a national dialogue, a series of nationwide discussions aimed at addressing the crisis.⁴⁸⁸ The dialogue took place between September 30 and October 4, 2019, and resulted in a series of recommendations, including changing the country's name back to the “United Republic of Cameroon” and the adoption of a Special Status for the two English-speaking regions.⁴⁸⁹ However, separatist groups rejected the recommendations as illegitimate.⁴⁹⁰ The English-speaking regions remain unsafe and marred by widespread human rights abuses. In 2020, Amnesty International reported that “fighting between various armed groups and the Cameroonian armed forces has continued unabated for the past three years, with civilians bearing the brunt of unlawful killings, kidnappings, and widespread destruction of houses and villages.”⁴⁹¹

⁴⁸³ *Cameroon: Witness testimony and satellite images reveal the scale of devastation in Anglophone regions*, Amnesty International, Jul. 28, 2021, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/07/cameroon-satellite-images-reveal-devastation-in-anglophone-regions/> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁸⁴ *Human Rights in Africa: Review of 2019—Cameroon [AFR 01/1352/2020]*, Amnesty International, 2020, Apr. 8, 2020, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2028266.html> (last visited May 13, 2022).

⁴⁸⁵ *Cameroon 2019*, Amnesty International, 2020, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/afr01/1352/2020/en/> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁸⁶ *Separatism in Cameroon: 5 years of violent civil war*, Deutsche Welle (DW), Oct. 1, 2021, available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/separatism-in-cameroon-5-years-of-violent-civil-war/a-59369417> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁸⁷ *Cameroon: Nine Killed in Army Attack*, Human Rights Watch, Feb. 4, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/02/04/cameroon-nine-killed-army-attack> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁸⁸ *Cameroon: Events of 2019*, Human Rights Watch, 2020, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/cameroon> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁸⁹ *Country Policy and Information Note: Cameroon: North-West/South-West crisis*, UK Home Office, Dec. 2020, available at: <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1345186/download> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁹⁰ *Cameroon grants 'special status' to its restive regions. They don't feel special*, African Arguments, Jan. 2020, available at: <https://africanarguments.org/2020/01/cameroon-grants-special-status-anglophone-conflict/> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁹¹ *Cameroon: Witness testimony and satellite images reveal the scale of devastation in Anglophone regions*, Amnesty International, Jul. 28, 2021, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2021/07/>

ii. Attacks by Boko Haram in the Far North Region

Boko Haram and its breakaway faction, ISWAP,⁴⁹² continue to engage in violence in the Far North region.⁴⁹³ In that region, the ongoing armed conflict between government forces and Boko Haram has killed over 3,000 Cameroonians, displaced about 250,000 and triggered the rise of vigilante self-defense groups.⁴⁹⁴

In November 2020, the Africa Center for Strategic Studies described the situation in the Far North Region as follows: “Northern Cameroon has experienced the sharpest spike of Boko Haram violence in the Lake Chad Basin over the past 12 months, namely in the form of attacks on civilians ... The number of violent incidents linked to militant Islamist groups in Cameroon's Far North Region jumped 90 percent, to roughly 400 events, over the past 12 months ... Most of the violence reported in Cameroon has been in the form of attacks against civilians (over 59 percent). The number of attacks against civilians in Cameroon over the last 12 months (234) is higher than in Nigeria (100), Niger (92), and Chad (12) combined. These attacks consist of Boko Haram raids, kidnapping for recruitment and ransom, and looting of villages and displaced persons camps.”⁴⁹⁵ According to a Human Rights Watch report, Boko Haram has stepped up attacks on civilians in towns and villages in the Far North region since December 2020, killing at least 80 civilians, and looting hundreds of homes in the region.⁴⁹⁶

Humanitarian Crisis

As of February 2022, the extreme violence in Cameroon had triggered a large and growing humanitarian crisis, creating 936,767 IDPs within Cameroon.⁴⁹⁷ Additionally, Cameroon hosts

[cameroon-satellite-images-reveal-devastation-in-anglophone-regions/](#) (last visited Apr. 14, 2022); *Separatist Fighting Continues in Cameroon a Year After Major National Dialogue*, Voice of America, Oct. 4, 2020, available at: <https://www.voanews.com/africa/separatist-fighting-continues-cameroon-year-after-major-national-dialogue> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022); see also *Ahead of peace talks, a who's who of Cameroon's separatist movements*, The New Humanitarian, Jul. 8, 2020, available at: <https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/analysis/2020/07/08/Cameroon-Ambazonia-conflict-peace-whos-who> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁹² *Boko Haram and the Islamic State West Africa Province*, Congressional Research Services, Feb. 24, 2022, available at: <https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF10173.pdf> (last visited May 13, 2022).

⁴⁹³ *Cameroon 2019*, Amnesty International, 2020, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/west-and-central-africa/cameroon/report-cameroon/> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022); see also *Country Report on Terrorism 2018—Chapter 1—Cameroon*, U.S. Department of State, 2018, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2019254.html> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁹⁴ *Cameroon*, International Crisis Group, available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022); see also *Cameroon: Events of 2019*, Human Rights Watch, 2020, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/cameroon> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁹⁵ *Boko Haram Violence against Civilians Spiking in Northern Cameroon*, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Nov. 13, 2020, available at: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/boko-haram-violence-against-civilians-spiking-in-northern-cameroon/> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁹⁶ *Cameroon: Boko Haram Attacks Escalate in Far North*, Human Rights Watch, Apr. 15, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/05/cameroon-boko-haram-attacks-escalate-far-north> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁴⁹⁷ POCs February 2022, UNHCR data portal, Feb. 2022, available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/91170> (last visited April 14, 2022); UNHCR Cameroon MCO Factsheet—January 2022, Mar. 9, 2022,

478,066 refugees, 8,368 asylum seekers, and 518,853 returnees (former IDPs).⁴⁹⁸ While people have been displaced in the English-speaking regions due to confrontation between government forces and separatist armed groups, IDPs in Cameroon's Far North Region were displaced by escalating Boko Haram attacks.⁴⁹⁹ With respect to refugees, OHCHR has reported that tens of thousands of Cameroonians have sought refuge in neighboring Nigeria, and many others have fled to nearby forests.⁵⁰⁰

In addition, Cameroon is experiencing economic deterioration linked to the aforementioned violence, impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic, and oil prices.⁵⁰¹ In the English-speaking regions, the crisis has “devastated the local economy and contributed to food insecurity in an already poor and remote region.”⁵⁰² The violence has significantly impacted the economy. In hard-to-reach areas where non-state armed groups have increased their presence, “[t]he weekly ‘ghost town’ [or lockdown] days, set up by nonstate armed groups, particularly affect displaced persons and host communities, limiting their movements and, therefore, their economic and agricultural activities.”⁵⁰³

According to the World Bank, the extreme violence in the English-speaking regions has resulted in the significant destruction of critical assets; schools, health facilities, and infrastructure have been deliberately targeted and destroyed. Moreover, the arrival of IDPs in the West and Littoral regions has overstrained a health sector that was already lacking in adequate workforce, supplies, and services in those regions.⁵⁰⁴

Food insecurity in Cameroon is a serious concern. According to the World Bank, the food situation in the Northwest and Southwest regions is alarming and continues to worsen.⁵⁰⁵

available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/cameroon/unhcr-cameroon-mco-factsheet-january-2022> (last visited Apr. 15, 2022).

⁴⁹⁸ UNHCR, Operational Date Portal, Refugee Situations Cameroon, available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/country/cmr> (last visited May 13, 2022).

⁴⁹⁹ *Food Insecurity Crisis Mounting in Africa*, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Feb. 16, 2021, available at: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/food-insecurity-crisis-mounting-africa/> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁵⁰⁰ *Thousands of Cameroonians seek refuge in Nigeria*, UNHCR, Oct. 13, 2017, available at: <https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/briefing/2017/10/59f83dfe4/thousands-cameroonians-seek-refuge-nigeria.html> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁵⁰¹ *Cameroon Economic Outlook*, African Development Bank (ADB), available at: <https://www.afdb.org/en/countries/central-africa/cameroon> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁵⁰² *Cameroon in Focus*, Congressional Research Service, Mar. 12, 2019, available at: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10279> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁵⁰³ *Country Policy and Information Note: Cameroon: North-West/South-West crisis*, UK Home Office, Dec. 2020, available at: <https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1345186/download> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022); see also *Easing Cameroon's Ethno-political Tensions, On and Offline*, International Crisis Group, Dec. 3, 2020, available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/295-easing-camerouns-ethno-political-tensions-and-offline> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁵⁰⁴ *The Socio-Political Crisis in the Northwest and Southwest Regions of Cameroon: Assessing the Economic and Social Impacts*, World Bank Group, Jan. 2021, available at: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/795921624338364910/pdf/The-Socio-Political-Crisis-in-the-Northwest-and-Southwest-Regions-of-Cameroon-Assessing-the-Economic-and-Social-Impacts.pdf> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁵⁰⁵ *The Socio-Political Crisis in the Northwest and Southwest Regions of Cameroon: Assessing the Economic and Social Impacts*, World Bank Group, Jan. 2021, available at: <https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/795921624338364910/pdf/The-Socio-Political-Crisis-in-the-Northwest-and-Southwest-Regions-of-Cameroon-Assessing-the-Economic-and-Social-Impacts.pdf> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

Additionally, “[a]griculture has been greatly disrupted in Cameroon's Far North region, where the army is fighting against a Boko Haram insurgency, and the West, where English speaking separatist [sic] are trying to create a breakaway state.”⁵⁰⁶ According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 4.9 million Cameroonians faced acute food insecurity.⁵⁰⁷

Government Restrictions on Political Space and Human Rights Violations and Abuses

In its 2021 annual report, DOS indicated that human rights violations and abuses in Cameroon include reports of “unlawful or arbitrary killings, including extrajudicial killings by the government and nonstate armed groups; forced disappearances by the government; torture and cases of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment by the government and nonstate armed groups; ...serious abuses in a conflict, including abductions and unlawful recruitment and use of child soldiers by nonstate armed groups; serious restrictions on freedom of expression and media, including violence, threats of violence, or unjustified arrests or prosecutions against journalists, censorship, and criminal libel laws; substantial interference with the right of peaceful assembly and freedom of association, including overly restrictive laws on the organization, funding, or operation of nongovernmental organizations and civil society organizations; ...”⁵⁰⁸ Observers assert that the government has increased restrictions on political opposition groups and civil society since President Biya won a seventh term in 2018.⁵⁰⁹ Politically, the situation has remained tense, due in part to disputes over the 2018 presidential elections.⁵¹⁰ Before that election, “Cameroonian authorities cracked down on the political opposition, violently broke up peaceful protests, and arrested hundreds of opposition party leaders, members, and supporters.”⁵¹¹ Additionally, political tensions continue between the government and the main opposition—Cameroon Renaissance Movement—led by Maurice Kamto.⁵¹²

⁵⁰⁶ *Conflicts in Cameroon exacerbate existing food insecurity*, Deutsche Welle, May 28, 2021, available at: <https://www.dw.com/en/conflicts-in-cameroon-exacerbate-existing-food-insecurity/av-57709937> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁵⁰⁷ *Food Insecurity Crisis Mounting in Africa*, Africa Center for Strategic Studies, Feb. 16, 2021, available at: <https://africacenter.org/spotlight/food-insecurity-crisis-mounting-africa/> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁵⁰⁸ 2021 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Cameroon, U.S. Department of State, 2021, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2021-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/cameroon/> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁵⁰⁹ *Cameroon: Key Issues and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service, Sept. 22, 2021, available at: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46919/2> (last visited: Apr. 14, 2022).

⁵¹⁰ *Cameroon: Opposition Leaders Arrested*, Human Rights Watch, Feb. 1, 2019, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/01/30/cameroon-opposition-leaders-arrested> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

⁵¹¹ *HRW World Report for Events of 2019*, Human Rights Watch, 2020, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/cameroon>; the main opposition leader, Maurice Kamto, who declared himself the winner of the 2018 presidential election, was arrested in February 2019 but released in October 2019. Kamto's political party, the Cameroon Renaissance Movement (*Le Mouvement pour la Renaissance du Cameroun-MRC*), boycotted the February 2020 municipal and parliamentary elections, arguing that electoral laws must be reviewed before any polls. The boycott paved the way for the ruling party to secure an overwhelming majority in parliament.

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⁵¹² *Easing Cameroon's Ethno-political Tensions, On and Offline*, International Crisis Group, Dec. 3, 2020, available at: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/central-africa/cameroon/295-easing-camerouns-ethno-political-tensions-and-offline> (last visited Apr. 14, 2022).

The ongoing violence in Cameroon has had significant civilian costs.⁵¹³ The two most disruptive crises are those between government forces and armed separatists in the English-speaking Northwest and Southwest regions of Cameroon and attacks by armed groups, such as Boko Haram jihadists, ISWAP combatants, and vigilante self-defense groups, in the Far North Region.⁵¹⁴ These two crises continue to have severe consequences for the population throughout the country and more specifically in the affected regions.⁵¹⁵ Thousands of people have been killed in the English-speaking regions, while hundreds of thousands more remain in IDP camps and tens of thousands have sought refuge in the neighboring country of Nigeria. Deadly attacks in the Far North region by Boko Haram and ISWAP continue unabated. Additionally, reports of human rights violations and abuses may create a precarious situation for some civilians. These three issues—crisis in the English-speaking regions, instability in the Far North region, and reports of human rights violations and abuses—have been creating various insurmountable challenges for people across Cameroon, including violence against civilians, economic decline and resulting humanitarian crises.

Ethiopia

On December 12, 2022, Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas announced via FRN the TPS designation for Ethiopia for 18 months, effective December 12, 2022, through June 12, 2024.⁵¹⁶

The information below describing the reasons for Ethiopia’s TPS designation has been excerpted from the December 12, 2022 FRN that announced the designation.

DHS and DOS have reviewed conditions in Ethiopia. Ethiopia faces armed conflict in multiple regions of the country resulting in large-scale displacement. In addition, Ethiopia has been experiencing severe climatic shocks exacerbating humanitarian concerns over access to food, water, and healthcare.

Ethiopia's civil war began in November 2020, when a constitutional dispute between Tigray and federal leaders escalated into conflict amid a prolonged power struggle.⁵¹⁷ Since then, Ethiopian forces and their allies have been accused of pillaging and targeting homes and civilian infrastructure including businesses, hospitals, banks, livestock, and harvests. Tigrayan forces have been accused of these same actions in other regions.⁵¹⁸ By July 2021, the conflict had spread to Tigray's neighboring regions of Afar and Amhara.⁵¹⁹ Human rights abuses by all

⁵¹³ *Cameroon: Boko Haram Attacks Escalate in Far North*, Human Rights Watch, Apr. 5, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/05/cameroon-boko-haram-attacks-escalate-far-north> (last visited May 13, 2022).

⁵¹⁴ *Cameroon: Boko Haram Attacks Escalate in Far North*, Human Rights Watch, Apr. 5, 2021, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/04/05/cameroon-boko-haram-attacks-escalate-far-north> (last visited May 13, 2022).

⁵¹⁵ *Cameroon—Global Humanitarian Overview 2022*, United Nations, 2022, available at: <https://gho.unocha.org/cameroon> (last visited May 13, 2022).

⁵¹⁶ See 87 FR 076074 (December 12, 2022) (18-month designation of Ethiopia for TPS through June 12, 2024).

⁵¹⁷ International Crisis Group, *Avoiding the Abyss as War Resumes in Northern Ethiopia* (Sept. 7, 2022), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/ethiopia/avoiding-abyss-war-resumes-northern-ethiopia>.

⁵¹⁸ Human Rights Watch (HRW), *Confronting Ethiopia's Abusive Siege* (Sept. 2, 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/the-day-in-human-rights/2022/09/02>.

⁵¹⁹ HRW, *Ethiopia's Other Conflict* (July 4, 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/07/04/ethiopias-other-conflict>.

parties to the conflict have been reported, including killings, torture, gender-based violence, arbitrary or unjust detentions, and there have also been potential human trafficking crimes.⁵²⁰ On March 24, 2022, the Ethiopian federal government declared a humanitarian truce, which the Tigray forces reciprocated.

With the exception of some limited clashes and shelling incidents, the humanitarian truce held, and the violence drastically decreased.⁵²¹ Humanitarian convoy movements to Tigray resumed on April 1, 2022 and continued until August 2022.⁵²² On August 24, 2022, a resumption of hostilities marked the breach of the five-month truce.⁵²³ On September 1, 2022, Tigray authorities stated that the Ethiopian and Eritrean forces had launched major offensives into the northwestern Tigray region.⁵²⁴ In an African Union-led process, the Government of Ethiopia and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF) signed a cessation of hostilities agreement on November 2, 2022.⁵²⁵ While this agreement is an important initial step in curbing violence in northern Ethiopia, it does not address violence in other parts of Ethiopia, and—as of early November 2022—there remains significant humanitarian suffering as a result of the two-year conflict.⁵²⁶

Insurgencies are ongoing in Oromia, Benshangul-Gumuz and Gambella regions of Ethiopia.⁵²⁷ Since 2019, Ethiopian government forces and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA),⁵²⁸ also known as the OLF-Shane/Shene, have engaged in clashes in western Oromia. This fighting has resulted in allegations of serious human rights abuses. Government forces have been accused of extrajudicial killings and arbitrary arrests and detentions of Oromos and have at times cut communications in the area. The OLA has been accused of killing government officials and attacking non-military government offices.⁵²⁹ Deepening insurgencies have also led to increased violence reportedly targeting civilians. This is particularly evident in Oromia. On June 18,

⁵²⁰ *Id.* Also, Department of State, 2022 Trafficking in Persons Report (July 19, 2022), <https://www.state.gov/reports/2022-trafficking-in-persons-report/>.

⁵²¹ *Id.*

⁵²² UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Ethiopia—Situation Report, 05 Aug. 2022* (July 22, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-situation-report-05-aug-2022>.

⁵²³ International Crisis Group, *Avoiding the Abyss as War Resumes in Northern Ethiopia* (Sept. 7, 2022), <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-of-africa/ethiopia/avoiding-abyss-war-resumes-northern-ethiopia>.

⁵²⁴ *Id.*

⁵²⁵ UN News, *Ethiopia: Peace agreement between Government and Tigray 'a critical first step'*: Guterres, Nov. 2, 2022, available at <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/11/1130137> (last accessed Nov. 17, 2022).

⁵²⁶ Cecelia Macaulay and Anne Soy, BBC News, *Ethiopia's Tigray conflict: Truce agreed*, Nov. 2, 2022, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-63490546> (last accessed Nov. 17, 2022).

⁵²⁷ ACLED, *Multiple Complications Threaten to Result in a Dangerous Re-escalation* (Aug. 15, 2022), <https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/ethiopia/mid-year-update/>.

⁵²⁸ In September 2018, leaders of a formerly exiled opposition group, the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), returned to Ethiopia with the support of Prime Minister Abiy's government. However, since the OLF's return, the Ethiopian government has been engaged in conflict with “armed groups associated with it in western Oromia.” The Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), also known as the OLF-Shane/Shene faction, is an armed group that splintered from the OLF. See Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, *Ethiopia: The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), including origin, mandate, leadership, structure, legal status, and membership; treatment of members and supporters by authorities (2014-2015)* (May 7, 2015), <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5696030f4.html>.

⁵²⁹ HRW, *Ethiopia: Civilians in Western Oromia Left Unprotected* (Aug. 31, 2022), <https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/08/31/ethiopia-civilians-western-romia-left-unprotected>.

2022, over 330 Amhara civilians were reportedly killed by suspected OLA gunmen in Oromia.⁵³⁰ ACLED data indicate that over 230 alleged incidents of civilians being targeted were reported in Ethiopia during the first six months of 2022. This reportedly resulted in more than 1,220 fatalities, with over 810 of these fatalities (66 percent) occurring in Oromia.⁵³¹

Violence in Ethiopia has caused many to flee their homes and has exacerbated existing humanitarian concerns regarding access to food, water, and healthcare. UNOCHA noted that regional violence remained a critical concern across Ethiopia, from Benishangul-Gumuz to Oromia to Tigray.⁵³² In the Amhara region, ongoing violence also remains unabated throughout the region, and along its regional borders with Benishangul-Gumuz, Oromia, and Tigray, resulting in displacement.⁵³³ A September 2022 UNOCHA report stated: “more than 20 million people affected by violence as well as climatic shocks ...require humanitarian assistance and protection services until the end of 2022.”⁵³⁴ In July 2022, UNICEF estimated that 29.7 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance, including access to food, water, and health services, in Ethiopia. UNICEF also estimated that there were 2.75 million IDPs in Ethiopia.⁵³⁵ In addition, the UNHCR estimated that there are more than 59,500 Ethiopian refugees in eastern Sudan who have fled violence in Ethiopia.⁵³⁶

Ethiopia faces massive displacement of persons due to armed conflict, intercommunal violence, natural disasters, and impacts of climate change.⁵³⁷ Since June 2020, more than 120,000 people have been displaced due to insecurity in the Benishangul-Gumuz region.⁵³⁸ In the Tigray region, over 2 million people [out of a population of 6 million],⁵³⁹ have been displaced due to the ongoing conflict between the Ethiopian government and TPLF.⁵⁴⁰

An August 2022 report by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) stated that, in 2022, 20.4 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure, which is 2.4 million more

⁵³⁰ ACLED, *Multiple Complications Threaten to Result in a Dangerous Re-escalation* (Aug. 15, 2022), <https://acleddata.com/10-conflicts-to-worry-about-in-2022/ethiopia/mid-year-update/>.

⁵³¹ *Id.*

⁵³² UNOCHA, *Humanitarian Needs Overview- Ethiopia*, February 21, 2021, pg. 20, https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/key-documents/files/ethiopia_2021_humanitarian_needs_overview-compressed.pdf.

⁵³³ UNOCHA, *Ethiopia: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (January-June 2021)*, July 30, 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-humanitarian-access-snapshot-january-june-2021>.

⁵³⁴ UNOCHA, *Ethiopia Situation Overview* (Sept. 7, 2022), <https://reports.unocha.org/en/country/ethiopia/card/5EhBh4Xf5z/>.

⁵³⁵ UNICEF, *Ethiopia Humanitarian Situation Report No. 7* (July 2022), <https://www.unicef.org/media/126921/file/Ethiopia%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Report%20No.%207,%20July%202022.pdf>.

⁵³⁶ UNOCHA, *Sudan: East Sudan (Kassala & Gedaref) & Blue Nile States—Ethiopian Emergency Situation Update* (as of 31 August 2022), (Sept. 14, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-east-sudan-kassala-gedaref-blue-nile-states-ethiopian-emergency-situation-update-31-august-2022>.

⁵³⁷ UNOCHA, *Response to Internal Displacement in Ethiopia Fact Sheet—January to March 2022*, (May 19, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/response-internal-displacement-ethiopia-fact-sheet-january-march-2022> (Sept. 22, 2022).

⁵³⁸ UNOCHA, *Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ethiopia*, Feb. 21, 2021, pg. 20, https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/key-documents/files/ethiopia_2021_humanitarian_needs_overview-compressed.pdf.

⁵³⁹ UNOCHA, *Ethiopia: Humanitarian Access Snapshot (January-June 2021)*, July 30, 2021, <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-humanitarian-access-snapshot-january-june-2021>.

⁵⁴⁰ *Id.*

than in 2021.⁵⁴¹ In the Tigray region alone, almost 5.3 million people are estimated to be severely food insecure, according to the same report.⁵⁴² A September 2022 UNOCHA report stated that 9.9 million people required food assistance and 2.9 million children and pregnant and lactating women required nutrition interventions until the end of 2022.⁵⁴³ It further stated that “the level of water scarcity is alarming for both livestock and human consumption.”⁵⁴⁴

Sporadic measles outbreaks and seasonal malaria cases have increased in Southern Nations Nationalities and People's region, Southwest Ethiopia People's region and Sidama region, following the rainy season.⁵⁴⁵ Over 60 cases of measles and 56,000 cases of malaria were reported in July 2022.⁵⁴⁶ Areas experiencing conflict have seen their local healthcare systems severely damaged and diminished. A July 2022 White House report stated that in the Tigray region, just 22 percent of health facilities were fully functioning, with 75 percent only partially functioning, and 3 percent not functioning at all.⁵⁴⁷ A June 2022 Doctors Without Borders report stated that only 20 percent of health facilities in the Afar region were reportedly functioning, “as many are damaged, destroyed, abandoned or without resources.”⁵⁴⁸ As of July 2022, only 23.3 percent of the Ethiopian population was fully vaccinated against COVID-19.⁵⁴⁹

Ethiopia has been in climate-induced shocks—primarily drought and floods—that have furthered displacement across the country and exacerbated humanitarian concerns. Since late 2020, Ethiopia has been experiencing one of the most severe droughts in the last forty years.⁵⁵⁰ An August 2022 USAID report stated that: “the likelihood of a fifth consecutive poor, rainy season in 2022 has significantly increased concern that already high levels of acute food insecurity and malnutrition in southern and southeastern Ethiopia will continue through at least the first half of 2023.”⁵⁵¹ Drought conditions have resulted in widespread death of livestock, a key source of food, milk, and income for pastoralists.⁵⁵² Between March and April 2022, the International

⁵⁴¹ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), *GIEWS—Global Information and Early Warning System, Country Briefs, Ethiopia* (Aug. 24, 2022), <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=ETH&lang=en>.

⁵⁴² UN FAO, *GIEWS—Global Information and Early Warning System, Country Briefs, Ethiopia* (Aug. 24, 2022), <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=ETH&lang=en>.

⁵⁴³ UNOCHA, *Ethiopia Drought Response July-December 2022 (Revised)* (Sept. 8, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-drought-response-july-december-2022-revised>.

⁵⁴⁴ *Id.*

⁵⁴⁵ UNICEF, *Ethiopia Humanitarian Situation Report No. 7* (July 2022), <https://www.unicef.org/media/126921/file/Ethiopia%20Humanitarian%20Situation%20Report%20No.%207,%20July%202022.pdf>.

⁵⁴⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁴⁷ WHO, *Situation Report: Greater Horn of Africa Drought and Food Insecurity Grade 3 Emergency* (July 29, 2022), https://cdn.who.int/media/docs/default-source/emergencies/who_ghoa_sitrep_2022-08-08.pdf?sfvrsn=dbdfc8b0_3&download=true.

⁵⁴⁸ Doctors Without Borders, *Conflict and drought spark a deadly malnutrition crisis in Ethiopia's Afar region* (June 9, 2022), <https://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/latest/conflict-and-drought-spark-deadly-malnutrition-crisis-ethiopia-afar-region>.

⁵⁴⁹ Reuters, *COVID-19 Tracker: Ethiopia* (July 15, 2022), <https://graphics.reuters.com/world-coronavirus-tracker-and-maps/countries-and-territories/ethiopia/>.

⁵⁵⁰ UNOCHA, *Ethiopia: Drought Update No. 4, June 2022* (June 3, 2022), <https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-drought-update-no-4-june-2022>.

⁵⁵¹ USAID, *Horn of Africa—Complex Emergency* (Aug. 19, 2022), https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-08-19_USG_Horn_of_Africa_Complex_Emergency_Fact_Sheet_2.pdf.

⁵⁵² *Id.*

Organization for Migration recorded 20 percent of all IDPs citing drought as the primary cause of displacement.⁵⁵³ In April 2022, 7.2 million people in Ethiopia were in need of food assistance due to severe drought.⁵⁵⁴ Additionally, in 2022, heavy rains from early August to October caused flooding that displaced at least 185,200 people and affected an additional 79,631 people.⁵⁵⁵ “Assessments also revealed that 72 percent of cropland was damaged (mostly the staple maize).”⁵⁵⁶

In addition to violence and climatic shocks, Ethiopia is facing economic pressure, exacerbated by the ongoing armed conflict.⁵⁵⁷ Annual inflation remains high, driven by rising food and fuel costs, which puts pressure on households’ ability to access market foods. Ethiopia is experiencing insufficient foreign currency reserves and the continuous depreciation of the national currency, the Ethiopian birr.⁵⁵⁸ Annual inflation in July 2022 was at 33.5 percent, down slightly from June 2022.⁵⁵⁹

In summary, Ethiopia is experiencing ongoing armed conflict in multiple regions of the country as well as extraordinary and temporary conditions resulting from drought, flooding, food insecurity, displacement of persons, and other humanitarian concerns.

Sudan

On April 19, 2022, DHS announced via FRN the designation of Sudan for TPS, effective April 19, 2022, through October 19, 2023.⁵⁶⁰

The information below describing the reasons for Sudan’s TPS designation has been excerpted from the April 19, 2022 FRN that announced the designation.

DHS and the DOS have reviewed conditions in Sudan. Based on this review and after consulting with DOS, the Secretary has determined that an eighteen-month designation is warranted because of the extraordinary and temporary conditions described below.

⁵⁵³ *Id.*

⁵⁵⁴ World Food Program, *Regional Drought Response Plan for the Horn of Africa May-December 2022* (July 1, 2022), <https://docs.wfp.org/api/documents/WFP-0000140899/download/>.

⁵⁵⁵ UNOCHA, Ethiopia: Gambella Region Flood Update (As of 21 October 2022), (October 24, 2022), [https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-gambella-region-flood-update-21-october-2022#:~:text=In%202022%2C%20heavy%20rains%20from,\(15%2C927%20households\)%20were%20affected.](https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/ethiopia-gambella-region-flood-update-21-october-2022#:~:text=In%202022%2C%20heavy%20rains%20from,(15%2C927%20households)%20were%20affected.)

⁵⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁵⁷ Vivienne Nunis, BBC News, *Ethiopia's economy battered by Tigray war*, Aug. 30, 2021, available at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-58319977> (last accessed Nov. 17, 2022); AP News, *Ethiopia's economy struggles as war reignites in Tigray*, Sept. 13, 2022, available at <https://apnews.com/article/africa-economy-government-spending-kenya-826141a7a692574d9609462d2549bffb> (last accessed Nov. 17, 2022).

⁵⁵⁸ Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), *GIEWS—Global Information and Early Warning System, Country Briefs, Ethiopia* (Aug. 24, 2022), <https://www.fao.org/giews/countrybrief/country.jsp?code=ETH&lang=en>.

⁵⁵⁹ Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), *There is the potential for extreme food insecurity in conflict and drought-affected areas of Ethiopia* (July 2022), <https://fewsn.net/east-africa/ethiopia/key-message-update/july-2022>.

⁵⁶⁰ See 87 FR 23202 (April 19, 2022) (18-month designation of Sudan for TPS through October 19, 2023).

Overview

Sudan is enduring a humanitarian crisis in which millions of individuals are exposed to violence, illness, and internal displacement. Political instability, civil unrest, and scarcity of resources are key contributors to the situation. In October 2021, the military removed the civilian-led transitional government, and declared a national state of emergency. Civil unrest and violent clashes rooted in tribal and inter-communal tensions occur across the country. An economic downturn and severe flooding have resulted in shortages of food and clean water and outbreaks of disease.

Political Situation

In April 2019, after a 30-year rule, Sudan's former President Omar al-Bashir was removed from power following a popular uprising.⁵⁶¹ In August 2019, a civilian-led transitional government was established – made up of a Sovereign Council whose military, civilian, and armed group representatives served as a collective head of state, a civilian Prime Minister as head of government, and a Council of Ministers.⁵⁶² Throughout 2021, Sudan continued to face rising political tensions and growing protests between different elements of the transition.⁵⁶³ On October 25, 2021, a military takeover led by Lieutenant General Abdel Fattah Al Burhan brought an end to the civilian-led transitional government.⁵⁶⁴

Since the October 2021 military takeover, protests have continued throughout Sudan.⁵⁶⁵ Hundreds have reportedly been arrested, including activists, passersby, and journalists; while some of these individuals have subsequently been released, new arrests continue.⁵⁶⁶ Security forces have reportedly used excessive force and violence, including live ammunition and tear gas

⁵⁶¹ Sudan Complex Crisis-Overview, Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS), Aug. 3, 2021, available at: <https://www.acaps.org/country/sudan/crisis/complex-crisis> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁶² Sudan Complex Crisis-Overview, ACAPS, Aug. 3, 2021, available at: <https://www.acaps.org/country/sudan/crisis/complex-crisis> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁶³ The Forces for the Declaration of Freedom and Change, or FDFC, is the main coalition of opposition groups that has been stepping up calls for the military to hand leadership over to civilians in the government. It is comprised of various anti-al-Bashir political parties, professional movements and opposition groups. It has also called for restructuring the military and security agencies and ensure that al-Bashir loyalists are removed from these agencies, and to absorb the various opposition armed groups into Sudan's security agencies. *See* Samy Magdy and Lee Keath, EXPLAINER: How months of tensions led to Sudan's coup, AP News, Oct. 26, 2021, available at: <https://apnews.com/article/explaining-what-led-to-sudan-coup-8e3609d1f573b6dd0383ed7a09f0d4aa> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁶⁴ Miriam Berger and Sammy Westfall, Sudan's military has taken over, Here's what to know about who's charge, The Washington Post, last updated Oct. 26, 2021, available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2021/10/25/sudan-coup-military-takeover-why-who/> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁶⁵ Sudanese forces shoot 14 in deadliest day since military coup, The Guardian, Nov. 17, 2021, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/17/sudanese-forces-shoot-dead-at-least-14-protesters-against-coup> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁶⁶ Sudanese forces shoot 14 in deadliest day since military coup, The Guardian, Nov. 17, 2021, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/17/sudanese-forces-shoot-dead-at-least-14-protesters-against-coup> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

on protestors.⁵⁶⁷ In addition to the arrests, by November 17, 2021, a reported 38 protestors had been killed with hundreds more injured by security forces.⁵⁶⁸

Following the military takeover, in November 2021, military leadership reinstated Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in an attempt to quell the protests. However, “[p]rotests continued even after Mr. Hamdok had returned to office, with some demonstrators saying that his reinstatement was helping to legitimize the military takeover.”⁵⁶⁹ With violence against civilian protestors continuing, Prime Minister Hamdok resigned on January 2, 2022.⁵⁷⁰ The U.S. government sanctioned the Central Reserve Police, a militarized police unit, for serious human rights abuse under [E.O. 13818](#) on March 21, 2022.

Armed Conflict and Civil Unrest

In 2020, the civilian-led transitional government signed a peace agreement—the Juba Peace Agreement⁵⁷¹—with various opposition groups, including groups from Darfur and the “Two Areas” (South Kordofan and Blue Nile) regions of Sudan.⁵⁷² However, one Darfuri opposition group which did not sign this peace agreement; the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement, led by Abdul Wahid (SLA/AW), continues to be engaged in clashes with government forces, including with the Sudanese Armed Forces.⁵⁷³

In January 2021, UNOCHA reported that instability, including intercommunal tensions, remained in several parts of the country.⁵⁷⁴ In July 2021, the Secretary General for the UN asserted that the primary security concern in Sudan remains “the increasing frequency of

⁵⁶⁷ Michael Atit, Sudan Journalists Protest Media Crackdown Since Coup, Voice of America, Nov. 17, 2021, available at: <https://www.voanews.com/a/sudan-journalists-protest-media-crackdown-since-coup/6317029.html> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022). See also U.S. Department of Treasury, Press Releases: Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Central Reserve Police for Serious Human Rights Abuse, March 21, 2022, available at: <https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0668> (last visited Apr. 5, 2022).

⁵⁶⁸ Sudanese forces shoot 14 in deadliest day since military coup, The Guardian, Nov. 17, 2021, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/17/sudanese-forces-shoot-dead-at-least-14-protesters-against-coup> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁶⁹ Sudan coup: Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok resigns after mass protests, BBC.com, Jan. 3, 2022, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-59855246> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁷⁰ Yassir Abdullah, Nima Elbagir, and Hamdi Alkhshali, Sudanese Prime Minister's resignation triggered by military renegeing on deal, sources say, CNN, Jan. 4, 2022, available at: <https://www.cnn.com/2022/01/03/africa/sudan-pm-resignation-details-intl/index.html> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁷¹ 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, U.S. Department of State, Mar. 30, 2021, pg. 2, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sudan/> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁷² 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, U.S. Department of State, Mar. 30, 2021, pg. 1, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sudan/> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁷³ Durable Solutions & Baseline Analysis for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan; Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding for the displacement-affected communities in Nertiti locality, Central Darfur, UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Aug. 2021, pg. 14, available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/88361> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁷⁴ Sudan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2021, UNOCHA, Jan. 2021, pg. 12, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2045900/SDN_2021HRP.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

intercommunal violence.”⁵⁷⁵ Additionally, the withdrawal of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in June 2021⁵⁷⁶ has “left a security and programmatic vacuum, which has yet to be filled by the transitional government or state-level authorities.”⁵⁷⁷

i. Civil Unrest in Darfur

In July 2021, the UN reported that intercommunal violence has increased in frequency and scale over the past year, in particular, in West, North and South Darfur.⁵⁷⁸ Since 2019, West Darfur has seen an escalation of intercommunal violence between two key ethnic groups in their region — the “Arab armed groups and [the] Masalit [Darfuri ethnic group].”⁵⁷⁹ An escalation of violence in April 2021 reportedly resulted in 144 people killed and 232 injured. Heavy weapons were reportedly used, and homes, a hospital, a UN compound, and a camp for internally displaced persons were destroyed or damaged. Also, “a power plant—the only source of electricity in El Geneina—was damaged, resulting in a critical disruption to most of the town’s communication facilities, in addition to electricity and water supplies in some areas.”⁵⁸⁰ A few months later, in July 2021, UNOCHA reported that “around 500 armed men attacked [a town] leaving more than 60 people dead, ...and another 60 injured.”⁵⁸¹

Central Darfur is also considered a hotspot for violent clashes due to the strong presence of the SLA/AW in this area, and throughout the Jebel Marra mountains.⁵⁸² Widespread insecurity and regular clashes between SLA/AW forces and the SAF has resulted in counter retaliation attacks and reported attacks on civilians for collaborating with either of the forces.⁵⁸³ In September

⁵⁷⁵ Review of the situation in Darfur—Report of the Secretary General, UN Security Council, Jul. 31, 2021, pg. 4, available at: <https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2021/696> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁷⁶ Withdrawal of Hybrid Peacekeeping Operation in Darfur Completed by 30 June Deadline, Under-Secretary-General Tells Security Council, Outlining Plans to Liquidate Assets, UN News, Jul. 27, 2021, available at: <https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14587.doc.htm> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁷⁷ Review of the situation in Darfur and benchmarks to assess the measures on Darfur; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/696], UN Security Council, Jul. 2021, pg. 4, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2058498/S_2021_696_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁷⁸ Review of the situation in Darfur and benchmarks to assess the measures on Darfur; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/696], UN Security Council, Jul. 2021, pg. 4 (footnote 9 and 10), available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2058498/S_2021_696_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁷⁹ Durable Solutions & Baseline Analysis for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan; Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding for the displacement-affected communities in Jebel Moon Locality, West Darfur, UNHCR, Aug. 2021, pg. 15, available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/88361> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁸⁰ Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/470], UN Security Council, May 17, 2021, pg. 5-6, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2052225/S_2021_470_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁸¹ Sudan: Escalation of Violence in Darfur—Flash Update No. 2, UNOCHA, Jul. 27, 2020, pg. 1, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2035090/Situation+Report++Sudan++23+Jul+2020+%284%29.pdf> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁸² Durable Solutions & Baseline Analysis for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan; Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding for the displacement-affected communities in Nertiti locality, Central Darfur, UNHCR, Aug. 2021, pg. 14, available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/88361> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁸³ Durable Solutions & Baseline Analysis for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan; Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding for the displacement-affected communities in

2021, the UN reported on continued fighting between SLA/AW and government forces in Central Darfur,⁵⁸⁴ including on May 18, when a clash reportedly resulted in the displacement of 1,284 people.⁵⁸⁵

In South Darfur, fighting in May 2020 over land grazing rights between an indigenous group, the Fellata/Fallata, and the Rizeigat reportedly resulted in the death of 30 civilians.⁵⁸⁶ In January 2021, deadly clashes between these groups resumed, reportedly leaving 60 dead and 40 wounded.⁵⁸⁷ In July 2021, intercommunal violence persisted between the Fallata and Ta'isha tribes, reportedly leaving 48 dead and displacing 185 people.⁵⁸⁸

Similar intercommunal tensions in East Darfur are rooted in a long history of tensions, “conflict between the Rizeigat (pastoralists) and Ma'aliya (sedentary farmers) and Rizeigat (pastoralists) against Misseriya (pastoralists).”⁵⁸⁹ These legacy disputes are “driven by control of land, tribal leadership and wider political power plus access to pasture and water.”⁵⁹⁰

ii. Civil Unrest in Other Regions

The security situation in the Two Areas remains tense.⁵⁹¹ In 2017, the main opposition group in this region—the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army-North (SPLM/A-N)—splintered into two factions, resulting in several months of violence between the two groups.⁵⁹² Both groups were reportedly also involved in area fighting between Arab nomads and Nuban farmers

Nertiti locality, Central Darfur, UNHCR, Aug. 2021, pg. 14, available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/88361> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁸⁴ Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, UN Security Council, Sept. 1, 2021, pg. 4, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2059931/S_2021_766_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁸⁵ Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, UN Security Council, Sept. 1, 2021, pg. 4, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2059931/S_2021_766_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁸⁶ 30 people killed in intercommunal violence in South Darfur, Reliefweb, May 6, 2020, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/30-people-killed-intercommunal-violence-south-darfur> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁸⁷ Samy Magdy, Tribal clashes leave dozens dead in 2 Sudanese provinces, Associated Press, Jan. 18, 2021, reported by abcNEWS, available at: <https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/sudanese-bury-victims-darfur-violence-death-toll-129-75322312> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁸⁸ Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, UN Security Council, Sept. 1, 2021, pg. 4, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2059931/S_2021_766_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁸⁹ Durable Solutions & Baseline Analysis for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan; Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding for the displacement-affected communities in Assalaya, Yassin and Sheiria localities, East Darfur, UNHCR, Aug. 2021 pg. 15, available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/88361> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁹⁰ Durable Solutions & Baseline Analysis for the UN Peacebuilding Fund and the Durable Solutions Working Group in Sudan; Key obstacles to durable solutions and peacebuilding for the displacement-affected communities in Assalaya, Yassin and Sheiria localities, East Darfur, UNHCR, Aug. 2021 pg. 15, available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/88361> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁹¹ Sudan: Country Report; The situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile—An Update (3rd edition with addendum), Asylum Research Centre, Mar. 2021, pg. 20, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2045013/Final_01.03.2021.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁹² A Question of Leadership: Addressing a Dangerous Crisis in Sudan SPLM-N, Enough, Jul. 2017, pg. 2, available at: <https://enoughproject.org/reports/a-question-of-leadership> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

in which a dozen or more people were killed.⁵⁹³ Similar “deadly clashes”⁵⁹⁴ in the region included security forces who joined and aligned with civilian fighting along ethnic lines.⁵⁹⁵

In January 2019, Sudan's Eastern State (the “Red Sea State”), also saw renewed inter-communal violence between the main Arab and non-Arab ethnic groups in the region.⁵⁹⁶ In September 2021, the UN assessed that the “security situation in the eastern Red Sea State remained volatile.”⁵⁹⁷

In the Abyei region disputed between Sudan and South Sudan, the UN reported that the security situation remained tense with renewed intercommunal violence between the two main ethnic groups in the region—the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka communities.⁵⁹⁸ In April 2021, the UN reported that the “general security situation in the Abyei Area has been relatively calm, yet tense and unpredictable.”⁵⁹⁹ The “most prevalent threats to security were shooting incidents, the increased presence of unidentified armed groups, armed attacks on civilians and violent confrontations between the communities.”⁶⁰⁰ As of March 2022, more than 50,000 people have been displaced due to hostilities in Abyei.⁶⁰¹

Humanitarian Crisis

Sudan also continues “to suffer from one of the world's largest protracted humanitarian crises” due to conflict and displacement, deteriorating economic conditions, limited access to basic

⁵⁹³ 2020 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, U.S. Department of State, Mar. 30, 2021, pg. 9, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2020-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sudan/> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁹⁴ Sudan: Country Report; The situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile—An Update (3rd edition with addendum), Asylum Research Centre, Mar. 2021, pg. 22, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2045013/Final_01.03.2021.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁹⁵ Situation of human rights in the Sudan Report of the Independent Expert on the situation of human rights in the Sudan, UN Human Rights Council, Jul. 30, 2020, pg. 13, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/report-independent-expert-situation-human-rights-sudan-ahrc4553-enar> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022); Sudan: Country Report; The situation in South Kordofan and Blue Nile—An Update (3rd edition with addendum), Asylum Research Centre, Mar. 2021, pg. 22-23, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2045013/Final_01.03.2021.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁹⁶ 2019 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Sudan, U.S. Department of State, Mar. 30, 2020, pg. 9, available at: <https://www.state.gov/reports/2019-country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/sudan/> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁹⁷ Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan, UN Security Council, Sept. 1, 2021, pg. 5, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2059931/S_2021_766_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁹⁸ The situation in Abyei; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2020/1019], UN Security Council, Oct. 15, 2020, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2039488/S_2020_1019_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁵⁹⁹ The situation in Abyei; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/383], UN Security Council, Apr. 20, 2021, pg. 2, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/situation-abyei-report-secretary-general-s2021383-enar> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁰⁰ The situation in Abyei; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/383], UN Security Council, Apr. 20, 2021, pg. 2, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/situation-abyei-report-secretary-general-s2021383-enar> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁰¹ Abyei Clashes Flash Update No. 2—As of 09 March 2022, OCHA, Mar. 9, 2022, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/south-sudan/abyei-clashes-flash-update-no-2-09-march-2022> (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).

services, and several disease outbreaks, including the COVID-19 pandemic.⁶⁰² Since 2018, Sudan has also faced severe economic challenges.⁶⁰³ National poverty levels have risen drastically,⁶⁰⁴ and incomes, wages, and purchasing power have fallen, “driving 9.6 million people—almost a quarter of the entire population of Sudan—to severe food insecurity.”⁶⁰⁵ This economic crisis has reportedly “degraded the already weak, underdeveloped and heavily underfunded primary healthcare system,” including by the end of 2020, reducing the number of healthcare facilities by 40 percent across the country.⁶⁰⁶ The COVID-19 pandemic has further “compounded the already dire public health situation.”⁶⁰⁷

During the rainy season in 2020, flooding affected “close to 900,000 people across the country and farmland, livestock, shelter and other infrastructure.”⁶⁰⁸ Other areas suffered droughts.⁶⁰⁹ Many of the flood areas have very limited access to clean water.⁶¹⁰ Water supply sources have been affected by overflow of the Blue Nile River destroying nearby latrines, resulting in increased risk of water contamination and the outbreak of waterborne diseases.⁶¹¹ The health situation in Sudan has continued to deteriorate due to flooding causing “stagnant and contaminated water.”⁶¹²

Sudan's worsening economy and protracted health emergencies have resulted in an increase in the number of people without access to basic health services.⁶¹³ Sudan has experienced disease outbreaks including cholera, malaria, dengue, chikungunya, viral hemorrhagic fevers and

⁶⁰² Sudan Humanitarian impact of multiple protracted crises, ACAPS, Nov. 24, 2021, pg. 2, available at: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20201124_acaps_briefing_note_sudan_impact_of_multiple_crises.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁰³ Sudan Economic Crisis, ACAPS, Feb. 2019, pg. 1, available at: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20190213_acaps_briefing_note_sudan_economic_crisis.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁰⁴ Child Protection Annual Report 2020, UN Children's Fund (UNICEF), Mar. 2021, pg. 6, available at: <https://www.unicef.org/sudan/media/6091/file/Child%20Protection%20.pdf> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁰⁵ Child Protection Annual Report 2020, UNICEF, Mar. 2021, pg. 6, available at: <https://www.unicef.org/sudan/media/6091/file/Child%20Protection%20.pdf> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁰⁶ Child Protection Annual Report 2020, UNICEF, Mar. 2021, pg. 6, available at: <https://www.unicef.org/sudan/media/6091/file/Child%20Protection%20.pdf> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁰⁷ Child Protection Annual Report 2020, UNICEF, Mar. 2021, pg. 6, available at: <https://www.unicef.org/sudan/media/6091/file/Child%20Protection%20.pdf> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁰⁸ Sudan: Humanitarian Response Plan 2021, UNOCHA, Feb. 21, 2021, pg. 12, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-response-plan-2021-january-2021-enar> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁰⁹ The situation in Abyei; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/383], UN Security Council, Apr. 20, 2021, pg. 5, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/document/2050368.html> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶¹⁰ Sudan: Floods—Operation Update—Emergency Appeal, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Mar. 25, 2021, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-floods-operation-update-emergency-appeal-n-mdrsd028-24-march-2021> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶¹¹ Sudan: Floods—Operation Update—Emergency Appeal, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Mar. 25, 2021, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-floods-operation-update-emergency-appeal-n-mdrsd028-24-march-2021> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶¹² Sudan: Floods—Operation Update—Emergency Appeal, International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Mar. 25, 2021, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-floods-operation-update-emergency-appeal-n-mdrsd028-24-march-2021> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶¹³ Sudan Situation Report, 31 May 2021, UNOCHA, May 31, 2021, pg. 46, available at: <https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2055652/Situation+Report+-+Sudan+-+12+May+2021.pdf> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

polio.⁶¹⁴ In 2020 alone, thirteen out of Sudan's eighteen states experienced one or more outbreaks of chikungunya, dengue fever, rift valley fever or diphtheria.⁶¹⁵ The COVID-19 pandemic has “further strained the capacity of the health care system due to nationwide lockdowns, re-allocation of health resources, and disruption of global supply chains that impacted availability of medicines and medical supplies.”⁶¹⁶

According to UNOCHA, in Sudan, “[w]omen and girls suffer the most due to insecurity, violations of basic human rights, low economic status, lack of livelihood opportunities, and lack of community awareness on women's rights.”⁶¹⁷ UNICEF has also noted that “[c]hildren throughout Sudan are already bearing the brunt of decades of conflict, chronic underdevelopment and poor governance,⁶¹⁸ with 64 percent of children below 14 years of age experiencing various forms of violence.”⁶¹⁹

According to UNOCHA, “Sudan has seen an increase in the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance from 5.8 million people in 2016 to 13.4 million in 2021.”⁶²⁰ It is estimated that among the 13.4 million people in need,⁶²¹ 9.8 million are severely food insecure.⁶²² Yet, access to humanitarian assistance is uncertain. In 2021, the Assessments Capacities Project reported that armed opposition groups in some areas created “barriers to the delivery of humanitarian aid.”⁶²³ Intercommunal clashes in other areas have also affected humanitarian operations.⁶²⁴ The UNAMID drawdown and closure has also resulted in increased looting and impacted “people's ability to move and reach needed aid.”⁶²⁵ In July 2021, the UN

⁶¹⁴ Sudan: Humanitarian Response Plan, UNOCHA, Feb. 21, 2021, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-response-plan-2021-january-2021-enar> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶¹⁵ Sudan Health Annual Report 2020, UNICEF, pg. 5, available at: <https://www.unicef.org/sudan/media/6141/file/Health.pdf> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶¹⁶ Sudan: Humanitarian Response Plan, UNOCHA, Feb. 21, 2021, pg. 46, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-response-plan-2021-january-2021-enar> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶¹⁷ Sudan: Humanitarian Response Plan, UNOCHA, Feb. 21, 2021, pg. 60, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-response-plan-2021-january-2021-enar> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶¹⁸ Children killed, injured, detained and abused amid escalating violence and unrest in Sudan, UNICEF, Jun. 11, 2019, available at: <https://www.unicef.org/press-releases/children-killed-injured-detained-and-abused-amid-escalating-violence-and-unrest> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶¹⁹ Child Protection Annual Report 2020, UNICEF, Mar. 2021, pg. 7, available at: https://www.unicefusa.org/about/publications/annual-report-2020?gclid=EAAtQobChMI9p2M0uD39AIVMv7jBx3c2gHbEAYASAAEgKHN_D_BwE (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶²⁰ Sudan: Humanitarian Response Plan, UNOCHA, Feb. 21, 2021, pg. 10, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-humanitarian-response-plan-2021-january-2021-enar> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶²¹ Sudan Key Figures, UNOCHA, available at: <https://m.reliefweb.int/country/220/sdn> (last visited on Nov. 23, 2021).

⁶²² Sudan Situation Report, UNOCHA, Sep. 27, 2021, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/sudan/sudan-situation-report-29-sep-2021> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶²³ Humanitarian Access Overview, ACAPS, Jul. 2021, pg. 12, available at: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210719_acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_july_2021.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶²⁴ Humanitarian Access Overview, ACAPS, Jul. 2021, pg. 12, available at: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210719_acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_july_2021.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶²⁵ Humanitarian Access Overview, ACAPS, Jul. 2021, pg. 12, available at: https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210719_acaps_humanitarian_access_overview_july_2021.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

reported that “since January 2021, 11 of the 14 UNAMID team sites, which have been handed over to civilian authorities, have been looted.”⁶²⁶

Ukraine

On April 19, 2022, Secretary Alejandro N. Mayorkas announced via *Federal Register* notice (FRN) the designation of Ukraine for TPS, effective April 19, 2022, through October 19, 2023.⁶²⁷

The information below describing the reasons for Ukraine’s TPS designation has been excerpted from the April 19, 2022 FRN that announced the designation.

DHS has reviewed country conditions in Ukraine. Based on this review, and in consultation with DOS, the Secretary has determined that an 18-month designation is warranted due to ongoing armed conflict and extraordinary and temporary conditions described below.

Overview

On February 24, 2022, Russia massively expanded its unprovoked military invasion of Ukraine, marking the largest conventional military action in Europe since World War II.⁶²⁸ There is widespread fear and flight of Ukrainian nationals as Russia's forces have continued to engage in significant, sustained bombardment of major cities across the country, including attacks on Ukraine's capital, Kyiv.⁶²⁹ This ongoing armed conflict poses a serious threat to the safety of nationals returning to Ukraine. Extraordinary and temporary conditions, including destroyed infrastructure, scarce resources, and lack of access to healthcare, prevent Ukrainian nationals from returning to their homeland in safety.

Ongoing Armed Conflict and Human Rights Abuses

Russia's expanded military invasion of Ukraine has placed civilians at significant risk of physical harm throughout the country.⁶³⁰ As of late March 2022, Russia's forces have engaged in sustained shelling campaigns of cities and towns across Ukraine that have harmed, killed, and

⁶²⁶ Review of the situation in Darfur and benchmarks to assess the measures on Darfur; Report of the Secretary-General [S/2021/696], UN Security Council, Jul. 2021, pg. 4, available at: https://www.ecoi.net/en/file/local/2058498/S_2021_696_E.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶²⁷ See 87 FR 23211 (April 19, 2022) (18-month designation of Ukraine for TPS through October 19, 2023).

⁶²⁸ “Russia invades Ukraine on multiple fronts in ‘brutal act of war,’” *PBS*, Feb. 24, 2022, available at: <https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/russia-invades-ukraine-on-multiple-fronts-in-brutal-act-of-war> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022); Natalia Zinets and Aleksandar Vasovic, “Missiles rain down around Ukraine,” *Reuters*, Feb. 24, 2022, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putin-orders-military-operations-ukraine-demands-kyiv-forces-surrender-2022-02-24/> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶²⁹ Ukraine: Humanitarian Impact Situation Report No. 1, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Feb. 26, 2022, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-impact-situation-report-no-1-500-pm-26-february-2022> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶³⁰ *Press briefing notes on Ukraine*, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner Human Rights, Mar. 1, 2022, available at: <https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/putins-nuclear-move-could-make-situation-much-much-more-dangerous-us-official-2022-02-27/> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

injured civilians and struck hospitals, schools, and apartment buildings, resulting in at least 3,039 reported civilian casualties according to the UN, with more casualties expected.⁶³¹

Artillery attacks and air strikes by Russia's military forces have become regular occurrences in Kyiv and other cities across Ukraine since the start of the February 2022 invasion.⁶³² Aerial bombardments in and around major cities have been reported as Russia's forces continue to target critical infrastructure.⁶³³ Russia's ground forces have been advancing on four primary axes: From Belarus in the North; from Russia in the Northeast; from the Russia-controlled Donbas region in the East; and Russia-occupied Crimea in the South.

The scale of attacks harming infrastructure in the city of Kharkiv, where a historic opera house, concert hall, and government building in the city's center were destroyed, has dramatically increased, resulting in numerous civilian casualties.⁶³⁴ In the city of Mariupol, Russia's forces have shelled the city, killing civilians with strikes on homes, schools, hospitals and shelters, while preventing pathways for humanitarian aid and civilian evacuation.⁶³⁵ Residents of the city “have described a freezing hellscape riddled with dead bodies and destroyed buildings” where thousands “are cut off from the world in the besieged city.”⁶³⁶ The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in The Hague has stated that “there is a reasonable basis to believe that both alleged war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed in Ukraine” during the past eight years, so his Office is proceeding with active investigations, and that its investigations will “encompass any new alleged crimes falling within the jurisdiction of [the] Office” that are committed in Ukraine.⁶³⁷ Based on information currently available, the U.S.

⁶³¹ “Ukraine: UN chief calls for safe passage from conflict zones, rights body records 1,123 civilian casualties, WHO outlines health concerns,” UN News, Mar. 6, 2022, available at: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113372> (last visited Mar. 8, 2022); *War Crimes by Russia's Forces in Ukraine, Press Statement*, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, Mar. 23, 2022, available at: <https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-by-russias-forces-in-ukraine/> (last visited Mar. 25, 2022); UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Ukraine: civilian casualty update 29 March 2022”, Mar. 29, 2022, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/news/2022/03/ukraine-civilian-casualty-update-29-march-2022> (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).

⁶³² “Fear, darkness and newborn babies: Inside Ukraine's underground shelters,” *The Guardian*, Feb. 26, 2022, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/26/fear-darkness-and-newborn-babies-inside-ukraine-underground-shelters> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶³³ “Russia's invasion of Ukraine in maps—latest updates”, *Financial Times*, Mar. 1, 2022, available at: <https://www.ft.com/content/4351d5b0-0888-4b47-9368-6bc4dfbccbf5> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶³⁴ *Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment*, The Institute for the study of War, p. 1 & p. 5, Feb. 28, 2022, available at: https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Russian%20Operations%20Assessments%20Feb28_1.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022); “Ukraine conflict: Russia bombs Kharkiv's Freedom Square and opera house”, *BBC*, Mar. 1, 2022, available at: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60567162> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶³⁵ “What is happening in Mariupol, the Ukrainian city under Russian siege?” *The Washington Post*, Mar. 21, 2022, available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/21/ukraine-mariupol-seige-russia-faq/> (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).

⁶³⁶ “What is happening in Mariupol, the Ukrainian city under Russian siege?” *The Washington Post*, Mar. 21, 2022, available at: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/03/21/ukraine-mariupol-seige-russia-faq/> (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).

⁶³⁷ *Statement of ICC Prosecutor, Karim A.A. Khan QC, on the Situation in Ukraine: ‘I have decided to proceed with opening an investigation.’*, International Criminal Court, Feb. 28, 2022, available at: <https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=20220228-prosecutor-statement-ukraine> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

government has assessed that members of Russia's forces have committed war crimes in Ukraine.⁶³⁸

Ongoing human rights abuses in the Donbas region and in Russia-occupied Crimea demonstrate the risk to Ukraine's territories under control by Russia's forces and Russia's proxies. In 2014, armed groups began seizing government buildings and territory across the eastern Donbas region bordering Russia.⁶³⁹ UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) indicated that torture, sexual violence, beatings, asphyxiation, electrocution, deprivation, isolation, and threats were used to extract confessions or information, and force cooperation during the 2014 hostilities.⁶⁴⁰ Under a local occupation authority installed by the Russian government, the human rights situation in Crimea deteriorated precipitously, with reports of “members of Crimean Tatar community and their supporters, including journalists, bloggers, activists, and others being subjected to harassment, intimidation, threats, intrusive and unlawful searches of their homes, physical attacks, and enforced disappearances.”⁶⁴¹

Humanitarian Situation

The unprovoked war Russia has brought against Ukraine “continues to result in civilian deaths and generate further population displacement, damage civilian infrastructure, and exacerbate humanitarian needs across the country.”⁶⁴² After eight years of on ongoing conflict with Russia, 2.9 million people in Ukraine were “projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2022, the majority of whom, some 54 percent, are women and girls.”⁶⁴³ Older persons are among the most affected, as “[t]hirty percent of people in need of humanitarian assistance are older than 60 years of age” with women facing particular hardships.⁶⁴⁴ Children and persons with disabilities have faced additional difficulties including access to health care and other services. In particular,

⁶³⁸ *War Crimes by Russia's Forces in Ukraine*, Press Statement, U.S. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken, Mar. 23, 2022, available at: <https://www.state.gov/war-crimes-by-russias-forces-in-ukraine/> (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).

⁶³⁹ “Arbitrary Detention, Torture and Ill-treatment in the Context of Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine 2014-2021”, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), p. 6, 2021, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UkraineArbDefTorture_EN.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁴⁰ “Arbitrary Detention, Torture and Ill-treatment in the Context of Armed Conflict in Eastern Ukraine 2014-2021,” Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), p. 2-3, 2021, available at: https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/UA/UkraineArbDefTorture_EN.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022); see also, *Amnesty International Report 2021/22: State of the World's Human Rights*, Amnesty International, pg. 375, 2021, available at: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/English.pdf> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁴¹ *Crimea: Persecution of Crimean Tatars Intensifies*, Human Rights Watch, Nov. 14, 2017, available at: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/11/14/crimea-persecution-crimean-tatars-intensifies> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁴² *Ukraine—Complex Emergency*, U.S. Agency for International Development, Mar. 25, 2022, available at: https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2022-03-25_USG_Ukraine_Complex_Emergency_Fact_Sheet_S.pdf (last visited Apr.12, 2022).

⁶⁴³ *2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine*, UNOCHA, pg. 4, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁴⁴ *2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine*, UNOCHA, pg. 6, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

“[m]any older persons with disabilities do not have an official disability certificate, which does not allow them to receive a disability allowance from the Government of Ukraine.”⁶⁴⁵

Destruction of Infrastructure and Scarce Resources

Since 2014, the armed conflict in the Donbas region has caused significant damage to systems and services in the affected areas, impacting transport and road infrastructure, energy, and water, with over 200,000 people living in areas now cut off from essential services and local markets.⁶⁴⁶ Attacks harming infrastructure in the region have also affected access to essential services such as health care, transportation, utilities, and education. Prior to the 2022 invasion, UNOCHA estimated that approximately 1 million children would be impacted by the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region and that 380,000 of them would need assistance and protection.⁶⁴⁷ More than 750 educational facilities have been damaged during the conflict⁶⁴⁸ and “over 250,000 children living near the contact line regularly experience shelling and exposure to landmines and explosive remnants of war, which has made them more prone to physical injuries and mental health issues”.⁶⁴⁹

Ukraine faced problems of aging infrastructure before the February 2022 invasion, which this invasion has exacerbated.⁶⁵⁰ Since February 24, significant infrastructural damage in Ukraine from Russia's air strikes has “left hundreds of thousands of people without electricity or water, while bridges and roads damaged by shelling have left communities cut off from markets for food and other basic supplies.”⁶⁵¹ Amid air raid sirens, civilians have sought safety underground in subway stations, basements, and bunkers.⁶⁵² Also, on February 27, 2022, Russia's missiles hit

⁶⁴⁵ 2022 *Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine*, UNOCHA, pg. 34, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁴⁶ *Protection Monitoring in 98 communities in the 0-5 km zone from the “contact line,”* UNHCR, Feb. 2021, available at: <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiYzdhZTNjODYtZTFkZS00ODMxLTk5MGEtNDQwNDczOTU4Zjc4IiwidCI6ImUIYzYzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDZlNC04YTBlTY1NDkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOiJh9> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁴⁷ 2022 *Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine*, UNOCHA, pg. 35, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁴⁸ 2022 *Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine*, UNOCHA, pg. 35, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁴⁹ 2022 *Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine*, UNOCHA, p. 35, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁵⁰ *Risk Assessment of the “Voda Donbasu” Water System*, UNICEF, Oct. 2019, available at: <https://www.unicef.org/ukraine/reports/VD-risk-assessment-2019> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁵¹ *Ukraine: Humanitarian Impact, Situation Report No. 01*, OCHA Ukraine, Feb. 26, 2022, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-impact-situation-report-no-1-500-pm-26-february-2022> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁵² “Fear, darkness and newborn babies: Inside Ukraine's underground shelters”, *The Guardian*, Feb. 26, 2022, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/26/fear-darkness-and-newborn-babies-inside-ukraine-underground-shelters> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

a number of targets vital to Ukraine's infrastructure, including an oil facility near Kyiv, a gas pipeline in Kharkiv, and the Zhuliany Airport.⁶⁵³

Food security is a concern in Ukraine with 1.1 million Ukrainian nationals in need of food assistance—more than a third of these being severely and moderately food insecure.⁶⁵⁴ The impact on women has been more pronounced and “all available data show that female-headed households are an estimated 1.3 times more often experiencing food insecurity, compared to the overall population.”⁶⁵⁵ In February 2022, UNOCHA estimated that 2.5 million Ukrainian nationals were in need of water, sanitation and hygiene assistance.⁶⁵⁶ Those without access to alternative water sources have been most heavily impacted.⁶⁵⁷

Lack of Access to Healthcare

Shortly after Russia began this offensive in 2022, UNOCHA reported that in Ukraine, the “most pressing humanitarian needs are emergency medical services, critical medicines, health supplies and equipment, safe water for drinking and hygiene, and shelter and protection for those displaced from their home.”⁶⁵⁸ The need for humanitarian health care is high, and approximately 1.52 million Ukrainian nationals are in need of health care assistance.⁶⁵⁹

Challenges within Ukraine's health care system have been exacerbated by the massive expansion of armed conflict amidst a pandemic.⁶⁶⁰ Strikes hitting medical facilities have resulted in injuries and deaths, including among health care workers, and have resulted in critical shortages of medical supplies in some areas.⁶⁶¹ Kyiv city authorities reported over 80 babies were born in

⁶⁵³ *Russia hits Ukrainian oil and gas facilities in wave of attacks*, Al Jazeera, Feb. 27, 2022, available at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/27/russia-ukraine-oil-gas-fuel-airport-attacks> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁵⁴ *2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine*, UNOCHA, pg. 79, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁵⁵ *2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine*, UNOCHA, pg. 51, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁵⁶ *2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine*, UNOCHA, pg. 73, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁵⁷ *2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine*, UNOCHA, pg. 39, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁵⁸ *Ukraine: Humanitarian Impact, Situation Report No. 01*, OCHA Ukraine, Feb. 26, 2022, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/ukraine-humanitarian-impact-situation-report-no-1-500-pm-26-february-2022> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁵⁹ *2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine*, UNOCHA, pg. 87, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁶⁰ *Impact of Health Reform on the Primary Healthcare Level in Conflict-Affected Areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts*, Médicos del Mundo, June 2021, available at: <https://reliefweb.int/report/ukraine/impact-healthcare-reform-primary-healthcare-level-conflict-affected-areas-donetsk-and> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁶¹ *Emergency in Ukraine: External Situation Report #3*, World Health Organization, Mar. 17, 2022, available at: <https://www.who.int/publications/i/item/WHO-EURO-2022-5152-44915-63936> (last visited Mar. 25, 2022).

bomb shelters in the first two nights.⁶⁶² The COVID-19 pandemic already put significant strain on Ukraine's health care system by stretching its limited capacity.⁶⁶³ In February 2022, Ukraine experienced its worst wave of COVID-19 cases thus far, bringing the total number of cases over five million and the number of deaths topping 100,000.⁶⁶⁴ Hospitals have struggled with the volume of COVID cases and Ukraine has one of the lowest vaccination rates in Europe.⁶⁶⁵

Displacement

Prior to Russia's full-scale military invasion into Ukraine on February 24, 2022, a large number of Ukrainian citizens had already been internally displaced by the Russia-backed conflict in the Donbas region and Russia's occupation of Crimea since 2014.⁶⁶⁶ As of March 5, 2021, well before the onset of the 2022 invasion by Russia, the Ukrainian Ministry of Social Policy had already registered 1,461,770 individuals as IDPs.⁶⁶⁷ Among these nearly 1.5 million IDPs, 195,320 were children, 724,786 were elderly and 51,478 were persons with disabilities.⁶⁶⁸ Moreover, life in Ukraine for many IDPs was dire with an estimated 300,000 IDPs having been identified as in need of livelihood assistance and food assistance for the year 2022, even before the beginning of Russia's offensive in February.⁶⁶⁹

The newly intensified and widespread conflict has caused more than four million people to flee Ukraine for Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, and beyond.⁶⁷⁰ The UN notes that “women and girls face higher risks of human rights violations and sexual exploitation and abuse, including transactional sex, survival sex and conflict-related sexual violence.”⁶⁷¹

⁶⁶² “Fear, darkness and newborn babies: Inside Ukraine's underground shelters”, *The Guardian*, Feb. 26, 2022, available at: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/26/fear-darkness-and-newborn-babies-inside-ukraine-underground-shelters> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁶³ “We are devoted to this work because the health and lives of people are at stake”, United Nations Office of the High Commissioner Human Rights, Aug. 16, 2022, available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Ukraine-and-COVID-19.aspx> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁶⁴ WHO Health Emergency Dashboard, WHO (COVID-19) Homepage—Ukraine, WHO, available at: <https://covid19.who.int/region/euro/country/ua> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁶⁵ WHO Health Emergency Dashboard, WHO (COVID-19) Homepage—Ukraine, WHO, available at: <https://covid19.who.int/region/euro/country/ua> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁶⁶ 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine, UNOCHA, pg. 34, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁶⁷ 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine, UNOCHA, pg. 34, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁶⁸ *Registration of Internal Displacement*, UNHCR, Mar. 5, 2021, available at: <https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiY2RhMmExMjgtZWRIbS00YjcwLWl0MzktNmEwNDkwYzdmYTMOiiwidCI6ImUIYzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBlTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOiJh9> (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁶⁹ 2022 Humanitarian Needs Overview—Ukraine, UNOCHA, pg. 34, Feb. 11, 2022, available at: https://www.humanitarianresponse.info/sites/www.humanitarianresponse.info/files/documents/files/ukraine_2022_hno_eng_2022-02-11.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2022).

⁶⁷⁰ Operational Data Portal, UNHCR, Mar. 30, 2022, available at: <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine> (last visited Mar. 31, 2022).

⁶⁷¹ *Rapid Gender Analysis of Ukraine: Secondary data review*, UNHCR, Mar. 29, 2022, <https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/91723> (last visited Apr. 4, 2022).

Section 4.6 Terminations Under INA § 244(b)(3)(B)

The Secretary did not terminate the TPS designations of any foreign states, or parts thereof, in CY 2022. See discussion below on DHS's compliance with court orders that relate to certain TPS termination decisions made by a former Secretary or a former Acting Secretary in previous years.

Section 4.7 Preliminary Injunction Orders and Order to Stay Proceedings

This section provides details about TPS actions announced by DHS in CY 2022, to ensure continued compliance with the preliminary injunction orders of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in *Ramos, et al. v. Nielsen, et al.*, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018) and the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York in *Saget, et al., v. Trump, et al.*, No. 18-cv-1599 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 2019), and with the order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to stay proceedings in *Bhattarai v. Nielsen*, No. 19-cv-00731 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2019).

Preliminary injunction order in *Ramos v. Nielsen*

In its October 3, 2018, order the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California enjoined DHS from implementing or enforcing the determinations to terminate TPS for El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Sudan pending resolution of the case on the merits.⁶⁷² As a result, DHS may not effectuate the termination of TPS for these countries while the order remains in effect. The order also requires DHS to continue the validity of documentation showing lawful status and work authorization for affected, eligible TPS beneficiaries from those countries. DHS has published six FRNs, on October 31, 2018,⁶⁷³ March 1, 2019,⁶⁷⁴ November 4, 2019,⁶⁷⁵ December 9, 2020,⁶⁷⁶ September 10, 2021,⁶⁷⁷ and November 16, 2022,⁶⁷⁸ to ensure DHS' compliance with the court's order. On September 16, 2021, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit vacated the *Ramos* preliminary injunction. *Ramos, et al., v. Nielsen, et al.*, No. 18-16981(9th Cir., Sept. 14, 2020). The plaintiffs filed a request seeking *en banc* review of the panel's decision, and on February 16, 2021, the Ninth Circuit stayed plaintiffs' request for rehearing *en banc* for a 60-day period. The stay was extended while the case was placed in mediation. The parties were unable to reach a settlement through mediation and on October 26, 2022, the case was returned to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, effectively lifting the stay on plaintiffs' request for a rehearing *en banc*. To date, the Ninth Circuit has not ruled on

⁶⁷² *Ramos v. Nielsen*, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018).

⁶⁷³ See 83 FR 54764 (October 31, 2018) (compliance with the preliminary injunction order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in *Ramos v. Nielsen*, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018)).

⁶⁷⁴ See 84 FR 7103 (March 1, 2019) (compliance with the preliminary injunction order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in *Ramos v. Nielsen*, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018)).

⁶⁷⁵ See 84 FR 59403 (November 4, 2019) (compliance with the preliminary injunction order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in *Ramos v. Nielsen*, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018)).

⁶⁷⁶ See 85 FR 79208 (December 9, 2020) (compliance with the preliminary injunction order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in *Ramos v. Nielsen*, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018)).

⁶⁷⁷ 86 FR 50725 (Sept. 10, 2021).

⁶⁷⁸ See 87 FR 68717 (November 16, 2022) (compliance with the preliminary injunction order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in *Ramos v. Nielsen*, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018)).

plaintiffs' request for a hearing *en banc*. The district court's preliminary injunction remained in effect throughout CY 2022, as did the *Bhattarai* court order discussed below.

Preliminary injunction order in *Saget v. Trump*

On April 11, 2019, in *Saget*, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York enjoined the termination of TPS for Haiti, pending a final decision on the merits of the case. However, the *Saget* case was dismissed upon the court's approval of the parties' joint Stipulation of Dismissal for mootness following the Secretary's new 18-month designation of Haiti for TPS on August 3, 2021, and DHS' continuation of existing beneficiaries' TPS and related documentation under the *Ramos* injunction through December 31, 2022.

The court order in *Bhattarai v. Nielsen*

On May 1, 2019, DHS announced actions to ensure compliance with the order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to stay proceedings in *Bhattarai*.⁶⁷⁹ The claims raised in *Bhattarai* are similar to, and will be impacted by, the resolution of the claims being litigated in *Ramos v. Nielsen, et al.*, No. 18-16981(9th Cir. September 14, 2020). For that reason, DHS stipulated that it will not implement or enforce the decision to terminate TPS for Honduras or Nepal⁶⁸⁰ pending the resolution of the *Ramos* appeal, or by other order of the court. Beneficiaries under the TPS designations for Honduras and Nepal will retain their TPS, provided that a noncitizen's TPS is not withdrawn because of ineligibility.

Continued compliance with the court orders

DHS complied with the various court orders described above by publishing appropriate FRNs that continue TPS for eligible beneficiaries and continue their TPS-related employment authorization and status documentation while the litigation proceeds. Since October 31, 2018, DHS has published seven FRNs to ensure its compliance with the court orders:

- 83 FR 54764 (October 31, 2018) (compliance with the preliminary injunction order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in *Ramos v. Nielsen*, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. October 3, 2018)).
- 84 FR 7103 (March 1, 2019) (compliance with the preliminary injunction order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California in *Ramos v. Nielsen*, No. 18-cv-01554 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2018)).
- 84 FR 20647 (May 10, 2019) (compliance with the order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to stay proceedings in *Bhattarai v. Nielsen*, No. 19-cv-00731 (N.D. Cal. March 12, 2019)).

⁶⁷⁹ See 84 FR 20647 (May 10, 2019) (compliance with the order of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California to stay proceedings in *Bhattarai v. Nielsen*, No. 19-cv-00731 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 12, 2019)). The *Federal Register* notices published on November 4, 2019, December 9, 2020, and September 10, 2021 also addressed the continuation of TPS and TPS-related documentation for eligible beneficiaries of TPS for Nepal. See 84 FR 59403 (November 4, 2019); 85 FR 79208 (December 9, 2020).

⁶⁸⁰ See Termination of the Designation of Nepal for Temporary Protected Status, 83 FR 23705 (May 22, 2018); Termination of the Designation of Honduras for Temporary Protected Status, 83 FR 26074 (June 5, 2018).

- 84 FR 59403 (November 4, 2019) (combined FRN to ensure compliance with the court orders in *Ramos*, *Bhattarai* and *Saget*).
- 85 FR 79208 (December 9, 2020) (combined FRN to ensure compliance with the preliminary injunction order in *Ramos*, as well as the *Bhattarai* and *Saget* orders).
- 86 FR 50725 (September 10, 2021) (combined FRN to ensure compliance with the preliminary injunction order in *Ramos*, as well as the *Bhattarai* and *Saget* orders).
- 87 FR 68717 (November 16, 2022) (combined FRN to ensure compliance with the preliminary injunction order in *Ramos*, as well as the *Bhattarai* order).

In its November 16, 2022, FRN cited above, DHS announced measures to continue its compliance with all of the relevant court orders in *Ramos* and *Bhattarai*.⁶⁸¹ Beneficiaries under the TPS designations for El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Nepal, Nicaragua, and Sudan will retain their TPS while the various court orders that cover each country remain in effect, provided that a noncitizen's TPS is not withdrawn because of individual ineligibility. The FRN automatically extends TPS and TPS-related documentation, such as the Form I-766 Employment Authorization Document, through June 30, 2024, for affected beneficiaries who maintain their individual TPS eligibility. As needed, DHS will publish future FRNs to continue its compliance with the court orders.

⁶⁸¹ See 87 FR 68717 (November 16, 2022) (combined FRN to ensure compliance with the preliminary injunction orders in *Ramos* and *Bhattarai*).

Appendix A – Immigration Status Codes⁶⁸²

Code	Description	Code	Description
1B1	H-1B1 SPECIALTY OCCUPATION	AS	ASYLUM APPLICANT
1B2	H-1B2 DoD SPECIALTY OCCUPATION	AS1	PRIMARY ASYLEE
1B3	H-1B3 FASHION MODEL	AS2	SPOUSE OF ASYLEE
A1	AMBASSADOR/DIPLOMAT/PUBLIC MINISTER/ CONSULAR OFFICER (OR IMMEDIATE FAMILY)	AS3	CHILD OF ASYLEE
A12	CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS A11 (UNMARRIED SON OR DAUGHTER OF U.S. CITIZEN BORN IN CAMBODIA, KOREA, LAOS, THAILAND, OR VIETNAM)	AS6	ASYLEE, ADJUSTMENT
A17	CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS A16 (UNMARRIED SON OR DAUGHTER OF U.S. CITIZEN BORN IN CAMBODIA, KOREA, LAOS, THAILAND, OR VIETNAM)	AS7	SPOUSE OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS AS6
A2	OTHER DIPLOMATIC OFFICIAL (OR IMMEDIATE FAMILY)	AS8	CHILD OF ASYLEE, ADJUSTMENT
A3	ATTENDANT/SERVANT/PERSONAL EMPLOYEE OF A1 OR A2 (OR IMMEDIATE FAMILY)	ASD	ASYLUM DENIED
AA3	AA-3, CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS AA1 OR AA6 (AA1, NATIVE OF CERTAIN ADVERSELY AFFECTED FOREIGN STATES (DIVERSITY TRANSITION))	ASR	ASYLUM STATUS REVOKED
AA6	NATIVE OF CERTAIN ADVERSELY AFFECTED FOREIGN STATES (DIVERSITY TRANSITION)	ASY	IMMIGRANT VISA – ASYLUM
AA8	CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS AA1 OR AA6.	AY1	LEGALIZATION APPLICANT, AYUDA CLASS MEMBER, WITH EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION
ABD	ABANDONMENT RESIDENCY	B1	TEMP VISITOR FOR BUSINESS

⁶⁸² This reference chart of Immigration Status Codes includes both current codes and previously used historical codes, which are reflected in this document, Section 3.2: *Number and Prior Immigration Status of TPS Beneficiaries During CY 2021*. The data in CLAIMS, which USCIS reviewed to compile this TPS CY 2022 Congressional Report, contains references to both current and historical data codes.

Code	Description	Code	Description
B11	B1-1, SELF-PETITION UNMARRIED SON/DAUGHTER OF U.S. CITIZEN	B29	B2-9, SELF-PETITION UNMARRIED SON/DAUGHTER OF LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT
B16	B1-6, SELF-PETITION UNMARRIED SON/DAUGHTER OF U.S. CITIZEN	B31	B3-1, SELF-PETITION MARRIED SON/DAUGHTER OF U.S. CITIZENS
B1A	NONIMMIGRANT VISA – TEMPORARY VISITORS FOR BUSINESS	B33	B3-3, CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS B31
B1B	NONIMMIGRANT DOMESTIC SERVANT OF U.S. CITIZEN	B36	B3-2, SELF PETITION MARRIED SON/DAUGHTER OF U.S. CITIZENS
B2	TEMP VISITOR FOR TRAVEL	BCD	DENIED BORDER CROSSING CARD (I-586)
B21	B2-1, SELF-PETITION SPOUSE OF A LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT	C1	NONCITIZEN IN TRANSIT THROUGH U.S.
B22	B2-2, SELF-PETITION CHILD OF LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT	C2	ALIEN IN TRANSIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS HEADQUARTERS DISTRICT UNDER SECTION 11 (3), (4), OR (5) OF THE HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED NATIONS
B23	CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS B21, B22, B26, OR B27	C21	C2-1, SPOUSE OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (SUBJECT TO COUNTRY LIMITATIONS) - CONDITIONAL
B24	B2-4, SELF-PETITION UNMARRIED SON/DAUGHTER OF LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT	C22	C2-2, STEP-CHILD (UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE) OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (SUBJECT TO COUNTRY LIMITATIONS) - CONDITIONAL
B25	B2-5, CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS B24 OR B29	C26	SAME AS C21 SPOUSE OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (SUBJECT TO COUNTRY LIMITATIONS) - CONDITIONAL
B26	B2-6, SELF-PETITION SPOUSE OF LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT	C27	C2-7, STEP-CHILD (UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE) OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (SUBJECT TO COUNTRY LIMITATIONS)

Code	Description	Code	Description
C3	FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL, MEMBERS OF IMMEDIATE FAMILY, ATTENDANT, SERVANT, OR PERSONAL EMPLOYEE, IN TRANSIT	CR1	SPOUSE OF U.S. CITIZEN – CONDITIONAL
C33	C3-3, CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS C31 – CONDITIONAL (C31, MARRIED SON OR DAUGHTER WHO IS A STEP-CHILD OF A U.S. (NOV. 10, 1986) CITIZEN – CONDITIONAL)	CR2	STEPCHILD OF U.S. CITIZEN – CONDITIONAL
C4	NONIMMIGRANT VISA – TRANSIT WITHOUT VISA (TWOV)	CR6	SPOUSE OF U.S. CITIZEN – CONDITIONAL
C57	SPOUSE OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS C51 OR C56 (NOT IN TARGETED AREA) – CONDITIONAL (C51, EMPLOYMENT CREATION IMMIGRANT (NOT IN TARGETED AREA) - CONDITIONAL	CR7	STEPCHILD OF U.S. CITIZEN – CONDITIONAL
CF1	ALIEN WHOSE RECORD OF AMISSION IS CREATED UPON THE CONCLUSION OF A VALID MARRIAGE CONTRACT AFTER ENTERING AS A FIANCEE OR FIANCEE OF A U.S. CITIZEN - CONDITIONAL	CS2	LEGALIZATION APPLICANT, CATHOLIC SOCIAL SERVICES CLASS MEMBER, WITH NO EMPLOYMENT AUTHORIZATION
CF2	MINOR STEP-CHILDREN OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED CF-1 – CONDITIONAL	CU6	CUBAN REFUGEE
CH	PAROLEE (HUMANITARIAN/HQ AUTH)	CU7	NON-CUBAN SPOUSE OR CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS A CU6
CP	PAROLEE (PUBLIC INTEREST/HQ AUTH)	CW1	NONIMMIGRANT VISA FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS TRANSITIONAL WORKERS

Code	Description	Code	Description
CW2	DEPENDANT OF CW1	DV6	PRINCIPAL, DIVERSITY IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM, ADJUSTMENT
CX1	CX-1, SPOUSE OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (EXEMPT FROM COUNTRY LIMITATIONS) - CONDITIONAL	DV7	SPOUSE OF PRINCIPAL, DIVERSITY IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM, NEW ARRIVAL
CX2	STEP-CHILD (UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE) OF A RESIDENT ALIEN (EXEMPT FROM COUNTRY LIMINATIONS) - CONDITIONAL	DV8	CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS DV1 OR DV6
CX3	CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS CX2 OR CX7 (EXEMPT FROM COUNTRY LIMITATIONS) - CONDITIONAL	E1	TREATY TRADER/SPOUSE/CHILD
CX6	CX-6, SPOUSE OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (EXEMPT FROM COUNTRY LIMITATION) - CONDITIONAL	E10	CHILD OF A PRIORITY WORKER CLASSIFIED AS E11, E16, E12, E17, E13, or E18
D1	NONCITIZEN CREW DEPART SAME VESSEL	E11	PRIORITY WORKER – ALIEN WITH EXTRAORDINARY ABILITY
DA	ADVANCE PAROLE (DISTRICT AUTH)	E16	ALIEN WITH EXTRAORDINARY ABILITY, ADJUSTMENT
DE	PAROLEE (DEFERRED INSPECTION)	E18	PRIORITY WORKER – CERTAIN MULITNATIONAL EXECUTIVE OR MANAGER
DED	DEFERRED ENFORCED DEPARTURE	E19	SPOUSE OF A PRIORITY WORKER CLASSIFIED AS E11, E16, E12, E17, E13, or E18.
DT	PAROLE GRANTED AT POE OR DIST OFF	E2	TREATY INVESTOR/SPOUSE/CHILD
DT2	SPOUSE OF ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS DT1 OR DT6	E21	PROFESSIONAL HOLDING AN ADVANCED DEGREE OR OF EXCEPTIONAL ABILITY
DV1	PRINCIPAL, DIVERSITY IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM, NEW ARRIVAL	E23	CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED E21 OR E26.
DV2	SPOUSE OF PRINCIPAL, DIVERSITY IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM, NEW ARRIVAL	E26	PROFESSIONAL HOLDING ADVANCED DEGREE, ADJUSTMENT

Code	Description	Code	Description
E27	SPOUSE OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS E21 OR E26.	EB2	EMPLOYMENT-BASED, SECOND PREFERENCE (WORKERS WITH PROFESSIONAL OR ADVANCED DEGREE, ETC.)
E28	CHILD OF ALIEN CLASSIFIED E26 (PROFESSIONAL HOLDING ADVANCED DEGREE), ADJUSTMENT	EB5	FIFTH PREFERENCE EMPLOYMENT CREATION (INVESTORS)
E3	VISA FOR NATIONALS OF AUSTRALIA (LIKE THE E TREATY VISA AND H1B VISA COMBINED) (AUSTRALIAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT)	ENT	ENTER WITHOUT INSPECTION
E30	CHILD OF A SKILLED WORKER OR PROFESSIONAL CLASSIFIED AS E31, E36, E32, OR E37	EW0	CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS EW3 or EW8.
E31	ALIEN WHO IS A SKILLED WORKER	EW8	OTHER WORKER PERFORMING UNSKILLED LABOR, NOT A TEMPORARY OR SEASONAL NATURE FOR WHICH QUALIFIED WORKERS ARE NOT AVAILABLE IN THE U.S.
E34	SPOUSE OF A SKILLED WORKER OR PROFESSIONAL CLASSIFIED AS E31, E36, E32, OR E37	EW9	SPOUSE OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED EW3 OR EW8
E36	ALIEN WHO IS A SKILLED WORKER	EWI	ENTRY WITHOUT INSPECTION
E37	PROFESSIONAL WHO HOLDS A BACCALAUREATE DEGREE OR WHO IS A MEMBER OF A PROFESSION	EXC	EXCLUSION – FORMAL DENIAL OF AN ALIEN’S ENTRY INTO THE U.S. BY AN IMMIGRATION JUDGE AFTER AN EXCLUSION HEARING
E39	SPOUSE OF A SKILLED WORKER OR PROFESSIONAL CLASSIFIED AS E31, E36, E32, OR E37	F1	STUDENT-ACADEMIC
EA0	EMPLOYMENT ADVISORY OPTION	F11	F1-1, UNMARRIED SON OR DAUGHTER OF A U.S. CITIZEN
EB1	EMPLOYMENT-BASED, FIRST PREFERENCE (PRIORITY WORKERS)	F16	F1-6, UNMARRIED SON OR DAUGHTER OF A U.S. CITIZEN

Code	Description	Code	Description
F2	SPOUSE/CHILD OF F1	FUG	FAMILY UNITY PROGRAM, STATUS GRANTED ALLOWING EXTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE
F21	F2-1, SPOUSE OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (SUBJECT TO COUNTRY LIMITATIONS)	FX1	SPOUSE OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (EXEMPT FROM COUNTRY LIMITATIONS)
F22	F2-2, CHILD (UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE) OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (SUBJECT TO COUNTRY LIMITATIONS)	FX2	CHILD (UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE) OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (EXEMPT FROM COUNTRY LIMITATIONS)
F24	F2-4, UNMARRIED SON OR DAUGHTER (21 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER) OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (SUBJECT TO COUNTRY LIMITATIONS)	FX6	SPOUSE OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (EXEMPT FROM COUNTRY LIMITATIONS)
F26	F2-6, SPOUSE OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (SUBJECT TO COUNTRY LIMITATIONS)	FX7	CHILD (UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE) OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (EXEMPT FROM COUNTRY LIMITATIONS)
F27	F2-7, CHILD (UNDER 21 YEARS OF AGE) OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (SUBJECT TO COUNTRY LIMITATIONS)	G1	PRINCIPAL REP RECOGNIZED FOREIGN GOVT/STAFF/IMMED FAMILY
F29	F2-9, UNMARRIED SON OR DAUGHTER (21 YEARS OF AGE OR OLDER) OF A LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN (SUBJECT TO COUNTRY LIMITATIONS)	G2	OTHER REP RECOGNIZED FOREIGN GOVT/ IMMED FAMILY
F31	MARRIED SON OR DAUGHTER OF U.S. CITIZEN, NEW ARRIVAL	G4	OFFICER/EMPLOYEE OF INT'L ORG AND IMMEDIATE FAMILY
F41	F4-1, BROTHER OR SISTER OF A U.S. CITIZEN	G5	ATTENDANT/SERVANT/PERSONAL EMPLOYEE OF G1/G2/G3/G4
F46	F4-6, BROTHER OR SISTER OF U.S. CITIZEN	GB	TEMPORARY VISITOR FOR BUSINESS UNDER GUAM VISA WAIVER PILOT PROGRAM
		GT	TEMPORARY VISITOR FOR PLEASURE UNDER GUAM VISA WAIVER PILOT PROGRAM

Code	Description	Code	Description
H1	SPECIALTY OCCUPATION	IMM	IMMIGRANT (INDEFINITE PAROLE)
H1B	SPECIALTY OCCUPATION	IN	INDEFINITE PAROLE
H2	TEMP WORKER FOR SERVICES NOT AGRICULTURE SERVICES UNAVAIL IN U.S.	IR1	SPOUSE OF U.S. CITIZEN, NEW ARRIVAL
H2A	TEMP WORKER FOR AGRICULTURE SERVICES UNAVAIL IN U.S.	IR2	CHILD OF A U.S. CITIZEN
H2B	TEMP WORKER FOR SERVICES NOT AGRICULTURE UNAVAIL IN U.S.	IR5	PARENT OF A U.S. CITIZEN, ADJUSTMENT
H3	TEMPORARY TRAINEE	IR6	SPOUSE OF U.S. CITIZEN, ADJUSTMENT
H3A	TRAINEE	IR7	CHILD OF A U.S. CITIZEN, ADJUSTMENT
H3B	SPECIAL EDUCATION TRAINING	IR7	CHILD OF U.S. CITIZEN, ADJUSTMENT
H4	SPOUSE/CHILD OF H1/H1B/H2/H2A/H2B/H3	IW1	WIDOW OR WIDOWER OF A U.S. CITIZEN
HA6	HAITIAN ADJUSTED LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT	IW6	WIDOW OR WIDOWER OR A U.S. CITIZEN, ADJUSTMENT
HB6	HAITIAN ADJUSTED LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT	J1	EXCHANGE VISITOR
I	FOREIGN PRESS (AND SPOUSE/CHILD)	J1S	VARIATION OF J1 NONIMMIGRANT STATUS (EXCHANGE VISITOR)
I1	REPRESENTATIVE OF FOREIGN INFORMATION MEDIA, SPOUSE AND CHILDRE	J2	SPOUSE/CHILD OF J1
IB0	BATTRED OR ABUSED PARENTS OF U.S. CITIZENS	K1	NONCITIZEN FIANC(E) OF USC
IB1	IB-1, SELF-PETITION SPOUSE OF U.S. CITIZEN	K2	CHILD OF K1
IB2	SELF-PETITION CHILD OF U.S. CITIZEN	K3	SPOUSE OF USC
IB5	BATTRED OR ABUSED PARENTS OF U.S. CITIZEN	K4	CHILD OF K3
IB6	IB-6, SELF-PETITION SPOUSE OF U.S. CITIZEN	L1	INTRA-COMPANY TRANSFEREE
IJ	REFERRED TO THE IMMIGRATION COURTS BY THE INS (E.G., ASYLUM APPLICANT)	L2	SPOUSE OF L1

Code	Description	Code	Description
M1	STUDENT-VOCATIONAL/NON-ACAD	O1M	NATIVE OF CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES (NONQUOTA)
M2	SPOUSE OR CHILD OF M1	O2	INDIVIDUAL WHO WILL ACCOMPANY AN O-1 ARTIST OR ATHLETE TO ASSIST IN A SPECIFIC EVENT OR PERFORMANCE
M83	REFUGEE-ESCAPEE PREVIOUSLY ADMITTED FOR LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS	O3	SPOUSE/CHILD OF O1, O2
N1	PRINCIPAL PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF MEMBER STATE OF NATO	OAR	AFGHAN GRANTED PAROLE UNDER OPERATION ALLIES REFUGE
NP1	IMMIGRANT WHO DOES NOT QUALIFY FOR ANY OF THE SIX FAMILY OR EMPLOYMENT PREFERENCES (NON-PREFERENCE)	OP	OVERSEAS PAROLEE
O1	EXTRA ABILITY SCIENCES/ARTS/EDUCATION/BUSINESS/ATHLETICS	P1	INTERNATIONALLY RECOGNIZED ATHLETE/ENTERTAINER
O1A	INDIVIDUAL WITH AN EXTRAORDINARY ABILITY IN THE SCIENCES, EDUCATION, BUSINESS, OR ATHLETICS (NOT INCLUDING THE ARTS, MOTIONS PICTURES OR TELEVISION INDUSTRY)	P1A	ALIEN WITH ATHLETIC EVENT
O1A	INDIVIDUAL WITH AN EXTRAORDINARY ABILITY IN THE SCIENCES, EDUCATION, BUSINESS, OR ATHLETICS (NOT INCLUDING THE ARTS, MOTIONS PICTURES OR TELEVISION INDUSTRY)	P1B	ALIEN WITH ENTERTAINMENT GROUP
O1B	INDIVIDUAL WITH AN EXTRAORDINARY ABILITY IN THE ARTS OR EXTRAORDINARY ACHIEVEMENT IN MOTION PICTURE OR TELEVISION INDUSTRY	P1S	SUPPORT PERSON OF P1 (P1, PERSON WHO LOST CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE (FORMERLY P1) (NONQUOTA) - NOT CURRENTLY IN USE)

Code	Description	Code	Description
P2	INDIVIDUAL PERFORMER OR PART OF A GROUP ENTERING TO PERFORM UNDER A RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM	Q3	DEPENDENTS OF IRISH PPCT PROGRAM OR CHILD OF NONCITIZEN CLASS Q-1 (Q1M)
P3	CULTURALLY UNIQUE PROGRAM ARTIST/ENTERTAINER	R1	RELIGIOUS WORKER
P3S	VARIATION OF P-3 NONIMMIGRANT VISA STATUS (ARTISTIC OR ENTERTAINER COMING TO PERFORM OR TEACH)	R2	SPOUSE/CHILD OF R1
P4	SPOUSE OR CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS P3	R86	REFUGEE PAROLED INTO THE U.S. PRIOR TO APRIL 1, 1980
P63	CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS P61 OR P66 - NOT CURRENTLY IN USE (P61, NEEDED SKILLED OR UNSKILLED WORKER (SIXTH PREFERENCE) - NOT CURRENTLY IN USE; P66, SAME AS P61 - NOT CURRENTLY IN USE NEEDED SKILLED OR UNSKILLED WORKER (SIXTH PREFERENCE)	RE	REFUGEE
PAR	PAROLEE	RE1	REFUGEE WHO ENTERED THE U.S. ON OR AFTER APRIL 1, 1980.
PWA	PRESENT WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION, A TERM USED BY IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT TO INDICATE ALIENS WHO ENTERED WITHOUT INSPECTION (EWI) OR VIOLATED THE TERMS OF THEIR STATUS	RE3	CHILD OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS RE1 (CHILD ENTERED THE U.S. ON OR AFTER APRIL 1, 1980)
Q1	NONIMMIGRANT VISA – INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM PARTICIPANT	RE4	OTHER MEMBERS OF THE CASE REGARDING AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS RE1 (ENTERED THE U.S. ON OR AFTER APRIL 1, 1980).

Code	Description	Code	Description
RE5	REFUGEE – HAITI	T21	SPOUSE OF LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT ALIEN, CONDITIONAL STATUS DENIED OR REOPENED
RE6	REFUGEE WHO ENTERED THE U.S. ON OR AFTER APRIL 1, 1980	T3	1ST PREF CHILD OF NONCITIZEN CL T1
REF	REFUGEE	T4	PARENT OF A T1 - NOT CURRENTLY IN USE
REM	REMOVAL – ALIEN WHO FALLS INTO DISTRESS OR WHO NEED PUBLIC AID AND HAS BEEN VOLUNTARILY REMOVED FROM THE U.S.	T41	MARRIED STEP-CHILD OF U.S. CITIZEN, CONDITIONAL STATUS DENIED OR REOPENED
S1	SPECIAL AGRICULTURAL WORKER	T5	UNMARRIED UNDER 18 SIBLG T1
S9	EMERGENCY FARM WORKER TO PERFORM AGRICULTURAL SERVICES OR LABOR OF A TEMPORARY OR SEASONAL NATURE WHEN SERVICES ARE UNAVAILABLE IN THE U.S. AND WILL NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS OF U.S. WORKERS	T51	EMPLOYMENT CREATION IMMIGRANT (TARGETED AREA) – CONDITIONAL
SL6	JUVENILE COURT DEPENDENT	TC1	SPOUSE OF U.S. CITIZEN, CONDITIONAL STATUS DENIED OR REOPENED
SR1	RELIGIOUS WORKER	TC2	CHILD OF U.S. CITIZEN, CONDITIONAL STATUS DENIED OR REOPENED
SR2	SPOUSE OF AN ALIEN CLASSIFIED AS SR1 OR SR6.	TC6	SPOUSE OF U.S. CITIZEN, CONDITIONAL STATUS DENIED
SR6	RELIGIOUS WORKER, ADJUSTMENT	TD	CANADIAN OR MEXICAN CITIZEN SPOUSE OR CHILD OF TN
ST	STOWAWAY	TPS	TEMPORARY PROTECTED STATUS
T1	NONIMMIGRANT VISA –VICTIM OF SEVERE FORM OF TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS	TR6	SPOUSE OF U.S. CITIZEN, CONDITIONAL STATUS DENIED OR REOPENED
T2	SPOUSE OF AN NONCITIZEN CLASSIFIED AS T1, FIRST PREFERENCE (QUOTA) - NOT CURRENTLY IN USE	TR7	CHILD OF U.S. CITIZEN, CONDITIONAL STATUS DENIED OR REOPENED

Code	Description	Code	Description
TRM	CONDITIONAL RESIDENT STATUS TERMINATED	V3	CHILD OF V1 OR V2
TW1	LEGALIZATION APPLICANT GRANTED TEMPORARY RESIDENT STATUS, ENTERED THE U.S. WITHOUT INSPECTION (EWI) PRIOR TO 1982	W26	ALIEN PREVIOUSLY GRANTED TEMPORARY RESIDENT STATUS (LEGALIZATION) WHO ENTERED THE U.S. AS A NONIMMIGRANT AND OVERSTAYED VISA PRIOR TO JAN. 1, 1982
TW2	LEGALIZATION APPLICANT GRANTED TEMPORARY RESIDENT STATUS, ENTERED THE U.S. AS A NONIMMIGRANT AND OVERSTAYED PRIOR TO 1982	W2D	LEGALIZATION APPLICANT DENIED PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS, ENTERED THE U.S. AS A NONIMMIGRANT AND OVERSTAYED PRIOR TO 1982
TW3	LEGALIZATION APPLICANT GRANTED TEMPORARY RESIDENT STATUS, FROM COUNTRY GRANTED BLANKET EXTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE (EVD)	WB	VISITOR FOR BUSINESS – VISA WAIVER PROGRAM
TWO	TRANSIT WITHOUT A VISA	WD	WITHDRAWAL
U1	VICTIM OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY	WI	WITHOUT INSPECTION
U2	SPOUSE OF U1	WT	TEMP TOURISM VISITOR – VISA WAIVER PROGRAM
U4	PARENT OF U1	X	NON-PREFERENCE QUOTA
UN/UU or UNK	UNKNOWN, OR NOT REPORTED	X11	NON-PREFERENCE QUOTA IMMIGRANT 203(a)(4)
V1	SPOUSE OF LPR AWAITING VISA	Z66	PERSON IN WHOSE CASE RECORD OF ADMISSION FOR PERMANENT RESIDENT STATUS WAS CREATED. MUST HAVE ENTERED ON OR AFTER JUNE 28, 1940 AND PRIOR
V2	CHILD OF LPR AWAITING VISA	ZN	NO DESCRIPTION MULTIPLE CLASSES